Is Evangelical Calvinism Compatible with Free Grace Theology?

Free Grace theology was what I grew up with as a Conservative Baptist pastor’s kid. We didn’t call it that, but that is, effectively, what it was. Later Zane Hodges, as a counter to John MacArthur’s Gospel According to Jesus, would write his book: Absolutely Free. He simply codified what many of us in that sphere had lived with, soteriologically, for our whole Christian lives. Essentially Free Grace theology is the notion that all that is required for salvation is that you simply believe in Jesus Christ, and once you do that you are eternally secure and eternally saved/justified before God. It is generally a non-Calvinist, what some used to call biblicist way of thinking soteriology; clearly coming out of a style of conversionist, revivalist, and even Kesweckian piety and spirituality.

Free Grace contrasts with something like Five Point Calvinism, which of course MacArthur’s ā€˜Gospel According to Jesus’ is. Contrary to Five Point Calvinism, Free Grace argues that salvation doesn’t require ā€˜repentance’ as a condition of salvation; it argues that a person is eternally secure (without so-called ā€˜good works’); it makes the distinction between salvation and disciple (so a hard distinction between justification and sanctification), which entails the notion that there are such things as ā€˜carnal Christians’; it argues that the warning passages in the New Testament pointed towards Christians aren’t referring to loss of salvation (which both Calvinists and Arminians take them as), but to loss of reward (which also includes loss of ruling and reigning with Christ during the millennium). There are other distinctions, but those are the primary ones. You might be able to see how this would differ from a Five Point Calvinism of the type that someone like JMac would endorse.

But how would an Evangelical Calvinism dovetail, or not, with Free Grace soteriology? I think there are many points of contact between an Evangelical Calvinism and Free Grace theology, but it requires the person to put on their theology thinking caps. Evangelical Calvinism, like Free Grace, sees salvation purely grounded in the promise and person of Jesus Christ. We, like Free Grace, do not see any conditions for salvation other than simply placing your faith in Jesus Christ. Once this has obtained a person is indeed eternally secure, and assured of salvation, simply because they are now in union with the One who is indeed secure, and eternal life in Himself. Once this Rubicon (from being lost to found) has been crossed, the impossibility of ā€œlosingā€ salvation would be as great as the eternal Son no longer being the incarnate man from Nazareth.

And yet the Evangelical Calvinist, or Athanasian Reformed, goes to a depth dimension in a way that Free Grace doesn’t. An Evangelical Calvinism grounds salvation in the person and work of Jesus Christ. So we don’t see salvation as something we ā€œacquire,ā€ but as a person, God the Son, who has acquired us in His gracious assumption of humanity (assumptio carnis). We press into the idea, into the logic of the homoousion, that Christ’s humanity is vicarious humanity for all. This results, further, in the idea that Christ first believed for us by the Spirit in His humanity, as archetypal humanity, such that when we say Yes, and not No, to salvation we are only echoing His Yes and amen for us. An Evangelical Calvinist anchors salvific belief in God’s salvific belief for us; this would be something of an ordo salutis for us. This might help clarify how an Evangelical Calvinism isn’t at necessary odds with Free Grace soteriology, but it also should indicate how we texture and deepen things on the theological side in ways that a Free Grace thinker might not. If I was still pure Free Grace I don’t think I would look at what I am communicating here and conclude that it is at odds with my position as a Free Grace thinker, but it might make me wonder about the hermeneutic an Evangelical Calvinist is using juxtaposed with my own as a Free Gracer.

One stark difference, because an Evangelical Calvinism doesn’t make a hard distinction between justification/sanctification, that is, not in the way that Free Grace does, this might represent a point of departure for the Free Gracer. I should qualify and say, an Evangelical Calvinism does make a distinction between justification and sanctification (we are Protestant after all), but that along with Calvin’s duplex gratia (double grace) soteriology, which sees Jesus alone embodying both justification and sanctification for us, we see the whole enchilada as grounded in Christ’s vicarious life for us. The guarantee of both of these realities obtaining, was actualized first in the life of Christ for us. It is as we come into union with Him, participate with Him that its reality becomes apparent as we keep in step with the Spirit in Him as we live out our Christian existences as disciples of Jesus Christ. We might say it like this: the justification Jesus has won for us in His vicarious humanity is the ground upon which sanctification is pollinated from as we either submit to Him, or don’t, even as Christian people. Again, this could be parsed in a way that is not at odds with Free Grace soteriology.

In the end, an Evangelical Calvinism and Free Grace theology have more in common, by way of mood, than not. We reject the juridical or forensic emphases that fund Five Point Calvinist soteriology. We emphasize that it is God for us in Jesus Christ, personally, that stands as the basis for a sound understanding of soteriology (contra the decretum absolutum of Calvinism). We are both prone towards thinking God in very warm-hearted and pietistic-relational ways. It’s just that I think an Evangelical Calvinism ends up being much more theologically developed and open that way than is a Free Grace theology (which is very biblicist by orientation). And maybe I’m being a little more charitable towards Free Grace than they would be towards me; maybe I’m a bit sentimental. I could offer a harder critique of Free Grace, probably, but I think the things I’ve hit upon here reflect areas that we might have certain general commonalities on. One critique I might make of Free Grace would be that their entire hermeneutic stands or falls on a dispensational hermeneutic being the correct one (which implicates the way they develop their understanding of rewards and ruling and reigning with Jesus Christ during the millennium). I might also critique them for what I take to be an inherent dualism that plagues not just them, but of course the classical Calvinists, Arminians, and the whole of the Latin theological tradition. But I won’t make those critiques here, I’m being charitable. šŸ™‚

Anyway, just some free floating thoughts on what Free Grace theology is (after Zane Hodges), and how an Evangelical Calvinism may or may not cohere with it at certain levels.

Luther’s Personalist Grace Contra Scholastic (Catholic and Protestant) Created Grace

Martin Luther’s doctrine of grace was of a personalist sort, contra the Thomist Catholic concept of grace as a ā€˜created grace’ or habitus (a disposition given by God to elect humanity in their ā€œaccidentsā€ whereby they might habituate [cooperate] with God by way of gratia infusa [infused grace, which is created and thus derivative grace] and merit the possibility to ultimately be justified before God wherein the iustitia Christi finally consummates as the iustitia Dei [ā€˜righteousness of Christ’ … ā€˜righteousness of God’]). This is significant to underscore, not just because it offers an alternative, ā€œbiblical,ā€ account of grace, contra Roman Catholicism, but this implicates Reformed orthodoxy insofar that itĀ received, and repristinated this doctrine of Grace, the Thomist doctrine, in the development and codification of itsĀ so-called ā€œorthodoxā€ Reformed theology. Here is Luther with some commentary by Helmut Thielicke:

ā€˜I take grace in the proper sense,’ writes Luther in his treatise Against Latomus (1521), ā€˜as the favor of God—not a quality of the soul, as is taught by our more recent writers. This grace truly produces peace of heart until finally a man is healed from his corruption and feels he has a gracious God.’ LW 32, 227. In his 1519 commentary on Psalm 1:2 Luther says: ā€˜Here ā€œdelightā€ [in the Law of the Lord] stands, first of all, neither for ability [potentia] nor for the indolent habit [habitus] which was introduced from Aristotle by the new theologians in order to subvert the understanding of the Scriptures, nor for the action [actus] out of which, as they say, that ability or habit proceeds. All human nature does not have this delight, but it must necessarily come from heaven. For human nature is intent and inclined to evil, . . . The Law of the Lord is truly good, holy, and just. Then it follows that the desire of man is the opposite of the Law.ā€ LW 14, 295.1

Thielicke develops Luther’s critique with greater depth, but for our purposes this quote will have to suffice. What should be understood though, as I highlighted previously, is that for the scholastics (Catholic or the Reformed orthodox latterly), what was most important was to recognize that ontologically nature retained its esse (essence), even post-fall; in other words, the intellect remained intact, retained a ā€œpoint of contactā€ with God even after its rupture from God in the fall. In this frame, then, grace was only needed as an addition to the ā€˜accidents’ (not the essence) of humanity whereby the elect person might synergistically cooperate and perform ā€˜their’ salvation with God (in the Catholic frame this took place sacramentally through the Church; for the orthodox Reformed this was understood through Federal or Covenantal theology as that developed progressively along the way). But significantly, grace for the Aristotelian (as that was appropriated in various iterations of ā€œThomismā€), was not, and would not be God himself, personally. The need, in the scholastic frame was not that desperate; that is, that God himself be grace for us (pro nobis). For the scholastic, as already noted, the fall did not plunge humanity into a rupture with God wherein the whole of what it means to be human was lost, just part, essentialistically, was lost. And it was ā€˜this part’ that a created grace, as a ā€˜medicine’ would make perfect (e.g. ā€˜grace perfects nature’). As the reader can see, though, Luther opposed this type of Aristotelian rambunctiousness.

For Luther, and others, even in the 16th and 17th century Reformed ambit, grace was in fact God for and with us. We of course see this theme picked up by people like Barth and TF Torrance in their contexts and under their own respective ideational periods of reference. Insofar that the Post Reformed orthodox have imbibed, retrieved, appropriated, repristinated the Thomist mantle, and they are doing that currently with exuberance, this is the doctrine of grace they are ingesting. There is a better way forward, and this is why I am so intent on introducing people to Karl Barth and Thomas Torrance. They are retrievers of the ā€˜Chalcedonian pattern,’ and the Athanasian frame wherein grace is indeed God for us in the vicarious humanity of Jesus Christ. As such, salvation obtains for us, ā€˜in Christ,’ fully, and not through a synergistic frame of cooperating (or persevering) with God by way of ā€˜created grace’ wherein nature is perfected and not re-created through apocalyptic resurrection, ascension, and the Parousia.

There is a better way for the genuinely evangelical (historically understood) Christian, and it certainly isn’t by retrieving, whole hog, Post Reformed orthodoxy, or the type of mediaeval classical theism so many are attempting to ā€œreviveā€ the Protestant church with today. The biblical faith is intentionally trinitarian, relational, and thus personalistic. The ā€˜ground and grammar’ of any truly evangelical theology must be pollinated by biblical and revelational categories rather than philosophical and speculative ones (of the sort that we get through Aristotelian Christianity). Luther knew this, this was the basis of his reforming work. He understood God’s grace in personal, relational ways, and thus genuinely evangelical ways rather than in the philosophical categories that the schoolmen did.

 

1 Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics: Foundations (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), 225 n. 3.

 

Zwingli, The Pluralist Universalist

I am just finishing up Bruce Gordon’s excellent bookĀ Zwingli: God’s Armed Prophet. In it, Gordon, almost in passing, notes that in Zwingli’s final theological confession, hisĀ Exposition of the Faith,Ā in his dedication to France’s king, Francis I, he writes the following. You will notice the universalistic intonations of Zwingli’s correspondence; Luther, and the Germans most certainly did. Indeed, in the following quotation, Gordon also supplies Luther’s acerbic response to what I would take, similarly, to be a highlyĀ unChristianĀ way to think about the salvation of pagan peoples.Ā Ā 

In his dedication, Zwingli urged the king to rule well, that he might join the heavenly company of exalted monarchs:Ā 

Then you may hope to see the whole company and assemblage of all the saints, the wise, the faithful, brave, and good who have lived since the world began. Here you will see the two Adams, the redeemed and the redeemer, Abel, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Judah, Moses, Joshua, Gideon, Samuel, Phineas, Elijah, Elisha, Isaiah, and the Virgin Mother of God of whom he prophesied, David, Hezekiah, Josiah, the Baptist, Peter, Paul; here too, Hercules, Theseus, Socrates, Aristides, Antigonus, Numa, Camillus, theĀ CatosĀ andĀ Scipios, here Louis the Pious, and your predecessors, the Louis, Philips,Ā Pepins, and all your ancestors, who have gone hence in faith. In short there has not been a good man and will not be a holy heart or faithful soul from the beginning of the world to the end thereof that you will not see in heaven with God. And what can be imaginedĀ more glad, what more delightful, what, finally, moreĀ honourableĀ than such a sight?Ā 

As Luther and others quickly noted, Zwingli’s words were arresting. Alongside the kings of Israel and France, the blessed included Socrates and theĀ Catos. The virtuous pagans would find their place among the elect. From Wittenberg came the caustic reply:Ā 

Tell me, any one of you who wants to be a Christian, what need is there of baptism, the sacrament, Christ, the Gospel, or the prophets and Holy Scripture, if such godless heathen, Socrates, Aristides, yes, the cruel Numa, who was the first to instigate every kind of idolatry at Rome by the devil’s revelation, as St Augustine writes in the City of God, and Scipio the Epicurean, are saved and sanctified along with the patriarchs, prophets, and apostles in heaven, even though they knew nothing about God, Scripture, the Gospel, Christ, baptism, the sacrament, or the Christian faith? What can such an author, preacher, and teacher believe about the Christian faith except that it is no better than any other faith and that everyone can be saved by his own faith, even an idolater and an Epicurean like Numa and Scipio?Ā 

The list was not the first time Zwingli had expressed himself on the salvation of non-Christians. Against his beloved Augustine, he was adamant that unbaptized infants would be saved. On the noble heathen, he had made his point most emphatically in his sermon on providence in 1530, when he claimed that Seneca was ā€˜the unparalleled cultivator of the soul among pagans’. He was a ā€˜theologian’ and his works ā€˜divine oracles’.Ā Ā 

Salvation was not limited to Israel or the visible Church. Zwingli’s conviction was consistent: God is entirely free in election to choose whom he wills with reasons completely beyond human comprehension. Profound attachment to divine freedom led Zwingli to find God working through the deeds and thoughts of non-Christians. God was the source of all goodness, and faith and goodness were to be found among virtuous pagans as they were somehow part of God’s election. Unlike John Milton later, Zwingli felt no need to explain the ways of God to humanity.1Ā 

Interestingly, Zwingli himself, according to Gordon’s commentary, has no problem imposing his soteriology on God’s freedom; this is precisely what Karl Barth would not do. Barth, like Zwingli, had a high view of Divine freedom, but just because of that, definitionally, Barth rightly saw that a person, like Zwingli, could not foreclose on said freedom; and ā€œmakeā€ God’s freedom the cipher by which an array of theologicalĀ adiaphoraĀ might be smuggled into the Divine way. This is what kept Barth et al. from following Zwingli’s apparent universalistic-turn. At most, for Barth, God’s freedomĀ couldĀ allow for a hopeful universalism, but not of the sort that we find, ostensibly, in Zwingli’s absolute, and even pluralistic form of universalism (I say anachronistically after Paul Tillich). Indeed, I find this rather striking; Zwingli seems to have an incipient form of what would later come to be Karl Rahner’sĀ anonymous ChristianĀ notion. Again, to read modern theologians, and their respective categories, back into someone like Zwingli would be, at best, anachronistic. But at a conceptual level it is interesting that there is at least some inchoate corollary between him and some moderns who would follow latterly.Ā Ā 

I found this nugget interesting, and something I didn’t know in regard to Zwingli’s soteriological imagination. Maybe you’ll find this interesting as well, which is why I’ve shared this.Ā Solo ChristoĀ Ā 

 

1 Bruce Gordon, Zwingli: God’s Armed Prophet (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2021), 238-39.

Ā 

The Headquarters of Evil: The Satanic in Christian Dogmatic Explanation

Sin by definition is irrational. More pointedly we could say sin is “disaffective,” that is in regard to sin’s relational nature as a rupturing of relationship between God and us. Ultimately, sin has no anatomy. We can identify what it does, but are unable to explain where it came from, per se. As such, attempting to answer theological questions based upon ostensible answers to sin’s ā€œnature,ā€ is always a fool’s-errand. Thomas Torrance avoids such foolishness, and instead explains the irrational nature of sin up against the order of God’s triune life, and how the latter provides for an ordered universe vis-Ć -vis Him. Torrance writes:Ā 

Second,Ā by its very nature, moral or natural evil isĀ essentially anarchic. It is an utterly irrational factor that has inexplicablyĀ entered intoĀ the created order. Whatever else evil is it involves the introduction of a radical discontinuity into the world that affects the relation ofĀ mankindĀ to God, of man to himself, and of man to woman and woman to man, and of course ofĀ men and womenĀ to nature. It affects the entire relation of the universe to God, infecting its contingent nature or the relative independence given by God to the created order. As such evil defies human comprehension and any rational explanation. It is a virulent, demonic force radically antagonistic to all that is holy and orderly,Ā rightĀ and good. St Paul spoke of it as the mystery of lawlessness (ἀνομία) of a strangely personal kind, in fact aĀ malevolentĀ will. It was in similar terms that Jesus referred to the Devil as the father of lies, the Satan with whom Jesus himself struggled in his temptation. And it is in similar terms that the Gospels tell us of the conflict of Jesus with the demonic powers of darkness that infested people’s lives in mind and body, but which he denounced as the enemy,Ā rebukedĀ and cast out of people’s lives, thereby showing that with his presence the Kingdom of God had been ushered in and deliverance from the power of darkness had been brought about. The sharp personal conflict of Jesus with evil reveals it to be more than theĀ hypostatisationĀ of a principle of contradiction between God and the world, and to be in fact anĀ organisedĀ kingdom of evil and darkness with a kind of headquarters of its own, the power house of an utterly rebellious evil will or spirit which the Holy Scriptures call Satan. We are unable to understand how God continues to deal with the forces of darkness, but we believe that as he dealt miraculously with sickness and death, miraculously brought the turbulent winds and waves under his command, ā€˜Peace, be still;’ so we believe that he will bring his divine peace and power to bearĀ marvellouslyĀ and triumphantly upon the physical conditions of human existence in history, not to be sureĀ in accordance withĀ our conceptions, butĀ in accordance withĀ his transcendent wisdom.1Ā 

The description of sin by Torrance, and its incubator, evil, could not be moreĀ aproposĀ for ourĀ current statusĀ in the world at large. WhatĀ shouldn’tĀ be lost is the point that TF rightly underscores: viz. ā€œAs such evil defies human comprehension and any rational explanation.ā€ This is the all-important pointĀ in regard toĀ not only the ā€˜noetic effects of the fall,’ but more significantly the possibility for humanity toĀ identifyĀ their actual problem as they stand in this world order. Without the light of knowledgeĀ provided forĀ by God in Christ, particularly in theĀ Incarnation&Atonement, human depravity will continue to lead itself into its own self-possessedĀ inbornĀ sense of divinity.Ā This is whyĀ theologies that are based inĀ speculationĀ andĀ discursiveĀ reasoning about God, speculation that starts from an epistemological ingress-point abstract from a ground of God in Christ, are doomed to theories of God, and thus everything, that only end in the circle of self-projection.Ā 

Beyond that, and to one of the primary points of TFT’s treatment, evil is personal. Not in an abstract sense, but up against the personal God of Jesus Christ. That is to say, evil, and its adjunct, sin, has a ā€œpersonalā€ origination insofar as that is embodied by a literal Satan and his literal demonic coven. The modern world, in post-Enlightenment form, has sought to demythologize the world of monsters, demons, and the angelic just the same. This is rooted, following TF’s point, in fallen humanity’s propensity to ignore the reality of the fall, and thus live into it by elevating themselves as the gods of the universe. As such, the unseen world, the invisible world is not manageable to them, thus the need to demythologize, or ā€˜disenchant’ the world of things they cannot seemingly master themselves. The irony of this ā€œfool’s-errand,ā€ is that such people, the people in the ā€˜Broadway,’ are in fact mastered by this unseen world to the point that the satanic ā€˜headquarters’ convinces unregenerate humanity thatĀ itĀ does not exist. One result is that such people, theĀ massa, do the bidding of Satan as he, indeed, is their father:Ā Ā 

41Ā You people are doing the deeds of your father.ā€ ThenĀ they said to Jesus, ā€œWe were not bornĀ as a result ofĀ immorality! We have only one Father, God himself.ā€Ā 42Ā Jesus replied,Ā ā€œIf God were your Father, you would love me, for I have come from God and am now here.Ā IĀ have not come on my own initiative, but heĀ sent me.Ā 43Ā Why don’t you understand what I am saying? It is because you cannot acceptĀ my teaching.Ā 44Ā You peopleĀ are fromĀ your father the devil, and you want to do what your father desires.Ā HeĀ was a murderer from the beginning, and does not uphold the truth,Ā because there is no truth in him. Whenever he lies,Ā he speaks according to his own nature, because he is a liar and the father of lies.Ā 45Ā But because I am telling you the truth, you do not believe me.Ā 46Ā Who among you can prove me guiltyĀ of any sin? If I am telling youĀ the truth, why don’t you believe me?Ā 47Ā The one who belongs toĀ God listens and respondsĀ to God’s words. You don’t listen andĀ respond,Ā becauseĀ you don’t belong to God.ā€ -John 8:41-47Ā 

The only remedy to this cosmic malady is for the person to repent and submit to the Word of God, rather than continuing to submit to the Serpent’s fake word.Ā 

 

1 Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2016), 227. Ā 

Ā 

Ā 

Augustine and TF Torrance in Deified Rapprochement?

His divine power has granted to us all things that pertain to life and godliness, through the knowledge of himĀ who called us to his own glory and excellence, by which he has granted to us his precious and very great promises, so that through them you may becomeĀ partakers of the divine nature,Ā having escaped from the corruption that is in the world because of sinful desire. -II Peter 1.3-4

The above passage is theĀ locus classicusĀ for many a Patristic theologian, in regard to articulating a doctrine ofĀ theosis vis-Ć -vis salvation. But typically, this articulation is only reserved for theologians of the ā€˜Eastern’ persuasion; the Westerners are often left out. Indeed, the primary Latin theologian, the progenitor of all that is holy in the West, St. Augustine himself, is painted as someone who suffered from this lacuna ofĀ theosisĀ in his soteriologicalĀ oeuvre. But as, David Vincent Meconi has iterated: ā€œ… Augustine far outpaces any other Latin patristic writer in his use of the technical termĀ deificareĀ and its cognates.ā€1Ā Meconi writes further,

Augustine was unique among the Church Fathers in arguing that the human person was the only creature brought into the world incompletely. Whereas the other days of creation receive an ā€œand it was good,ā€ Augustine’s very careful reading of Scripture alerted him to the fact that God does not stamp the sixth day with its own exclusive declaration, ā€œessetĀ bonum,ā€Ā but instead on the sixth day God overlooksĀ allĀ things together and declares that all things together (cuncta) are very good (cf. Gen 1:31). As such, the day on which humans are created is still incomplete, pointing to something beyond itself. Adam is thus presented as ā€œforeshadowing another something still to comeā€ (Gn. litt. 3.24; CSEL 28.92). This is how Augustine accounts for the divine dynamism inherent in the human soul; although created naturally good, theĀ imago DeiĀ still longs to be like God, and in Adam’s very humanity, how that will be accomplished is foreshadowed.

This desire of a copy to be like its paradigmatic archetype was something Augustine had worked out very early on. In hisĀ SolilooquiaĀ (386–87) he famously admits to wanting to know nothing more than ā€œGod and the soul,ā€ and the two meet in his subsequent discussion on the imago DeiĀ where Augustine cleverly depicts himself [A] talking to reason personified [R]:

R: Does it not seem to you that your image in a mirror wants, in a way, to be you and is false because it is not?

A: That certainly seems so.

R: Do not all pictures and replicas of that kind and all artists’ works of that type strive to be that in whose likeness they are made?

A: I am completely convinced that they do

(sol. 2.9.17;Ā PaffenrothĀ 2000, 72-73; cf. c. Acad. 3.17.39).

This move is essential to understand. Deifying union with God for Augustine is not the abolishing of human nature but its only true fulfillment. The heart isĀ inquietumĀ outside the divine life for which it has been created. Sin depersonalizes and destroys. Growing in likeness with God restores the otherwise fragmented self. ā€œI shudder inasmuch as I am unlike him, yet I am afire with longing because I am like himā€Ā . . . .Ā The doctrine of theĀ imago DeiĀ allows Augustine to explain deification as the consummation of all human impulse and agency, the copy’s full share in its model, the final rest for which every human person is created.2

I wanted to point this up because, often, TF Torrance, my homeboy and teacher, isĀ known for his critique of Augustine’s theology, in general, which he identifies with what he calls theĀ Latin Heresy.Ā This heresy, for Torrance, is simply the idea that Augustine suffered too much from his commitment toĀ neo-Platonism, and the inherent dualism (between the eternal and the temporal / the spiritual-material) therein. But in relief, Meconi might help provide a constructive point ofĀ rapprochementĀ between Torrance and Augustine; at least when it comes to thinkingĀ soteriologicallyĀ about a God-human relation.

 

1 David Vincent Meconi, S.J., ā€œAugustine’s doctrine of deification,ā€ in David Vincent Meconi, S.J. and Eleonore Stump eds., The Cambridge Companion to Augustine (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 208.

2 Ibid., 212-13.

Is Southern Baptist ‘Traditionalism’ or Leighton Flowers’ ‘Provisionism’, Semi-Pelagian?: An Engagement with Adam Harwood’s Essay

IsĀ ProvisionismĀ or Southern BaptistĀ TraditionalismĀ semi-Pelagian? That is the question Dr. Adam Harwood attempts to answer in the negative. In other words, in a short essay he wrote for theĀ Journal for Baptist Theology and MinistryĀ he sets out to demonstrate the way that Traditionalism or Leighton Flowers’ ProvisionismĀ definitionally elides the oft made charge that their respective soteriological position fits the historic bill of semi-Pelagianism.

I intend on engaging with Harwood’s essay by interrogating each of the sections that make up his total essay, respectively. The first section is entitled:Ā Historical and Theological Definitions of Semi-Pelagianism Which are Contradicted by the Traditional Statement. I will limit myself to engaging solelyĀ with what Harwood presents in his essay. In other words, I will not engage with theĀ Traditional StatementĀ (TS)Ā directly; instead, I will engage with the way that Harwood represents the TS in his essay—and trust that he accurately represents his ownĀ soteriologicalĀ tradition accurately.

Harwood writes the following with reference to his thesis:

Shedding a false charge can be difficult. Consider as an example McCarthyism in the 1950s. A person publicly accused of belonging to the Communist Party had difficulty shaking the accusation. ā€œYou’re a Communist. Prove you’re not!ā€ How does one disprove such an accusation? Those who affirm ā€œA Statement of the Traditional Southern Baptist Understanding of God’s Plan of Salvationā€ (TS) find themselves in a similar situation. Claims have been made that the TS is, or appears to be, semi-Pelagian. This chapter seeks to disprove the charge in four ways. First, historical and theological definitions of semi-Pelagianism will be provided and will be shown to be contradicted by claims in the TS. Second, it will be demonstrated that the theological claims made at the Second Council of Orange (529) fail to indict the TS as unbiblical. Third, the historical-theological context of fifth-century semi-Pelagianism suggests that the historical debate has no connection to the current conversation among Southern Baptists regarding the TS. Fourth, errors will be exposed in an early assessment of the TS. [1]

Here we see the way he will organize the entirety of his essay. To the point of this riposte, we will simply engage with his first section, first, and then proceed, through forthcoming blog posts, to engage with the rest in succession.

His first section is terse and right to the point. He offers examples, from various theological dictionaries, of what semi-Pelagianism is generally understood to be. He then, as a counter, offers quotes from the TS which he claims offers the ā€˜proof’ that TS (orĀ Provisionism) does not fit the definitional frame of how historic semi-Pelagianism is typically (and universally) characterized. In order to review his argument, I will now share the definitions he appeals to in order to establish the entailments of semi-Pelagianism, and then the quotes from the Southern Baptist Traditional Statement that Harwood believes demonstrates beyond a shadow of a doubt that the TS understanding of salvation does not fall prey to the charge of being semi-Pelagian.

Definitions of Semi-Pelagianism

It ā€œmaintained that the first steps towards the Christian life were ordinarily taken by the human will and that grace supervened only later.ā€ –Ā The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church

Ā It ā€œaffirmed that the unaided will performed the initial act of faithā€ and ā€œthe priority of the human will over the grace of God in the initial work of salvation.ā€ –Ā Evangelical Dictionary of TheologyĀ 

ā€œThe semi-Pelagians claimed that sinners make the first move toward salvation by choosing to repent and believe.ā€ Also, ā€œThe semi-Pelagian scheme of salvation thus may be described by the statement ā€˜I started to come, and God helped me.ā€™ā€ –Ā Integrative Theology

A term which has been used to describe several theories which were thought to imply that the first movement towards God is made by human efforts unaided by grace.ā€ –Ā The Westminster Dictionary of Christian TheologyĀ [2]

And:

Semi-Pelagianism Contradicted by the Traditional Statement

ā€œWhile no one is even remotely capable of achieving salvation through his own effort, no sinner is saved apart from a free response to the Holy Spirit’s drawing through the Gospel.ā€ – Article 2

Ā ā€œWe affirm that grace is God’s generous decision to provide salvation for any personĀ by takingĀ all of the initiative in providing atonement.ā€ – Article 4

Ā ā€œGod’s gracious call to salvationā€ is made ā€œby the Holy Spirit through the Gospel.ā€ – Article 8 [3]

Harwood engages in a basic category mistake. It is hard to square how he could make this sort of mistake given its forthright nature. In other words, he is equivocating. The ā€˜definitions of semi-Pelagianism’ he supplies are referring to anthropological dispositioning. That is, semi-Pelagians, as we can infer from the definitions Harwood provides, has to do with the movement of humanity; or it presupposes on a capacity innate within the human agent that would allow them to make a ā€˜natural’ move towards God.

The responses Harwood offers from the Traditional Statement, that ostensibly counter the charge that Traditionalism is semi-Pelagian, aren’t all that clear; that is in regard to answering the question of whether or not the human agent in salvation has an innate capacity to make a movement towards God. Indeed, this is the abiding question under consideration. What we get in the TS, as offered by Harwood, are statements that ā€˜appear’ to potentially contradict the definition of semi-Pelagianism; but on closer inspection what they really seem to be communicating is that God has objectively offered a way for salvation. But the question under consideration has to do with an anthropological question, in regard to the internal makeup of the human being vis-Ć -vis God. Semi-Pelagianism has to do with the human agent’s posture towards God; it doesn’t have to do, per se, with God’s posture (so to speak) towards humanity.

What Harwood remains unclear on, with reference to his deployment of the TS, is whether or not human agents have an innate capacity to be for or against God; that is apart from God’s unilateral activity upon the human agent. In other words, for Harwood, in particular, and the TS, in general, does the grace that comes with the Gospel offer itself internally ā€˜enable’ the human agent to make a choice for or against God that heretofore it didn’t have prior? In other words, do the ā€˜Provisionists’ maintain that the human agent in salvation is inborn with all of the ā€˜equipment’ necessary in order to say yes or no to the Gospel; or does the Gospel itself, in its objective reality, confront the human agent in such a way that the ā€œinternalsā€ of the person are given an alien capacity (to its own native or natural capacities;Ā ieĀ freewillĀ etc) that allows them to say yes or no, subjectively, or ontically to the Gospel reality?

Harwood’s brief presentation, in his first section, does not offer clarity on these things. It leaves us wondering if he isn’t equivocating with the terms in order to elide the charge he is attempting to evade;Ā ieĀ semi-Pelagianism. It seems to me that we could posit that the Gospel reality is an objective or alien reality indeed. That person X could be presented with the Gospel, and that person X, even while standing in the presence of the graciousness of the Gospel, is not affected one way or the other, internally, in regard to their capacity to say yes or no to the Gospel. This is what Harwood’s analysis, thus far, is unclear on.

All Christians agree that there is a general call made by the Holy Spirit in regard to the Gospel. But that isn’t the question under consideration. The question remains open and is not answered by Harwood’s comparative analysis. His deployment of the TS does not answer the anthropological question. Instead, it claims to offer an answer by using a theological proper category, which does not directly address the anthropological question about human agency in salvation. It says that, ā€œWe affirm that grace is God’s generous decision to provide salvation for any personĀ by takingĀ all of the initiative in providing atonement,ā€ but this, again, only speaks to God’s objective decision to provide salvation through the atoning work of Christ. This doesn’t address the question of ā€˜how’ this works towards ā€˜moving’ the human heart towards or away from God.

In this brief engagement, thus far, we are left, at least by my lights, to conclude that Harwood (and Flowers following) has not addressed the all-important question of how the Gospel ā€˜initiates’ God’s unilateral movement of salvation in the human heart. Harwood’s appeal to the TS only shows what all Christians affirm: viz. That God has provided Himself, in Christ, objectively for the salvation of the world. The TS does not address the subjective impact that that offering has on the human agent in salvation; it only asserts that the Holy Spirit draws, but then does not indicate what in fact that drawing entails. Maybe the remaining sections in Harwood’s essay will address the question his essay set out to answer. We will see.

________________________________________________

[1]Ā Adam Harwood, ā€œIs the Traditional Statement Semi-Pelagian?,ā€Ā Journal for Baptist Theology and MinistryĀ (Spring 2013), 47-56.Ā 

[2] Ibid., 49

[3] Ibid.

 

Christ Conditioned Assurance of Salvation: Against ‘Conditional Security’ and Synergisms

The following is the concluding summary from my personal chapter for our last book. The title of my chapter is: ā€œAssurance is of the Essence of Saving Faithā€ Calvin, Barth, Torrance, and the ā€œFaith of Christ.ā€Ā As you can see the body of work prior to this conclusion engaged with John Calvin, Karl Barth, and Thomas Torrance on the issue of assurance of salvation. I offered some constructive critique of Calvin’s insufficiency, stemming directly from his doctrine of predestination; and attempted to correct that with the work of Barth/Torrance. The result, insofar as the correction was successful, were my following summative thoughts on assurance of salvation vis-Ć -vis a doctrine of predestination qua election/reprobation. I was prompted to share this because I just listened to a podcast where the speakers were attempting to argue for what they call ā€˜conditional security.’ They both affirm some form of what is more commonly known, in church history, as ā€œsemi-Pelagianismā€ (for better or worse). They both claim to be proponents of synergism vis-a-vis salvation. In other words, they both believe that we must cooperate or work ā€˜concurrently’ with God in order for final salvation (glorification) to ultimately obtain. They both think of salvation from an abstract frame, meaning their respective views of salvation are not principiallyĀ grounded in the vicarious (homoousios) humanity of Jesus Christ. As such they place space between humanity and God in Christ in the reconciliatory event that a concrete understanding of a Christ conditioned notion of salvation does not suffer from. As a result of their ā€˜synergism’ and abstract notion of soteriology vis-Ć -vis Christology, they arrive at the conclusion that personal salvation is ultimately contingent on the human agent’s drive to maintain relationship with the triune God. As such, for my money, they operate from the very homoĀ incurvatusĀ in seĀ that a Christ conditioned notion of salvation has come to save us from; not by might, nor by power, but by the Spirit of the Lord. But it is because of this ā€˜space’ between the human agent in salvation, and God’s salvation for humanity accomplished in Christ, that these two must think a way to continuously make salvation somehow conditional upon the part ā€˜they’ play in the salvific event (which for them isn’t an event at all, but a process).

In light of the aforementioned, as already noted, I offer the following as a correction to any sort of synergistic or even so-called ā€˜semi-Pelagian’ understandings of salvation wherein Christ himself isn’t salvation for all humanity, in his vicarious humanity, which indeed is archetype humanity for all. Indeed, he isn’t called the ā€˜second Adam’ for nothing.

Having surveyed Calvin’s, Barth’s, and Torrance’s respective doctrines of union with Christ and vicarious humanity, it remains to offer aĀ constructiveĀ retrieval of their theology and apply this directly to a doctrine of assurance. We will see how Calvin’s belief that ā€œassurance is of theĀ essenceĀ of faithā€ might be affirmed, particularly as we tease out Barth’s and Torrance’s thinking on the vicarious humanity of Jesus Christ.

    1. Calvin was onto something profound, and this is why Evangelical Calvinists gravitate towards his belief that ā€œassurance is of the essence of faith.ā€ That notwithstanding, as we developed previously, Calvin’s lack of place for reprobation in his soteriology coupled with the idea of ā€œtemporary faithā€ can be problematic. It has the potential to cause serious anxiety for anyone struggling with whether or not they are truly one of God’s elect. In this frame someone can look and sound like a Christian, but in the end might just be someone who has a ā€œtemporaryā€ or ā€œineffectual faith.ā€ The problem for Calvin, as with the tradition he is representing, is that the focus of election is not first on Jesus Christ, but instead it is upon individuals. Even though, as we have seen, Calvin does have some valuable things to say in regard to a theology of union with Christ, if we simply stayed with his doctrine of election and eternal decrees, we would always find assurance of salvation elusive.
    2. Despite what is lacking in Calvin’s superstructure he nevertheless was able to offer some brilliant trajectories for the development of a doctrine of assurance. Union with Christ and the duplex gratia in Calvin’s theology provide a focus on salvation that sees salvation extra nosĀ (outside of us), and consequently as an objective reality that Growā€”ā€œAssurance is of the Essence of Saving Faithā€ 53 is not contingent upon us, but solely contingent on the person and achievements of Jesus Christ for us. This is where assurance can be developed from Calvin’s theology in a constructive manner. IfĀ salvationĀ is not predicated upon my faith or by my works, but instead is a predicate of Jesus’ faith and faithfulness, then there is no longer space for anyone to look but to Christ. As we have already noted, Calvin did not necessarily press into the idea of Jesus’ faith for us, but that could be an implication in an inchoate way within Calvin’s thought. Calvin provides hope for weary and seeking souls because of his doctrines of union with Christ and the duplex gratia;Ā primarilyĀ because what these doctrines say is that all aspects of salvation have been accomplished by Jesus Christ (namely here, justification and sanctification). Calvin’s theology, when we simply look at his theology of union with Christ and grace, leaves no space for seekers to look anywhere else but to Christ for assurance of salvation. And at this level Calvin can truly say that ā€œassurance is the essence of faith.ā€
    3. As we moved from Calvin to Barth and Torrance what we have are the theological resources required for a robust doctrine of assurance. With Barth and Torrance we certainly have Calvin’s emphases on union with Christ and grace, as Christ is understood as the objective (and subjective) ground of salvation. But moving beyond this we have Calvin’s weaknesses corrected when it comes to a doctrine of election. Because Barth and Torrance see Jesus as both elect andĀ reprobateĀ simultaneously in his vicarious humanity for all of humanity, there is absolutely no space for anxiety in the life of the seeker of assurance. Since, for Barth and Torrance, there is no such thing as ā€œtemporary faith,ā€ since faith, from their perspective, is the ā€œfaith of Christā€ (pistis Christou) for all of humanity, there is no room for the elect to attempt to prove that they have a genuine saving faith, since the only saving faith is Christ’s ā€œfor us and our salvation.ā€ Further, since there is no hidden or secret decree where the reprobate can be relegated, since God’s choice is on full display in Jesus Christ— with ā€œno decree behind the back of Jesusā€ā€”the seeker of assurance does not have to wonder whether or not God is for them or not; the fact and act of the incarnation itself already says explicitly that God is for the elect and not against them.
    4. If there is no such thing as elect and reprobate individuals, if God in Christ gave his life for all of humanity in his own electĀ humanity, if there is no such thing as temporary faith, if Christ’s faith for us is representative of the only type of saving faith there is; then Christ is all consuming, as such he is God’s assurance of salvation for all of humanity. The moment someone starts to wonder if they are elect, properly understood, the only place that person can look is to Jesus. There is no abstract concept of salvation; Jesus Christ is salvation, and assurance of salvation and any lingering questions associated with that have no space other than to look at Jesus. The moment someone gets caught up in anxious thoughts and behavior associated with assurance, is the moment that person has ceased thinking about salvation in, by, and for Christ. Anxiety aboutĀ salvation, about whether or not I am elect only comes from a faulty doctrine of election which, as we have seen, is in reality the result of a faulty Christology. We only have salvation with God in Christ because of what Jesus Christ did for us by the grace of God; as such our only hope is to be in union with Christ, and participate in what Calvin called the ā€œdouble graceā€ of God’s life for us. It is this reality that quenches any fears about whether or not I am genuinely elect; because it places the total burden of that question on what God has done for us, including having faith for us in the vicarious humanity of Jesus Christ.

Do Humans Have Freewill?: What it Means to Be Free in Christ the King’s Economy Before God

31Ā Then Jesus said to the Jews who had believed in him, ā€œIf you continue in my word, you are truly my disciples;Ā 32Ā and you will know the truth, and the truth will make you free.ā€Ā 33Ā They answered him, ā€œWe are descendants of Abraham and have never been slaves to anyone. What do you mean by saying, ā€˜You will be made free’?ā€34Ā Jesus answered them, ā€œVery truly, I tell you, everyone who commits sin is a slave to sin.Ā 35Ā The slave does not have a permanent place in the household; the son has a place there forever.Ā 36Ā So if the Son makes you free, you will be free indeed. –John 8:31-36

5Ā For if we have been united with him in a death like his, we will certainly be united with him in a resurrection like his.Ā 6Ā We know that our old self was crucified with him so that the body of sin might be destroyed, and we might no longer be enslaved to sin.Ā 7Ā For whoever has died is freed from sin.Ā 8Ā But if we have died with Christ, we believe that we will also live with him. –Romans 8:5-8

Discussions surrounding freewill in human agency abound; whether that be between Calvinism and Arminianism, or in the secular world and philosophy in regard to ethics and moral culpability. But is this really how so called ā€œfreewillā€ operates in a genuinely Christian Dogmatic frame? Augustine, even Luther believed that humans have freewill, but that because of the greater loves supervening in the fallen heart’s life, humans, apart from the Spirit of the LORD, will always choose those things that serve themselves; serves their greater appetites and loves that start and end in an incurved self (homo in se incurvatus).

But really, is this what human ā€œfreedomā€ entails? One would think that what and who a human is, purposively, would determine and shape what in fact so called freedom entails. In other words, if human beings’ ultimate teleology or purpose was always already to be in a conciliatory relationship with the Triune God wouldn’t what it means to be free mean to be free for God? I contend that this is indeed what it means to be humanly free; i.e. free for God. I believe that this is what Jesus and the Apostle Paul were referring to when they thought of ā€œfreedomā€; to be free from our incurved and broken selves (which is the dehumanizing factor), and to be open and genuinely free for the living God—to be able to live in his type of freedom (the only actual ontology of freedom available) as we participate in and from his life through the mediated eternal life in Jesus Christ.

John Webster gets at these things as he discussing what human freedom entails within the rubric of Divine Providence. He writes:

God’s governance secures the creature’s freedom. If this fails to commend itself, it is because it contravenes a destructive convention according to which true freedom is indeterminacy and absolute spontaneity or it is nothing at all. To say that is to deny creatureliness. Freedom is existence in accordance with created nature and towards created ends, not self-authorship or aseity. This means that freedom is reception, but not passivity – that is permission and summons, but not spoken by me, but to me by God. ā€˜God is the abiding cause of man’s being a cause able to determine the character of his existence.’ The free person fulfils her self by perfecting a given nature. That perfecting is the work of providence which does not constrain but fulfils the creature’s self-determination, because, in Aquinas’s terms, God’s providence moves the creature’s will ā€˜as he influences it interiorly’ (interius eam inclinando). Can a moved will be free? Yes, because ā€˜to be moved voluntarily is to be moved of one’s own accord, i.e. from a resource within. That inner resource, however, may derive from some other, outward source. In this sense, there is no contradiction between being moved of one’s own accord and being moved by another’. If we are to see that Aquinas’s argument is evangelically well-judged, we need to grasp that divine providential acts are not simple compulsion (the archer sending the arrow) but rather intrinsic to the creature whom God moves, what Aquinas calls ā€˜natural necessity’, in which the creature is activated and not diminished. And to see this we also need to see that – as that astute reader of Aquinas, Turretin, puts it at the beginning of the modern period, ā€˜The fount of error is the measuring of the nature of liberty from equilibrium and making indifference essential to it. Liberty must be defined by willingness and spontaneity.’

This points us to how, in the light of the gospel, providence dignifies creatures. As with creaturely freedom, so with creaturely dignity: it does not consist only in being agens seipsum, one’s own director. To be moved by divine government is not to be beaten, but to be moved to act.[1]

Webster’s insights, particularly as he gleans those from Aquinas, can easily get us into discussions revolving around what has been called compatibilism, libertarian free agency, Molinism, synchronic contingency etc. But let’s not get lost in that patch.

The basic point I am wanting to reiterate is that in the Kingdom of God in Christ—in other words, in ā€œreally real realityā€ā€”what it means to be ā€˜free’ for human beings is to be free for the Triune God. Webster, via Aquinas, notes the role that teleology and purposiveness as regnant realities have for what being human coram Deo means vis-Ć -vis a conception of freedom. To be free, in an ultimate and even basic sense, for the creature in God’s economy (which is the only real economy around) is to be free for God. Living in and from his freedom, the type that grounded and grounds his choice to be for us and not against us, the type that grounded and grounds his choice to create and recreate in the resurrection is the only real freedom there is. Thus, for the human, what it means to actually be free and to have free-choice, is what it looks like for God as that is derived through our participation in his life in and through Christ.

And the last point I just iterated needs to be pressed; Webster doesn’t press it in the quote I provide from him, and he has certain antinomy towards it more broadly when it comes to speaking about moral human free agency. That is: we need to ground what it means to be human in the archetypal humanity of Jesus Christ for us. If we don’t we will be prone to think humanity from discoverable (versus revealed) traits and resonances that we think we can discern by reflection upon human experience and circumstance in the profane and mundane world. We need a robust doctrine of the vicarious humanity of Jesus Christ to regulate our theological anthropology if we are going to have a proper understanding of not only what it means to be human coram Deo, but what it subsequently means to be free before God in accord with our given natures as human beings.

 

[1]John Webster,Ā God Without Measure: Working Papers In Christian Theology: Volume 1: God And The Works Of GodĀ (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2015), 139.

Miscellanies on How the Order of a Doctrine of Election Affects the Pyromaniacs and The Gospel Coalition

The Gospel is Kingdom initiating, Kingdom grounding; indeed it could be said that the Gospel is the disruptive orientation of the original creation’s ultimate purpose as that is realized in the re-creation of God in Jesus Christ and his resurrection from the dead. As David Fergusson has written, ā€œthe world was made so that Christ might be born;ā€ this adage captures well the inherent value or the inner reality that the creation itself has. It is one born only in and from God’s reality to graciously be for the world and to do so in himself, in the Son, by the Spirit and thus to pretend as if the Triune reality is not the ground and grammar of ALL of reality—inclusive of morality—is to reduce the Gospel to a pietist individualism that only has to do with me and my salvation/me and my eternal destiny. While personal salvation, its appropriation, is very important, it is grounded more objectively and universally in the reality of redemption that God in Christ has proffered for all of creation, with Jesus being its crowning reality and jewel. In other words, the cosmic reality of salvation, grounded in the humanity and divinity (an/enhypostasis) of the eternal Logos become flesh, Jesus Christ, encompasses all aspects of created reality. It is not simply a matter of sufficiency but of efficacy; in other words, in the Kingdom, in the recreation there is not a delimitation of that to particular parts (i.e. classic election/reprobation) of the creation; no, the Kingdom of God in Christ (which is given reality in the Gospel which is embodied and lived in the Christ) is a macrocosmic reality (Rom. 8.18ff) that indeed disruptively impacts individuals who are willing, by the Holy Spirit’s wooing, to participate in this new created reality in and through the priestly-vicarious humanity of Jesus Christ. This is why when people like Phil Johnson want to attempt to reduce the Gospel reality to its more individualistic provenance they end up critiquing work like The Gospel Coalition is engaging in as it sees the whole of reality implicated by the Kingdom Gospel; he fails to recognize that the Gospel is about a broader work and doctrine of creation/recreation than it simply being about ā€˜fire-insurance’ for an elect group of people elevated over and against the rest of creation (what TF Torrance identifies as ā€˜The Latin Heresy’ or an inherent dualism that comes to pass when we start denominating parts of creation from the mass of the creation). In this vein note what Johnson recently wrote in critique of The Gospel Coalition and its engagement with popular culture:

The “gospel-centered” movement that many of us were so enthusiastic for just one decade ago has gone with the drift. The Gospel Coalition has for some time now shown a pattern of embracing whatever new moral issue or political cause is currently popular in Western culture by arguing that this, too, is a legitimate “gospel issue.” They are by no means alone in this. Everything from the latest Marvel movie to gun control legislation has been deemed a “gospel issue” by some savvy evangelical writer at one or more of the most heavily trafficked evangelical websites. But if everything is supposedly a gospel issue, the expression “gospel-centered” is rendered meaningless.

As I said in a Tweet earlier today, we must not abandon the focused simplicity of Luke 24:46-47 in favor of a social gospel that encompasses a large complex of racial, economic, and political issues. Every denomination, every educational institution, and every church that has ever made that error has seen a quick demise. I for one don’t intend to watch in silence while the current generation repeats that mistake.[1]

In response to this I have read others on Twitter raise the question of sufficiency; in other words, is Scripture itself sufficient in responding to race or human sexuality questions, or in Scripture’s overt silence on these things are we able and responsible to turn to other resources—latent within God’s good creation (i.e. common grace)—to seek responses to the ills that the fallen world presents us with in an attempt to ultimately point people to the ultimate sufficiency of the living God as that is provided for in Jesus Christ? So the response seems to be: not all things are intensively or directly related to the narrower message of the Gospel, instead they are related but only in an extensive or indirect matter which allows for and even calls for Christian thinkers to respond to questions not explicitly spoken to in Scripture in such a way that honors the general reality of the Gospel; and within that space has freedom to address issues that might not otherwise seem to have to do with the Gospel in any meaningful sense, but in fact are Gospel issues insofar as they are indirectly impacted by the ultimate reality of it (in other words: natural law, or a natural ethic is going to be appealed to—something that in this line of thinking does not undercut the sufficiency of Scripture to speak to what it intends to speak to, but in fact works in a complementary way to Scripture with the a priori recognition that all of creation belongs to God and is within the realm of his Providential care, governance, and sustenance).

There is a certain irony to these views (Johnson’s and Twitter’s). Both of these approaches share a similar doctrine of creation, theologically/soteriologically. They both share a particular view on the sufficiency of the Gospel and Scripture, but apply that differently (because of broader hermeneutical differences). They denominate parts of creation out from the greater mass of creation, believing that one part is the elect of God while the rest is damned. Johnson focuses on the elect part of creation, but dispensationally neglecting the whole of creation, while the other side also focuses on the elect part of creation, but they see that as the seed that ultimately cashes out in the new creation; they place election into a cosmic understanding of salvation and Providence while Johnson places election into an individualistic and pietist understanding of salvation wherein what ultimately matters is not this creation simpliciter, but the legal salvation of an elect people from an eternal hell. The irony is that they share some overlapping soteriological assumptions, in regard to election, but where that doctrine is placed in their respective theologies cashes out differently in the way that they see the Gospel itself implicating the whole of creation. The Twitter-view works from a cosmic doctrine of salvation, while the Johnson view works from a pietistic, individualist understanding of salvation that is discontinuous from creation as a cosmic reality. The difference in the end is that the Twitter view is Covenantal while the Johnson view is Dispensational. The Twitter view reflects a historic confessionally Reformed perspective, while the Johnson view reflects his Calvinist-lite perspective which is the reduction of Reformed theology to the so called five-points.

Just take this post for what it’s worth. I was going to totally go in another direction and refer us to Oliver O’Dononvan and Philip Ziegler (and apocalyptic theology), but the above is what came out instead. It’s just me thinking out loud. But I think there might be something to my theoretical meanderings. And I only think this is a worthwhile exercise because I think it illustrates a substantial theological polarity that is present within the so called Reformed world. I’ll want to return to how I opened this post up, and get into the relationship of the Gospel and the Kingdom within an Apocalyptic Theology and how I think that informs discussions like these.

[1] Phil Johnson, The Root of the Matter, accessed 05-28-2018.

Using Apocalyptic Theology to ‘Re-fund’ the Doctrine of Total Depravity with the Hope of ‘De-funding’ the Pelagian-Impulse in the Christian Church

I don’t have any quotes from someone else in this post; I simply wanted to state something very briefly. Many of my posts are in critique of what I have called classical Calvinism, which is a designation I use to classify the dominant form (in its reception) of ā€˜Reformed theology’ or Calvinism in its common expressions in the 21st century west (whether that be an elaborate form of federal theology, or a reduced form of five-pointism). That notwithstanding, Evangelical Calvinism, as myself and Myk Habets articulate it (and in this post I am really just speaking for myself) have a strong doctrine of total depravity. That is, we believe that at a moral/spiritual level, theological-anthropologically, there is nothing in humanity but a homo incurvatus in se (human incurved upon themselves); a very Augustinian concept, or more pointedly, I’d argue, Pauline. It is at this point that Evangelical Calvinists can lock-arms with their classical Calvinist cousins; yet, I’d argue, that in many cases this is only in principle (de jure). The intention of articulating a doctrine of total depravity is to take away any sort of Pelagian notion that within humanity there is a neutral spot, a point of contact that remains lively between God and humanity; a point of contact that is not contingent upon God’s choice to be for humanity, but instead upon humanity’s choice to be or not to be for God. We see this principle, the ā€˜Pelagian-principle’ rearing its head over and over again through the history of interpretation in the church. Whether that be in Pelagius himself, John Cassian following, the Roman Catholic church with its teaching on created and cooperative grace, certain iterations of Reformed federal theology that have a doctrine of preparationism (quid pro quo contractual conception of salvation), or what have you. I contend that this impulse, this Pelagianizing impulse remains a pernicious devil that wants to remain present at all costs; and as such through many forms of sophistication and subtleties we do indeed see it remaining, even in various iterations (significant ones) of so called Christian theology.

As a proponent of what has come to be called ā€˜Apocalyptic theology’ I think that theology, which I take ultimately to be heavenly and Pauline, has the realistic resources to counter this Pelagian-impulse; in the sense that apocalyptic theology takes seriously the radicality required in order to deal with the human-inspired desire to continuously inject itself into the realm that alone belongs to God. Apocalyptic theology ultimately recognizes that creation is in such a dire place of irreconciliation with God that its only hope is if God breaks into his creation in Jesus Christ, puts it to death, resurrects and recreates such that creation itself only has hope if it lives from this new creation whose name is Jesus Christ. Apocalyptic theology sees nothing of value left in the old creation (in the sense of a moral component left in humanity before God), and by consequent, Pelagianism, and all its Genesis 3.15ish iterations go the way of the ā€˜stony ground.’ Humanity, soteriologically, only has hope as it lives from the reality of the new creation, from the new humanity in Jesus Christ; the humanity whose reality is only realized by the person of the eternal Logos, the Son of God, who we now know as Jesus Christ (an/enhypostasis).

We need to constantly repent and live from Christ. Total depravity recognizes the dangers of presuming a place in humanity that has spark for God apart from God’s intervention in Christ. Sometimes people who are proponents of total depravity in word, in deed end up undercutting the intention of total depravity by offering theological models and constructs that end up re-inserting the very premises that total depravity was intended to guard against (think of ā€˜created grace’ for example).