The notion of freewill in a human agency, biblically speaking, is the very premise of a fallen humanity. And yet secular humanity, along with its pervasive seed, as that has developed throughout the Christian tradition, would have us believe that being âfree unto ourselves,â from ourselves, is the basis, the component centrum of what it means to be a
genuinely sentient and âaliveâ human person. But, again, this notion is adroitly awry insofar that it is a notion of humanity, and its ostensible clutch of freedom as its raison dâetre, that kicks the living God from the throne only to replace Him with them. The Apostle Paul writes:
What then? Shall we sin because we are not under law but under grace? Certainly not! Do you not know that to whom you present yourselves slaves to obey, you are that oneâs slaves whom you obey, whether of sin leading to death, or of obedience leading to righteousness? But God be thanked that though you were slaves of sin, yet you obeyed from the heart that form of doctrine to which you were delivered. And having been set free from sin, you became slaves of righteousness. I speak in human terms because of the weakness of your flesh. For just as you presented your members as slaves of uncleanness, and of lawlessness leading to more lawlessness, so now present your members as slaves of righteousness for holiness. -Romans 6.15-19
The notion of a human freedom in abstraction from God, while enthralling to imagine for the heart hardened beyond the point of feeling, is in fact what it means to be in bondage. The only way such freedom could be genuinely free is if we constructed and created ourselves for our own self-determined telos (raison dâetre). This could be framed as such: Q. Do humans have freewill? R. No, God has freewill. To think that humans have freewill in abstraction from God would be to think that humans are God. Humans, by birth, think they are God, eo ipso humans think they have freewill. It is because humans are born into a world not of their making that they are subject to the antecedent factors that preceded their ingression into said world. In other words, and again, humans, in order to genuinely be free, with the type of freewill most people just assume they have, would have to be born into a world that wasnât already pre-conditioned to be what it was, even if that involves a disruption with its very being vis-Ă -vis God, that would allow them, the human agent, to be genuinely self-determined and thus free. But Christians (in theological principle) know this isnât the case, and so Barth writes:
It is precisely and only this distinction of the command of God from all other commands, precisely and only its characterisation as permission, which reveals its seriousness and rigour. The command of God is imperative. When it orders us to be free, it orders with authority. And it enforces itself. It secures obedience by itself setting us free. As the divine permission given to us, it is not the confirmation of a permission that we have given ourselves, or obtained or secured elsewhere, although there are, of course, other permissions, just as there are other commands, and in the most intimate connexion with these commands.
We are continually âpermittingâ ourselves all possible things, decisions and attitudes, thoughts and words and works, in which we regard ourselves as free, which we apparently do gladly, in which we think that we are happy. There is none of those other commands which , when it imposes its yoke upon us, has not a way of recommending itself to us. Its fulfillment is perhaps a particular confirmation of our freedom, or it is perhaps bound up for us with a particular desire, or the avoidance of a dislike, so that at bottom we want to do the thing which it would have us do. And so in the fulfilling of these other commands there is, in fact, no human action which is not in some measure bound up with the consciousness, experience and feeling of apparent freedom and joy. âAnd the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desiredâ (Gen 3.6). And so the man permits himself to make use to the permission of his wife, who on her part had accepted it from the serpent. The man said, the woman whom thou gavest to be with me, she gave me of the tree, and I did eat. And the Lord God said unto the woman, What is this that thou has done? And the woman said, The serpent beguiled me, and I did eatâ (Gen. 3.12f [sic]). It is apparently pure permission that rules. The man permits himself to renounce the grace of God. He permits himself to be set up so as one who knows good and evil and therefore as judge over both. He permits himself therefore to be established in the divine likeness. Man obviously thinks that he is particularly free and happy even in his fall.
The permission of the command of God cancels all this, not by opposing His prohibition to a real permission, freedom and joy, but by revealing the truth, by unmasking the supposed permission, freedom and joy as the deception of a strange lor and tyrant, âwho under its semblance has made man a slave. The command of God is the renewed offer of the grace of God that man has repelled. The command of God wants man to be genuinely free. It wants him to make use of the real permission at his disposal, to return to his true freedom, to rejoice not merely in appearance but in truth in what he does. The free will of man has nothing to do with permission, freedom and joy. It is in his free will that he is tricked and tricks himself out of all this, reducing himself to that servile state and service, however free and happy he thinks himself to be. He is then oppressed and tormented by the law of that foreign lord and tyrant, to whom he does not belong, who has not created him, with whom his destiny has nothing to do, who has nothing that he can command him to do and therefore nothing that he can permit him to do, in whose service he can never be free and happy (whatever his consciousness, experiences and feelings may be), in whose service he can only be deceived even in this consciousness. The command of God rends this veil, and it does it by being and expressing the real permission given to man. It is this that it is serious and rigorous, binding and committing us with a seriousness and rigour beyond the power of all other commands. The command of God sets itself against human free will, not because it does not wish man to be really free and happy, but on the contrary, because God does not want this, because he cannot really be free and happy in his self-will. The command of God protests against what man permits himself, or knows how to create or find elsewhere by way of permission. The reason for this protest it that these permissions are really only the disguises of the servitude to which he is subjected. The form which it takes is that, in opposition to the foreign dominion to which he has yielded, it gives him again permission which is really proper and belongs to him.[1]
An underlying implication of Barthâs treatment is a critique of humanityâs incapacity, its inability of self-extrication, in regard to its âborn-status.â This is what I was getting at prior to sharing the above passage from Barth; viz. that humanity is always already born into a pre-conditioned state of affairs, and in our case âfallen,â which does not allow them to be, by definition, âfree.â To be free in Godâs world, which this world is, is to be rightly oriented to Him, and under the conditions He has pre-determined, pre-set, by which said orientation might obtain. As the Christian, de jure, understands, this pre-determination, this pre-condition, in Godâs Kingdom of righting the wrongness of humanityâs âself-permission,â comes only as we submit to His command for the world as that is actualized, and enfleshed, in the vicarious humanity of Jesus Christ. Only Jesusâs humanity is rightly suited for and oriented to God, and this pro nobis (for us). This entails that what it means to be a genuinely free human, under the prior conditions God has Self-determined in triune fellowship, is to be in union with Christ, and thus in participation with the Spirit conceived humanity by which God has decided that humans can come to be genuinely human by, thus experiencing Godâs freedom. In other words, Godâs freedom is the only ontological type of freedom available, and He has freely chosen that we, as His counterpoints of fellowship, as that is realized in the humanity of Christ for us, can come to experience His freedom, and thus be free ourselves, as our lives terminate in koinonial-bond with His.
The point of this whole consideration is this: God is genuinely free; God has freewill. Humans are not born genuinely free because they believe themselves to be God, by nature. Since humans believe themselves to be inherently, or naturally free, they give themselves permission, and as a tautology, this sense of permission-giving makes them feel free. But as Barth has sufficiently shown, this is in fact precisely the point at which humans arenât free, but instead in bondage to a self-possessed self. If human freedom doesnât come from human self-permission, but instead from Godâs free action to bring us into fellowship with Himself through the mediatorial humanity of Jesus Christ, then human freedom outwith the necessary pre-condition of Godâs freedom âfor usâ becomes the very snare by which the Serpentâs word continues to cast humanity into its own self-asserted sense of self-divinity, and thus slavery and death.
The above, while thinking things in rather general terms, can be applied to Christian theology. There is a whole tradition[s] within the Christian history of interpretation that has attempted to argue for a notion of human freewill/freedom that they contend is vouchsafed by a created grace or capacity God has superveniently presented humans with; to have or not to have. And yet even this presupposes an independence inherent to the human agent, a sense of self-permission governed by an independent nature vis-Ă -vis God, that commits such âChristian offeringâ to the snare of the Serpentâs word once again. In other words, positing a notion of so-called âprevenient graceâ as the way out of the type of trap Barth has described for us, doesnât get said proponents off of the hook. Even if God were to offer a prevenient grace, as if a thing to be received or not received, it is this very type of offering that once again commits these people to a notion that humans have some inner independent capacity, and thus its own ontic freedom, to respond to Godâs offering of freedom or not (and so such reasoning dies the death of petitio principii âcircular reasoningâ).
Human freedom is either a correspondence with Godâs freedom, in a one-for-one sense, or it is a mythology, and thus idolatry of the human imagination. It is this because, again, God is God, God is free and we are not; we are not outwith being in relationship with Him, this is what it means to be humanly free. And to be humanly free, thusly, is, by definitional necessity, not something the human agent can bring about, for they are definitionally unfree; to be free requires an extra nos, âoutside of usâ reality to invade our humanity, and turn it out from itself, and thus bring it to look to the actual ground of its freedom as that has always already eternally been the case for Godâs being, as He has freely related as the One and the Three (De Deo uno), the Three and the One (De Deo trino), as the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit of ineffable and immortal bliss.
[1] Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics II/2 §37 [594-5] The Doctrine of God: Study Edition (London: T&T Clark, 2009), 82-3.