The Disincarnate Word as the Christian Doctrine of Predestination

The primacy of Jesus Christ is the doctrine of pre-destination. That is, pre-destination within God’s free life of koinonial love and grace, to be not God without us, but with us; Immanuel. God has freely Self-determined to always already be with us, to be for us, to be in us, to ā€˜be closer to us than we are to ourselves.’ This is the summary of a Christian doctrine of predestination, of election. The focal point, the centraldogma of this elegant doctrina is the eternal Logos, Huios (Son), who cannot be thought of outwith His election to be the elected Son of Man for the world.

Thinking of predestination under these terms, christological and trinitarian terms, reorients this oft divisive doctrine, among the saints, in a way that it becomes an occasion to focus on Jesus once again. As I recall, Jesus taught that the Holy Spirit would speak and confirm Jesus’ words to us; that the Holy Spirit would point us to the Christ all our days and in all our ways. So, if that is the litmus test for knowing whether or not something is a sound doctrine or a false doctrine, then we are on safe ground when we consider this doctrine within Barth’s articulation.

He ā€œis the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of every creature: For by him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible . . . all things were created by him and for him: And he is before all things, and by him all things consistā€ (Col. 1.15f.). It is to be noted that the One of whom all this is said is called ā€œthe head of the body, the churchā€ and the ā€œfirst-born from the deadā€ in v. 18, and that according to v. 20 it can be said of Him, this Ī±į½Ļ„ĻŒĻ‚, that it pleased the Father in Him to reconcile all things to himself, ā€œhaving made peace through the blood of his cross.ā€ But there could obviously be no sense in talking of the blood of the eternal Son of God as such, or of this Son as the firstborn from the dead. The declarations of predestination from v. 15 onwards, cannot, therefore, relate only to the Son of God, to a Ī»ĻŒĪ³ĪæĻ‚ į¼„ĻƒĪ±ĻĪŗĪæĻ‚ [discarnate Word].

But again, the statement in Jn. 1.2: ā€œThe same (οὗτος ἦν) was in the beginning with God,ā€ would be a meaningless repetition of the second statement in Jn. 1.1 if it were not an anticipation of the incarnate Logos attested and declared by John the Baptist in the words: ā€œThis was he (οὗτος ἦν) who coming after me is preferred before me, for he was before meā€ (Ļ€Ļįæ¶Ļ„ĻŒĻ‚ μου ἦν). The result is that we cannot possibly refer abstractly to the eternal Logos either Jn. 1.3: ā€œAll things were made by him; and without him (χωρὶς αὐτοῦ) was not anything made that was made,ā€ or Jn. 1.10: ā€œThe world was made by him.ā€ The event attested in Jn. 1.14 is one to which the whole Prologue looks back. So, then, the whole Prologue (with the possible exception of the first phrase of v. 1)—although it certainly speaks of the eternal Logos—speaks also of the man Jesus. The saying in Jn. 8.58, which reaches back to the Prologue: ā€œBefore Abraham was, I am,ā€ must be understood in the same way. And nothing could be more explicit than the way in which, in Jn. 6.51, ā€œthe living bread which came down from heavenā€ is equated with ā€œmy flesh, which I will give for the life of the world.ā€[1]

Barth’s reference to and development of a Logos asarkos (disincarnate Word) brings with it some knotty stuff within the Barth studies’ world. Suffice it to say: Barth is simply referring to the patristic notion that the Son as the image of God, always already within Himself, within the inner-life and mystery of the triune fellowship, had freely chosen to become human, ever before the foundations of the world (i.e., supralapsarian). This is where we get the Latin phraseology, Logos incarnandus (ā€˜the Word to be incarnate’) and Logos incarnatus (ā€˜the Word incarnate’). Here Barth is appealing to that type of theological thinking about the incarnation vis-Ć -vis God’s eternal life. That is, for Barth (and me) there is no other way to theologically imagine or know God outside of God for us, and always forever to be for us, in and through Jesus Christ, the eternal Logos who is also the Logos ensarkos (the Word enfleshed). As Barth is indicating, it is this image that humanity was originally created and recreated in, in the resurrection and ascension of Jesus Christ. Christ, the firstborn from the dead, who unioned with us before we ever existed so that we might by His gracious life, union with Him by the Holy Spirit, as we came into existence, is the very essence of what a genuinely Christian doctrine of predestination is referring to in Barth’s (and the Apostle Paul’s) theology.

In this way, a doctrine of predestination loses all of its speculative, worrisome baggage, and finds refreshment in the smiling face of the Son of God for us, for the world.

[1] Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/2 §64 [033-4] The Doctrine of Reconciliation: Study Edition (London: T&T Clark, 2010), 31-2.

Barth as a Covenant Theologian Contra the Federal Theologians

Karl Barth is a covenant theologian. But just as with anything, when it comes to Barth, he retexts the older pretexts into new theological contexts as those then are given shape by the pressure of God’s triune life for the world in Jesus Christ. Barth was critical of the early federal or covenant theologians, because he saw the inherent bilateralism present within it in a God-world/human relation. In other words, Barth rightly identified the dualism, or competitive fund between God and humanity, built into the very fabric of the magisterial federal theologians. He was critical of the doctrine of God that would present us with a ā€œGod’s sideā€ in the covenant and an abstract ā€œhumanity’s sideā€ (even if they were the ā€œelect sideā€) in the covenant; indeed, just as that elixir is present within the federal theological frame. Rinse H Reeling Brouwer offers his commentary:

Barth writes ā€˜For the rest you shall enjoy Heppe’ s Locus xiii only with caution. He has left too much room for the leaven of federal theology. It was not good, when theĀ foedus naturaeĀ was also called aĀ foedus operum’. In Barth’ s eyes, the notion of a relationship between God and Adam as two contractual partners in which man promises to fulfil the law and God promises him life eternal in return, is a Pelagian one that should not even be applied to theĀ homo paradisiacus. Therefore,

one has to speak of theĀ foedus naturaeĀ in such a way that one has nothing to be ashamed of when one speaks of theĀ foedus gratiaeĀ later on, and, conversely, that one does not have to go to the historians of religion, but rather in such a way that one can say the same things in a more detailed and powerful way in the new context of theĀ foedus gratiae, which is determined by the contrast between sin and grace. For there isĀ re veraĀ only one covenant, as there is only one God. The fact that Cocceius and his followers could not and would not say this is where we should not follow them – not in the older form, and even less in the modern form.

In this way paragraph ends as it began: the demarcation of sound theology from federal theology in its Cocceian shape is as sharp as it was before. Nevertheless, the attentive reader will notice that the category of the covenant itself is ā€˜rescued’ for Barth’ s own dogmatic thinking.[1]

Even so, as Brouwer presciently notices, Barth doesn’t want to discard the mechanism of covenant, but to retool it; again, under the pressures of a Christological conditioning wherein God’s relationship with humanity/world is grounded in His singular being as the triune God, with the corollary being that His action toward the world in Christ is sheerly based on His unilateral act to both give and receive for us in Jesus Christ. For Barth, God’s covenant with humanity has conditions, but God graciously places the onus of those conditions (of righteousness) on Himself for us (i.e., think Barth’s ā€œJudge judgedā€). As such we, the people, are freely able, by the awakening work of the Holy Spirit, to loving respond to God’s call for us to come unto Him and sup with Him, with the cost laid on His account for us, and not on our account for Him.

[1] Rinse H Reeling Brouwer,Ā Karl Barth and Post-Reformation OrthodoxyĀ (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2015), 112-13.

The Dialectic of In-In Christ and In-Outside Christ

In the Barthian, and I’d say, the Pauline dialectic, it is possible and right to say that someone is in Christ, and possibly, at the same time, outside of Christ. When you die you want to be in-in Christ and not in-outside Christ. And not just when you die, but as you live you want to be in-in Christ and not in-outside Christ. And yet, we are constantly being given over to the death of Christ that the life of Christ might also be made manifest in the mortal members of our bodies.

Herculean Freedom or Divine-Human Freedom at the Crossroads

Human freedom, ā€œfree will,ā€ for theological purposes has always been a deep and abiding riddle for many. Its depths, in regard to understanding it, seems to be akin to the heights of comprehending the inner life and aseity of God; that is to say: human freedom vis-Ć -vis God is quite mysterious and to the depths. But really, this locus only comes to have the mysterious characteristics insofar that is thought of nakedly and speculatively from a purely philosophical and rationalistic vantage point. If the theologian engages in a genuinely theological method, they will come to an understanding of human freedom before God that is fitting to who God is, and fitting to who humans are as creatures created in the imago Dei, imago Christi.

Without attempting to explicate this seeming paradox, for the philosophers anyway, let us read along with Karl Barth as he does the real yeoman’s work, the real theological work of a theological theologian. Here Barth is referring to his continued treatment on a doctrine of Baptism. In his treatment certain themes are present in order for him to make his baptismal doctrine work. Doctrinal themes such as sanctification, human agency, free will, Divine agency, so on and so forth. The reader will notice that Barth uses the pagan philosophical mythological notions of human freedom, provided for by the Hellenic mythologies juxtaposed with his genuinely theological offering in regard to human freedom in a doctrine of baptism and sanctification, in order to amplify his own offering.

Baptism, then, is the twofold answer of man to the divine justification and sanctification, cleansing and renewal, which have taken place for him and been revealed to him in Jesus Christ. It is the corresponding renunciation and pledge. Hence water baptism, not in and for itself, but as a first model which is to be followed throughout the Christian life, is the human decision which follows the divine change effected for man, and which corresponds to the history of Jesus Christ and baptism wit the Holy Ghost. Is it, then, what Hercules did at the cross-roads? Not at all. The decision taken by this profoundly pagan ideal figure, closely resembling in its character as such the decision of Paris between the gifts proffered him by the three goddesses, is a choice between two ways which are both equally open, i.e., between two possibilities. But the decision of the Christian, executed in his baptism as pledge and renunciation, is not a choice between two possibilities available to him. The one reality which he encounters in God’s work in Jesus Christ is that which in his pledge, sanctified and renewed by God for God, he prefers to the way which is now impossible and closed to him as one who is justified by the same work and word of God, so that it can be the object only of his rejection and renunciation. He chooses that which is alone actual and possible, and therewith he rejects eo ipso that which is absolutely impossible in the light of what is alone actual and possible. To the impossible which he rejects and renounces there belongs also and indeed primarily the idea of the pagan liberum arbitrium [free will], which is illusory because it contests the one true reality, and which, as foreseen already in Gen. 3.5, makes man equal to God, the judge between good and evil, a Hercules at the cross-roads. Justified by God before God, man will justify God, accepting the right which God has against and for and to him, not seeking to establish and execute right himself, resolutely rejecting the role of quasi-divine umpire. In the knowledge that God is his righteousness, he finds not merely an admonition and warning against any such enterprise, but also cleansing from even the will or desire for it. Hence the object of his pledge, that which, sanctified by God for God, he affirms, chooses and grasps, cannot be the arbitrary or futile enterprise of self-sanctification for a service which he has sought out himself, which God ahs not required from him, with which he can only affront God. His Yes to his renewal becomes rather his will and desire for the freedom of a witness to the sanctification in which it has pleased God to call sinners, and himself in particular, to the service of His omnipotent mercy, to make them ready and capable in this service, to use them in it, to open for them the forward way beside which there is no other for them. At issue always in the Christian life are this renunciation and pledge which are not at all like the choice of Hercules. They are at issue already at the beginning of this life, in Christian baptism.[1]

In reduction, if it isn’t sinful to reduce, Barth is saying that the ā€œbrute choiceā€ for the Christian for God is non-existent. Indeed, it is non-existent in the very fact that the Christian is for God; and this freedom for God, for the Christian, has first come into existence for the human before God in the human who is truly for God for us, Jesus Christ. It is because of His already No for us that we can now say Yes, in His Yes for us, to the living God. This vicarious representative human action (to riff Bonhoeffer’s language) by Christ for us is in itself what it means to be free for God at the very ground of human agency. This is why Barth so readily does away with anything representing something like a Hercules at the cross-roads, as if there is something deep and inherent within an abstract ā€œnaturalā€ humanity that has the innate autonomous capacity to say Yes to God on its own powers of deliberation and rationales.

For Barth, the inner change for the human being, in what it means to be truly human before God, has already been actualized for humanity in the vicarious humanity of Jesus Christ de jure. This vicarious freedom ā€˜we’ now have for God has already been blazed a trail in the human heart of God in Jesus Christ for us. As the Holy Spirit awakens the human agent to what is already true for what it means to be human, they come to operate out of the capacity already recreated for them in the heart of flesh they have been given in God’s participation for them in the archetypal humanity, the second Adamic humanity of Jesus Christ. As such, the choice has already been made for the Christian, in God’s choice to be the ā€œChristian for them,ā€ in the humanity of Christ. In this space the individual human agent, in correspondence, in relationis with Christ’s first Yes for them, can now likewise, as corollary say Yes and Amen to the ways of God; indeed, as their raison d’etre as creatures and recreatures for God in the resurrection and ascension of Jesus Christ.

I have glossed over many important details in the above paragraph, but alas, that’s all I have the time to offer at the moment.

[1] Karl Barth,Ā Church Dogmatics IV/4 §75 [163] The Doctrine of Reconciliation:Ā Study Edition (London: T&T Clark, 2010), 157–58.

Barth Contra Metaphysics of Causation / God’s Personal Action in Salvation

I don’t think people realize that Barth (Torrance) isn’t attempting to figure out the riddle of individual belief, as if he can identify a causal system that explains it all. He limits Himself to what is revealed in the Theanthropos, the Godman, Jesus Christ. We know why Jesus believes, trusts the Father; and we know that He does so for us in our stead; and so from thence we know that people believe God because of God’s action in humanity, in the Son. Barth isn’t worried about solving the “causation” enigma, per se; at least not by referring to some speculative metaphysics of causation. But this is why people constantly claim that Barth’s theology must reduce to universalism; even though Barth’s theology only really reduces to the freedom of God to be God as God has always already and eternally been, and continues to be.

Barth’s Covenant Theology in Human Action

Barth’s covenant theology entails this: The triune God acts and becomes for the world in Christ, and in His action He creates the space for free human action in correspondence with Christ’s freedom for the Father by the Holy Spirit. It is a unilateral divine action that re-creates the space for their to be a genuinely free and human action in correspondence with God’s action. So, human action in this covenantal schema has never been grounded in an independent autonomous humanity, but only within God’s humanity for the world in Jesus Christ. Union with Christ by the Holy Spirit is where human freedom comes to spark towards God as God gives us, His creatures and re-creatures in Christ’s risen and ascended humanity, a share in His liberum arbitrium (freewill); but in grace and in creaturely correspondence to His. The circle between God and humanity is closed within the humanity of God for the world in Jesus Christ.

Constructively Correcting Calvin’s Doctrine of Assurance: Resourcing Barth and TFT

From the conclusion on my personal chapter for my co-edited/authored book,Ā Evangelical Calvinism: Dogmatics&Devotion: Volume 2.Ā My chapter is entitled: “Assurance is of the Essence of Saving Faith” Calvin, Barth, Torrance, and the ā€œFaith of Christā€.Ā In it I offer a charitable corrective of John Calvin’s doctrine of assurance of salvation (or lack thereof), by resourcing the theologies of Karl Barth and Thomas Torrance, respectively.

What we have come to see is that assurance of salvation, dogmatically understood, is fully grounded in Jesus Christ. From Calvin, to Barth, to Torrance, union with Christ and the vicarious humanity of Christ provides the foundation for how to understand assurance of salvation and how it should be framed; that the faith of Christ for us is the only real saving faith, as such elect people can only participate from that faith for them. It is this reality, as we have seen, that allows the seeker (of assurance) to realize that indeed assurance is of the essence of faith; precisely because faith is a reality that comes from God in Christ and not individual human beings. We also came to see, particularly in Barth and Torrance, that election and reprobation should be understood to be fully concentrated in the vicarious humanity of Christ. Again, what this does is to evacuate the question of whether or not Jesus died for me, and instead allows all of humanity to keep their eyes fully on Jesus because Jesus, in this frame, died for all of humanity. As a result, any space that could allow for anxiety has been erased, and Jesus is understood to be the one that stands in the gap between God and all of humanity in his vicarious humanity. We have come to see that from this vantage point assurance is the essence of saving faith because to think salvation is to fully think Jesus and not ourselves. Assurance for the Evangelical Calvinist, then, is of the essence of saving faith because it is not an individual’s faith that saves them, but instead it is the vicarious faith of Jesus Christ. We look to Christ, then, and no one else, not even ourselves; particularly when we think things salvation. Jesus Christ is assurance.

 

The 20th Century Swiss Evangelical Church in Concert with the 21st Century North American Evangelical Church

A Church in Basel, Switzerland

As an evangelical (at least that’s my pedigree from birth), here in the 21st century, things have become rather dire, in my opinion, with reference to finding sound so-called ā€œevangelical churches.ā€ This is no abstract thing for me, but an ongoing reality. We have literally been churchless for quite a while now (we watch a home church of ours back in Southern California online every Sunday morning, which isn’t ultimately sufficient; as far as real life in-person fellowship etc.) We have tried multitudes of ā€œevangelical churches,ā€ and not to be reductionistic, they are all almost exactly the same. They still have 1990s seeker sensitive programs ongoing—with 21st century technology—and/or personality cult driven pastorates that only stay viable until said pastor dies or retires (which such pastors rarely do). But the actuality of Christ is really nowhere to be found; in name only. Bibles are nowhere present, not in the hands of the people (some of that is tech related, but not really, I don’t think), and the sermons mostly mimic bad Ted Talks. The worship/music part of it appears to be something more like American Idol tryouts than it does actual leadership to worship of the triune God. Beyond that, and based on a relatively recent poll of evangelicals, most don’t even believe that or know if Jesus Christ is fully God. The sound doctrinal body of teaching is lacking to the point that it is non-existent; which then that vacuum only leaves room for bad doctrine. This is a lamentable thing.

And yet the aforementioned, unfortunately, isn’t unique to the 21st century evangelicals. Here is Karl Barth discussing his own experience of the ā€œchurchā€ in his early to middle 20th century context in his native Switzerland:

It hardly needs to be said that we are dealing here with a point of view which has been most flagrantly neglected in modern Protestantism since the 18th century. From the visible standpoint our Protestant national Churches are little more than great unions, or communities of interest, of individuals who are Christian or are called Christian, individualists, each of whom—like the people of Israel in the time of the Judges—does that which is right in his own eyes, so that although some may act together in particular ecclesiolae [churches] called movements, we cannot inquire too closely what it really is that unites them. Even less can we inquire what these Churches are as a whole, a question which would yield the most gratuitous and to a large extent unconvincing answers. If we will and can and must maintain the form revealed in them, then we can only sigh: Kyrie eleison. Destroying as they do the relationship between the community and its members, they are hopelessly a-catholic Churches, hardly distinguishable, if at all, from heretical sects, or sects which verge on heresy, in the matter which now concerns us.

The most obvious example is the 1911 Constitution of the Evangelical Reformed Church of the City of Basel. It begins with a kind of hymnal introit to which a conscientious exegete could hardly give any but an Arian sense . . ..[1]

What is the common identifiable theme that holds Barth’s early to middle Evangelical Reformed church together with the North American evangelical church of today? Embedded in the passage from, where he notes, ā€œIt hardly needs to be said that we are dealing here with a point of view which has been most flagrantly neglected in modern Protestantism since the 18th century. . ..ā€ It is the Enlightenment tentacles, and its anthropology of turn-to-the-subject that has helped to tie the whole modern and postmodern churches together (there are other factors, as well). A spirituality where individualism reigns prime, romanticist feelings cajole the heart-strings, and personal interest sublimates the interests of the living God. Kyrie eleison indeed!

Are there exceptions? Always. In fact, we are looking for an exception currently; so please keep that in prayer if you would. Note: I am not implying or presuming that we are looking for a ā€œperfect church.ā€ Nein. We are simply looking for the church in its local expression. An environ wherein the church is being the Church by genuinely bearing witness to her reality in Jesus Christ and the triune God.

I am remaining charitable in my language throughout this post. The so-called evangelical church has already gone right by the impasse, and she doesn’t even realize it. She indeed functions as a series of social clubs with the name of Jesus Christ splattered all over her programs and multimedia presentations. Good intentions, and smiles are not enough to gloss over the tragedy of it all. Only repentance, as if ancient Israel before God, will do. Kyrie eleison.

[1] Karl Barth,Ā Church Dogmatics IV/1 §62 [521–22] The Doctrine of Reconciliation: Study Edition (London: T&T Clark, 2010), 195.

PS. I also work on call 24/7 which makes “church shopping” that much more difficult. But I know we will eventually find something.

Divine and Human Agency Betwixt a Doctrine of Sanctification

Human agency, a Theanthropology will be a central piece of development in treating a doctrine of Sanctification in the theologies of Barth and TFT, respectively. Without genuine human agency, human freedom before God, even as that is somehow unilaterally grounded by God’s Self-freedom, it isn’t really meaningful to think of a Christian doctrine of sanctification. That is, because agency without real human freedom only reduces the human to metaphysical abstractions acting out an automated history already done for them absolutely by God. But in reality, if thought well, both accounts of agency, Divine and human, must and can be thought together—hypostatically so.

On Barth’s Affirmation of Anselm’s ‘Proof of God’ and Rejection of A Natural Theology

Being oppositional to natural theology is a hallmark of Karl Barth’s theological posture. His primary rejection of a natural theology isn’t a result of his socio-politico atmosphere in the Reich of Germany per se; even though it has application towards the type of Nationalistic Socialism that characterized Adolf Hitler’s vision of the golden age of Germany. Barth rejected natural theology for theological reasons; i.e., theological-anthropological reasons. He maintained a radical commitment to the reformational notion of the total depravity of humanity; albeit, in an Athanasian key. This commitment is best illustrated by his collegial correspondences, and even debates with Catholic German theologian, Erich Przywara. Przywara, was a modern advocate, and constructive builder, indeed, a retriever of the classical Thomistic analogia entis (ā€˜analogy of being’). Przywara ultimately argued from something like a capaciousness left in fallen humanity, as if a residual spark continued to burn within the intellect; which when perfected by grace, even preveniently or objectively so, would allow fallen human beings to build an intellectual cathedral wherein its spire might reach into the heavens and touch the feet of God. But of course, this was a speculative measure by which human beings reason by a series of negations from their finite beings to its primary and first cause in the infinite being, the unmoved mover, who is, in the Przywaran frame, the God of Jesus Christ. Barth retorted to such machination with a loud Nein, such that the canton church bells in Basel were made to ring out.

Barth offered his own reading on thinking God. This has been identified by such theologians as Eberhard Juengal et al. as the analogia fidei -/relationis (analogy of faith -/relation). Barth contended that there was such a qualitative disjunction between God and humanity that outwith God’s invasion, His descending into the fallen world, outwith His assumptio carnis (assumption of flesh) it would be nigh impossible for human beings to begin to even imagine the living and triune God; let alone ā€˜know’ this God. What was required in Barth’s estimation was that God enter into the garb of our humanity, by becoming human Himself in Jesus Christ, and to do so unto the point of death; even death on the cross. Barth maintains that it was only this type of the dissolution of fallen humanity, and then via its resurrection in the resurrection of Jesus Christ, that humanity by the Holy Spirit, in union with Christ’s humanity (spiritually), might come to have a correspondence of faith, with Christ’s faith, through Christ’s relationship to humanity mediated through His humanity, and in turn, through His human nature in inseparable relationship with the divine Logos, who is the ground of Christ’s singular person, that humanity could ever have a center in God to rightly know God by.

With the aforementioned noted, Anthony Feneuil offers a helpful reading on how Barth engaged with Anselm’s so-called ā€˜ontological proof’ for the existence of God. As Feneuil shows, Barth could affirm Anselm’s proof without collapsing it into something like the analogia entis presented by Przywara et al. So, how could Barth affirm a ā€˜proof’ for God’s existence, without falling prey to his own critique of an analogia entis (which is a subset of a natural theology simplicter)? Feneuil writes (in extenso):

According to Barth, Anselm’s proof is not natural theology. Anselm never places himself on the —supposedly common to the believer and the unbeliever—ground of natural reason. The definition of God Anselm gives at the beginning of the Proslogion is not, says Barth, a definition in the strict sense of the term but, rather, a confession of faith. It does not define the nature of God but acknowledges a divine command, actually the first of the Ten Commandments (ā€œYou shall have no other gods before meā€): ā€œWe believe that You are something than which nothing greater can be thought.ā€ It is not about the abstract essence of God, but about the relation of lordliness between the revealed God and God’s creatures. Anselm does not place himself on the fool’s ground, he does not think on the same level. And the proof does not primarily prove the existence of God but, rather, the fact that, on the ground of this lordliness relationship that God initiated, it is not even possible for us to imagine, even as a mere hypothesis, the inexistence of God. The mere hypothesis of the nonexistence does not fit God. In that respect as well, God is very differentĀ  from any other object of the world (very different from a hundred–euro note, for instance). Therefore, Anselm’s proof is not an ontological proof, that is, a proof that would go from God’s essence in thought of God’s actual existence. It is not a proof in which human thought is above God, in which human thought decides about God’s existence. It is the other way around: the proof aims at showing, from the revealed name of God, that human thought cannot establish itself as a spectator above God. The proof shows that human thought, in relation to God, is unescapably limited.

Therefore, one could say that, in a sense, the proof aims precisely at negating the possibility of any natural theology, understood as a human attempt to escape the relation of obedience to God, and to establish oneself in the position of being able to make judgments about God’s existence, just as about the existence of any object. It is a proof that declares our wisdom as a folly before God. Hence, the insipiens, in Barth’s reading of Anselm—that is, the one who does not understand the proof—is not only the one who denies the existence of God, but also the one who tries to establish this existence on purely rational grounds. Who, then, is the insipiens? He is Descartes, not less than Kant, because when Descartes attempts to ground the certainty of God’s existence exclusively on human reason, he believes that he can consider God as a thought object similar to others, whose existence can always be put into bracket. Insofar, he is an insipiens: he believes that one can talk about God as about a thing or an absent person, using a third-person discourse, whereas one cannot talk about God without talking to God. Consequently, there is no fundamental difference between Anselm’s insipiens and Paul’s fool: both refer to those who do not acknowledge the foolishness of their own wisdom, but neither Anselm’s incipiens [sic.] nor Paul’s fool refer to the one who cannot reason well, for any contingent cause.[1]

If Feneuil is correct in his reading of Barth, and there is no reason to think otherwise, we can see, even in Barth’s reading on Anselm’s ā€˜proof’ how Barth’s rejection of a natural theology was operative. Ultimately, I would contend, Barth sees natural theology, and its subset in the analogia entis, as foolish because it attempts to decenter God’s ontology with fallen humanity’s; i.e., by asserting that there remains a residual foundation within the intellect of fallen humanity whereby knowledge of the true and living God has been retained; even if it might need a drop of God’s created grace to jumpstart it.

[1] Anthony Feneuil, ā€œThe Cross of Wisdom: Ambiguities in Turning Down Apologetics (Paul, Anselm, Barth),ā€ in Christophe Chalamet and Hans–Christoph Askani, eds., The Wisdom and Foolishness of God: First Corinthians 1—2 In Theological Exploration (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015), 174–75.