On Ryan Hurd’s Babylonian Captivity

I’ve ā€œknownā€ Ryan Hurd for many years now; through online engagements and personal correspondences. I’ve only known Hurd in his classical Reformed context as that has taken place during his time at New Saint Andrews College, and then as he has been an instructor for Davenant Hall. My last correspondence with him was quite a few years ago; he and I were discussing his entrance into the PhD program in theology at the University of Kampen (he was just getting started then). There was no indication that he was wrestling with the types of ecclesiological matters that have now finally bubbled up in his recent announcement. In case you don’t follow online theological matters closely, Ryan just wrote a post for his Substack that announced his (and his wife’s) movement into Roman Catholicism. If you don’t know of Ryan his primary theological interlocutor over the years has been the ā€˜Angelic Doctor,’ Thomas Aquinas. Indeed, it was this hook that finally captured Hurd’s total intellectual and spiritual development. I have always contended that if you’re going to be a Thomist (follower of Thomas Aquinas), then for consistency’s sake you ought to be a Tridentine Roman Catholic (a Catholic after the Council of Trent). Ryan clearly arrived at that same conclusion. Here is a piece of what he wrote for his Substack announcement:

This occurred in my case. And here is where we findĀ theĀ reasonĀ for me becoming Catholic. Of course, there are always many reasons for a thing like this, a whole host and all very different. Actually, it is my impression that people often cannot point to reallyĀ a singleĀ reason within the mass of them; but in my particular case, I can do so easily.Ā TheĀ reason, for me, is precisely what initially determined me to the Catholic part on these contradictions. The name of that reason is Thomas Aquinas, and particularly his auctoritas.

Auctoritas is a condition of a person comprising both his knowledge in a science, as well as his moral goodness. The former is how you know that he is not deceived; and the latter is how you know that he does not deceive when he testifies as to which part is true. When such a person does testify, you assent to that part merely on account of that person’s condition (propter auctoritatem)–and then you proceed from there.

Over time, it happened that Thomas’s auctoritas became supreme in my intellectual experience. Obviously, it is not supreme absolutely speaking–Thomas would be the first person to tell you that. But it is so in myĀ experience–especially as I have undergone the confirming process of (1) assenting initially merely because Thomas said so; (2) eventually found rationes; and then (3) locked the proposition down in a demonstration and achieved scientia. All throughout this, my learning process, I have never found Thomas wanting, not even close. He has never steered me wrong. And over time, my intellect has become habituated to proceed about contradictions in precisely this mode (I have articulated this elsewhere as simplyĀ what it means to be a Thomist).

As I became intellectually obliged to follow Thomas wherever he leads me, so withholding my assent became intellectually unjustified–even regarding those contradictions where, initially, I had no reasons for the Catholic part, or even my remaining Protestant doubts. Remarkably, I became obliged to conclude Catholicism, merely because Thomas had told me to do so. And in the end, I listened.[1]

Why have I maintained that to be a Thomist most organically leads to being a Tridentine Catholic? Primarily because of the hierarchical chain-of-being and theory of causation present with Thomas’ appropriation of the Aristotelian categories and causation. Steven Ozment writes,

The assumption that real relations existed between God, man, and the world made possible Aquinas’s confidence inĀ a posterioriĀ proofs of God’s existence; finite effects led necessarily to their origin, because they were really connected with it. The same assumption underlay Aquinas’s distinctive views on the ā€œanalogicalā€ character of human knowledge and discourse about God. According to Aquinas, one could speak meaningfully of one’s relationship to God by analogy with one’s relationship with one’s fellow man because a real relationship existed between the values of people shared and those God had prescribed.[2]

It is this theory of real hierarchical relations finding their causal and actual force from the Unmoved Mover, God, that in my view entails an ecclesiological theory wherein the Catholic church fits best. Why? Because it makes sense that if there is One God, One primary cause, that in a chain-of-being movement from highest to lowest, that within that chain there be one Church, one people of God. And on analogy even within the structural framework of the said Church, there be a hierarchy of one (like the Pope represents) that works its way down into diffuse levels of leadership out into the various priests, so on and so forth. Indeed, just as in Thomas’ theory, he sees the angels with a similar hierarchical structure within the angelic structure itself. And again, this all starts with the actus purus (pure act) or Pure Being of the singular God.

Does this mean that the hierarchical theory of God’s being in action must necessarily lead to the Roman Episcopy? No. But the most organic iteration of it, I would argue, given the Dominican’s ecclesial space for reasoning, is in fact the Roman Catholic church. And of course, this is why the Nominalists and the via moderna posed such a problem for the prelates within the Roman city. For sure, as the nominalists maintained, there were no real or necessary relations between God and the world. If the ā€˜moderns’ were right about this we can see how the authority of the Roman church could easily be called into question. If God merely related to the world through covenants and ad hoc words (think of the potentia theology), then the centrality and the necessity for the Roman church to mediate God to the world, could not theologically make an argument for the authority of the papacy. But then this is why I think that to be an ecclesiological Thomist is to be Roman Catholic. Aquinas constructed his theory by deployment of and synthesis with the Aristotelian categories toward buttressing the authority and reality of the Holy Communion of Roma in view. Even if early on his theology wasn’t as enthusiastically endorsed as it finally became post and contemporaneous with Trent.

To draw this back in: Hurd, as I have briefly sketched, I think, is being consistent with the aims of Thomas’ ecclesiology and its coherence with the Roman ecclesiology and theory of church government and authority therefrom. There was once another Reformed fellow, in his case, a Presbyterian, named Jason Stellman; he too, within his Presbyterian (Aristotelian) theological commitments arrived at the same conclusion as Ryan Hurd. As a result, he also swam the river Tiber. Surely, there are many former Reformed folk who have made this move. And I would argue for similar reasons to Hurd’s. Ultimately, I have greater respect for people like Hurd who see that the pressure of Thomas’ thinking, if held consistently, ought to lead all of his adherents to Vatican City, Italy. Of course, there are better ways to be genuinely Protestant. And so, I would invite Hurd et al. to abandon Thomas’ project altogether and recognize what it truly means to be a biblical Christian. There are theological, dogmatic ways for doing that; and ways that do not require a sacrificium intellectus. But alas, that was never Hurd’s way to begin with; that is, to be Protestant.

[1] Ryan M. Hurd, Why I’ve Become Roman Catholic, accessed 04-10-2026.

[2] Steven Ozment,Ā The Age of Reform 1250–1550: An Intellectual and Religious History of Late Medieval and Reformation EuropeĀ (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980),Ā 49.

God’s Beauty in Jonathan Edwards’ Theology: With a Flourish of Inspired Worship

A word from American theologian par excellence, Jonathan Edwards, on the beauty of the triune God:

It is unreasonable to think otherwise, than that the first foundation of a true love of God, is that whereby He is in Himself lovely, or worthy to be loved, or the supreme loveliness of His nature. This is certainly what makes Him chiefly amiable. What chiefly makes a man, or any creature lovely, is his excellency; and so what chiefly renders God lovely, and must undoubtedly be the chief ground of true love, is His excellency. God’s nature, or the Divinity, is infinitely excellent; yea it is infinite beauty, brightness, and glory of itself. But how can that be true love of this excellent and lovely nature, which is not built on the foundation of its true loveliness? How can that be true love of beauty and brightness which is not for beauty and brightness’ sake?[1]

For our purposes we will ignore the implicit analogia entis procedure of negative knowledge of God in Edwards’ above rumination, and simply focus on his conclusions.

Along with Edwards I think we need to ā€˜Make the Beauty of God Great Again’ (MBGGA). Not that we can predicate anything of God, but indeed, we must bear witness to the reality that is in fact lovely, beautiful. In the above statement Edwards refers to brightness as a synonym of beauty with reference to God. What this conjures for me is Genesis 1, and the Light of God’s Grace made known at God’s first Word: ā€˜In the beginning God created the heavens and earth.’ God’s Light is the primordial Light of the world, indeed the Light that will finally make the Sun and Moon no longer necessary in the Eschatological Light of the Son of Man as His presence in the abode of the Father by the Holy Spirit is unquenchably diffuse throughout the New Heavens and Earth, the Heavenly Zion as that spans the expanse of a de-futilized creation.

Further, implicit and at the base of God’s life for Edwards is that God’s beauty is fitting in the sense that God is a perichoretic relationship of interpenetrating filial and pneumic subject-in-being onto-relating Self-givenness one in the other eternal life. But it is precisely this, for Edwards, at least in my riff of him, that God’s love is indeed beautiful; that is, that God is not a philosophical monad, but instead a relationship of eternal persons in koinonial singular being as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. As such it is the mysterium Trinitatis that is deserving of all praise and worship. The mystery of God’s eternal life to be basked in by His creatures in Christ, in a doxological wash of bliss and beholdenness. The beauty of the triune God becomes the purpose of the human ensouled body. It is here, in this magnificent beauty of the Father, the Son in His bosom, hovered over by the Holy Spirit that the people recreated in His image in the face of the Son, Jesus Christ, that the sons of God long for; indeed, the revealing of the sons of God as they are unfurled from their bodies of death, and finally brought into the consummate participatory Beatific vision of the triune God. And for the Christian why wait? Even though our bodies of death attempt to keep us clinging to the dust of our earthly origin, the excellency of God’s life in us raises up over and again in the intercession the Son continuously makes for those who will inherit eternal life.

Amen.

[1] Jonathan Edwards cited by Nick Needham, 2000 Years of Christ’s Power: The Age of Enlightenment and Awakening 18th Century, Volume 5 (Great Britain: Christian Focus Publications Ltd., 2023), 364.

Heretic or Heterodox?

Arius the Heresiarch

I’ve been involved in some discussions recently revolving around figuring out what ought to count as heresy versus heterodoxy. Well, I should say, I’ve been attempting to introduce the heterodoxy category as a way to think about aberrant teachings without going to full ramming speed, and labelling everything we disagree with as heresy. The reason this has been coming up more on other social medias is because Kirk Cameron recently just came out as an Annihilationist (or Conditional Immortality proponent). So, predictably, folks have been calling him a heretic. But I protest.

It is better to identify teachings that we might disagree with, and that might be considered aberrant, as heterodox. The distinction I make between heresy and heterodoxy is as follows:

  1. Does it deny the eternally triune life of God (de Deo uno, de Deo trino)?
  2. Does it deny that the singular person of Jesus is both fully God and fully human?
  3. Does it deny that salvation comes by grace alone, through faith alone, in Christ alone?

If the answer to the above questions is yes, then I would identify holding these teachings as damnable heresies; that if someone is committed to them, they cannot be eternally saved. But if someone, like Kirk Cameron, has arrived at what I would consider to be a matter of adiaphora and/or aberrant, non-essential, teaching in regard to a doctrine of hell, then I would consider this heterodoxy. Surely, heterodox teaching can have serious effects on someone’s Christian spirituality and the way they interpret the world, and those around them; and for this reason, if something is heterodox it represents a serious matter worth debating over. But just because Cameron, in this instance, affirms an aberrant or heterodox doctrine of hell (in my view), this will not result in him spending an eternity in hell for affirming it. Cameron, I presume in good faith, doesn’t reject any of the three marks of heresy I have indexed above. As such, he is eternally justified before the living God in Christ, and not a heretic.

If everything we disagree with, in regard to Christian teaching, is just heresy because I disagree with it, then in reality nothing will be heresy in the end. There needs to be some nuance on the continuum of Christian teaching; that is, in regard to its relative intensity vis-Ć -vis the role it might play in regard to identifying a teaching that is in fact eternally damning. Annihilationism does not represent a damnable teaching, even if, in my view, it represents a heterodox position. Matters of adiaphora, like doctrines of hell, respective viewpoints on biblical eschatological positions, so on and so forth, can indeed, as noted previously, have some serious and deleterious implications with reference to someone’s daily experience as a Christian person. And for this reason, bad teaching ought to be identified and called out. But it ought to be done in such a way, that recognizes distinctions along a continuum of gravity, and discern therefrom.

That said, many consider me a Barthian heretic; so, my post could be self-serving in that sense Haha.

Living in the Mystical Union of Christ within the Mysterium Trinitatis

Richard Sibbes (1577-1635), Puritan pastor and theologian has a few words on the sufficiency of Christ’s offering to the Father, and the trinitarian shape of the gospel:

What a support to our faith is this, that God the Father, the party offended by our sins, is so well pleased with the work of redemption! And what a comfort is this, that seeing God’s love resteth on Christ, as well pleased in him, we may gather that he is as well pleased with us, if we be in Christ! For his love resteth in whole Christ, in Christ mystical, as well as Christ natural, because he loveth him and us with one love. Let us, therefore, embrace Christ, and in him God’s love, and build our faith safely on such a Saviour, that is furnished with so high a commission. See here, for our comfort, a sweet agreement of all three persons: the Father giveth a commission to Christ; the Spirit furnisheth and sanctifieth to it; Christ himself executeth the office of a Mediator. Our redemption is founded upon the joint agreement of all three persons of the Trinity.[1]

What amazing thoughts! Did you notice in the first paragraph how Sibbes highlights the function that our union with Christ has before the Father? We are loved by the Father, with the same love that He loves His Son, Jesus, with. Let that reality sink in, meditate upon how intimate in fact you are with the Father, through the Son, by the Holy Spirit! We are truly represented, and known to the Father, because of the redemptive work and mediatorial Priesthood of the Son. Come boldly to the Father, come as if you are His dearly beloved Son . . . because You are! We have been enveloped into the intratrinitarian life of the Father, Son, and Spirit; snatched out of the idolatry and slavery of self-love, and brought into the union and communion of HIS love. LOVE BOLDLY!

[1] Richard Sibbes, trans. Grosart, Works of Richard Sibbes: The Bruised Reed and Smoking Flax, 42-3.

*Originally written in 2009 for another blog of mine back in the day.

 

The Lombard, An Origenist Analogy On the Church Catholic the Church Protestant

Peter Lombard (ca. 1095-1160), bishop of Paris. Lombard taught theology at the school of Notre Dame and his text Four Books of Sentences was the key theology text of the Middle Ages. (Photo by Ā© CORBIS/Corbis via Getty Images)

I was just pondering how all of us Protestants (Reformed, Lutheran, evangelicals et al.) are still members of the Latin/Western church (normally understood to be the Catholic church). As Providence would have it, as I’m reading Book 4 of Lombard’s Sentences (in my quest to become a mediaeval doctor of the Church), I came across the following citation from Lombard on and from Origen:

ORIGEN, ON LEVITICUS. And so those whom the Church’s sentence strikes and wounds according to what they deserve are outside also before God. Whoever did not deserve it, is wounded by the Church’s sentence, unless he holds it in contempt. Hence Origen: ā€œOne has gone out from truth, from faith, from charity: on this account, he goes out of the encampments of the Church, even if he is not cast out by the bishop’s voice. Likewise, on the contrary, another is sent outside by a judgement which is not right, but if he did not do anything to deserve to go out, he suffers no wound. And so, at times, one who is sent outside is within; and one who is outside, appears to be kept within.ā€ (Lombard, Sentences, 4.18.7 (103).3)

In context this is referring to the binding and loosing power that the Catholic church believes priests have, in regard to forgiveness and confession of sins. But on analogy, it could also be observed, in principle, that there remains this type of ā€œoutside/withinā€ dynamic even within the broader catholic Western church (and beyond). Of course, how this outside/within dynamic is affirmed, perspectivally, will determine who the outside and within are. From a historical perspective it would be the Catholic church within which the Protestant church, while outside, is still within in certain important ways. Indeed, in the way Luther had originally intended: to be a reformer from within rather than outside the church. Hence, Exsurge Domine notwithstanding, I would argue, de jure, the Protestants are still within even while outside.

Problematizing a Development of Sacra Doctrina within the Church: With Reference to Peter of John Olivi

Bernard McGinn writes the following with reference to the apocalyptic-theology-of-history present in the mediaeval theologian, Peter of John Olivi’s (c. 1248—1298) thought:

The invective Olivi directs against the evidences of the carnal Church is concerned not only with the ecclesiastical abuses of the day, especially with avarice and simony, but also, like Bonaventure before him, with the use of Aristotle in theology. The ProvenƧal Franciscan also expressed belief in a double Antichrist—the Mystical Antichrist, a coming false pope who would attack the Franciscan Rule, and the Great, or Open Antichrist, whose defeat would usher in the final period of history. Characteristic of Franciscan apocalyptic is his emphasis on the role of Francis as the initiator of the period of renewal and his hope for the conversion of all peoples in the course of the final events.[1]

Olivi was a student of the infamous mediaeval theologian, Bonaventure. But I thought this treatment by McGinn on Olivi was telling. Telling in regard to the patterns and thematics of theological development. Telling, in regard to how theologies and emphases often repeat themselves in various and all periods of theological development throughout history. As McGinn highlights, Olivi was concerned with a ā€œcarnal Churchā€; he was concerned with the imposition of Aristotle’s categories upon Christian theology (which of course Thomas Aquians was famous for doing). We also observe, that for Olivi, according to McGinn, he saw that the Catholic church itself had corruption riddling it throughout; he saw the Antichrist coming from within the Church, not without. This latter development is interesting to me because it reminds me of Martin Luther’s view that the office of the Pope would finally produce the Antichrist (the Lutheran Church Wisconsin Synod still holds to this position in their confession). And then, we see in Olivi, a belief in something like a postmillennial understanding of the very end of history. He believes, according to McGinn, that the whole world will be Christianized prior to the second coming of Jesus Christ.

Many things stood out to me in this one paragraph on Olivi’s theology. The primary hook for me, and this won’t be surprising to my readers, is that Olivi was critical of Aristotle’s presence in the development of the sacra doctrina within the Church. Olivi, like his teacher, Bonaventure, believed that Aristotle could only serve as an artificial grammar for articulating Christian doctrine. Such sucralose, in the minds of Bonaventure and Olivi, respectively, had no place in affecting a theology for the Church, insofar that Aristotle himself thought a construct of God as a pagan.

It is important for Christian folks in the 21st century to get beyond theology purely sourced from Twitter/X and other social media platforms. What the genuine student finds, if they study the books, is that things are much more complex and less concretized than they might want to think. There have been various strands of development, various traditions cultivated in the Church’s history that transcend the parochial and sectarian and absolutized divides we see today on the interwebs. I think this one paragraph alone on Olivi helps to illustrate that point.

Within evangelical/reformed theology today there is a movement towards retrieval. And yet what this has come to mean, especially through the work of someone like Matthew Barrett and Craig Carter, is that what is really being retrieved is one strand of development that is Aristotelian/Thomist heavy; as if ā€˜Christian Aristotelianism’ was the only development present within the mediaeval and early and post Reformed churches. This simply is not the case; again, as our passage illustrates.

Conversely, I am anti-Aristotelian myself (no shocker there!) Some might think that this is because of my appreciation for the theologies of Barth and TF Torrance alone. Again, this is not the case. I was anti-Aristotelian way before I ever read Barth and TFT. I was exposed to the Bonaventure-Olivi thread of development twenty-three years ago in seminary. This thread was developed further with the sparker of the Protestant Reformation, Martin Luther; he looked back to such threads in the via antiqua through his direct mentor, Johann von Staupitz, and before him, Jean Gerson.

Anyway, this post is somewhat of a smorgasbord of hits on various issues; something like a Miscellanies. But I hope, at least, the reader might be able to better appreciate the ā€œproblematizedā€ nature of doctrinal development within the Church of Jesus Christ. In other words, I hope that folks might be alerted to the problem of reducing and then absolutizing one’s pet positions. Surely, we ought to be convicted about the theological things we believe. But those convictions ought to first take shape (in a spiraling and continuous way) through the caldron of toiling with the sources (ad fontes) of the history of interpretation and development of the sacra doctrina.

[1] Bernard McGinn, Visions of the End: Apocalyptic Traditions in the Middle Ages (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 205.

St. Martin Luther, the Christian Humanist Against the Glory Theologians

Definitions are important; if for no other reason but to understand what something means. Context provides meaning, and thus definition, for words; whether that is in sentences, paragraphs, chapters, books, so on and so forth. When attempting to understand where a particular theologian lies, as far as classification, within the alternative types of being a theologian, it is important that we get a handle on the definitions used to ascertain that. In the medieval period, generally, a theologian could be classified as a scholastic theologian, or a Christian humanist; or potentially, both, depending on the way someone enters into the reconstruction of said history. There are general markers that broadly characterize a scholastic theologian from a Christian humanist theologian. 1) A scholastic theologian was, methodologically, committed to the dialectical methodology. This methodology entailed a presentation of: a) thesis, b) antithesis, c) synthesis. Beyond its formality, more materially, the scholastic was often an Aristotelian, and later, after Thomas Aquinas’ synthesis of Aristotle with Christian dogmatics, a Thomist. 2) A Christian humanist theologian was typified by an attempt to ad fontes (go back to the sources, behind the layers and accretions of beliefs the scholastics had developed), with a focus on understanding the original biblical languages (so getting beyond Latin); and by way of methodology, the Christian humanist didn’t necessarily attempt to synthesize ideas. The humanist believed, by reference to their set of literary and linguistic and historical tools, that they could arrive at a scenario, when deciding on the validity and soundness of this or that theological loci, that the theologian should be able to say: Yes or No.

The above is the world that Martin Luther, and the magisterial reformers in general, were birthed into. There is argument on whether or not Luther was more scholastic or more humanist in his approach. For my money, Luther, fit more broadly, within the school of the Christian humanists (we could refer to Lorenzo Valla here to underscore the genesis of the humanist way). Some would argue that to drive too hard of a wedge between the scholastics and the humanists in the late medieval and early reformation period, would be to engage in presenting a false dilemma. These folks would prefer that we understand that these ā€œschoolsā€ were not as nice and tidy as we might make them today; that there was an organic crossover between the schools, materials, and methods of the two camps. Be that as it may, Brian Gerrish, via Charles Partee’s engagement, believes Luther fits the Christian humanist, or even the biblical humanist classification; as both a theologian and reformer of the Latin church.

Brian A. Gerrish raises ā€œthe possibility that perhaps Luther may be, indeed should be, classed with the so-called ā€˜Biblical Humanistsā€ [sic] A sounder basis for excluding Luther, not from humanism in general, but from the notion of Christian philosophy in particular, is the fact that Luther insists that philosophy and theology should be carefully distinguished. Luther sees philosophy as the theology of the heathens. With this understanding Luther is less interested in studying philosophy with appreciative intent than others.[1]

Theologically, we might suggest that Luther’s infamous theologia crucis (ā€˜theology of the cross’) fits well with the Christian or Biblical humanist orientation. It rejects the philosophical and speculative measures deployed by the theologians of glory, and instead focuses on the concreto of God’s Self-revelation in Jesus Christ; particularly as the character of God is given full magnification in the Son’s ā€œobedience of death, even unto death on the cross.ā€ The theology of the cross, repudiates speculating about a God up yonder, and entrenches itself within the Light of Light of God that is given for the world in God’s life for the world, in the person of God for the world in Jesus Christ.

This type of orientation, as the one we have just ostensibly observed in Luther, is present in someone like John Calvin; and beyond, into the modern period, we see this mood picked up by folks like Karl Barth and Thomas Torrance, respectively. It is this orientation that has drawn me to such theologians. I am, broadly speaking, a proponent of a form of Chrisitan humanism, as described in this post; and as illustrated by a suggestive proposal with reference to St. Martin Luther. So let it be written, so let it be done.

[1] Charles Partee, Calvin and Classical Philosophy (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1977), 12-13.

Cage-Stage and Seminary Debates as a Mode of Life

I have the following passage in my sidebar here at the blog, it communicates an important perspective that we would all do well to keep before us each and every day; especially those of us who get so caught up in the nitty-gritty of theological mechanics. Barth quotes early Lutheran theologian, Martin Chemnitz:

We must always keep in mind that the reason the Son of God came down from the hidden throne of the eternal Father and revealed heavenly doctrine was not to furnish material for seminary debates, in which the display of ingenuity might be the game, but rather so that human beings should be instructed concerning true knowledge of God and of all those things which are necessary to the pursuit of eternal salvation.[1]

We might call getting caught up in ā€œseminary debatesā€ as the cage-stage of intellectual and theological development. It seems ā€˜natural’ for this type of mode to obtain for just about anyone, at some level, when they are introduced to new information that others aren’t as privy to. But the prudent Christian, even in the midst of much of this heat, will have the discernment to see through this acquisition and quagmire of knowledge, and throw themselves at the mercy of Christ, asking for His intervention in their lives; requesting that He keep them humble before the living God, and to see any knowledge they gain of Him to be held loosely as something they have been given as a gift from Him. Unfortunately, all too often, particularly on social-media these days, we see the exact opposite happening; and the cage-stage turns into a life of theological glory wherein said Christian learns to present their mastery of theological ingenuity in ways that make them appear self-deprecating and humble before God and others. And yet, a corrosive bent has already taken root for many, and their eyes become glazed over by the beauty of their own navels, even as if their navels are the face of Jesus Christ Himself. Age is no boundary here. A person can be a senior Christian scholar, or a ā€˜new-guy-seminarian,’ and continuously stumble over the same type of love of self that leads to making the means the end, and collapsing themselves into Christ in such a way that the words they speak must simply be life and peace. ā€˜The love of knowledge puffs up.’ This is the message that Chemnitz is articulating, and we would do well to heed his wisdom.

[1] Martin Chemnitz,Ā Loci theol.Ā ed., 1590,Ā HypomnemataĀ 9 cited by Barth,Ā CDĀ I/1, 82.

The Hellenic, the Neo-Thomist Origins of Modernity

When Divine grace is separated from its reality in God, when grace becomes a thing, a substance, a quality infused into the accidents of humanity, it is only one small step removed from being integrated into the essence of what it means to be human. If this step is taken, and it has been in the ā€˜modern-turn,’ the turn-to-the-subject, the Gifter of grace no longer remains necessary, in a transcendent sense, as graceĀ becomes materialized, immanentized, horizontalized into an ā€˜immanent frame,’ as Charles Taylor grammarizes. Indeed, Taylor writes with reference to what it means to be human in a frame wherein grace has become the possession, the generative reality of what it means to be a self-determined, self-constructed modern person in the 21st century:

There is another facet of this narrative of secularity which it is worth mentioning here, because of its ubiquity and importance in the ā€œclosedā€ spin on immanence. The story line here is this: once human beings took their norms, their goods, their standards of ultimate value from an authority outside of themselves; from God, or the gods, or the nature of Being or the cosmos. But then they came to see thatĀ these higherĀ authorities were their own fictions, and they realized that they had to establish their norms and values for themselves, on their own authority. This is a radicalization of the coming to adulthood story as it figures in the science-driven argument for materialism. It is not just that freed from illusion, humans come to establish true facts about the world. It is also that they come to dictate the ultimate values by which they live.1

Once the secular person came to imagine, through their new ā€˜social imaginary’ (cf. Taylor) that in fact the classical God was really just a projection of their own imagination, an inner to outer extrapolation of their best selves onto a cipher by which they might live and adjudicate life, they were able to bring diremption for themselves and determine that in fact they were God and thus gods after all. What secularism ultimately brings, this ostensible ā€˜come of age’ moment, is really just another expression of polytheism, a serpentine belief that humanity itself possesses godness, and thus are the creators of their own reality and existence (in a world where existence and essence have become a singular reality).

As I suggested at the beginning there is a theological origin story behind the secular-turn. Ironically, this turn has a Christian source, albeit as that source has been dressed down by a synthesis of Christian theology with speculative philosophical categories; such categories derived from the classical philosophers like Aristotle et al. The abstraction of grace from the giver or reality of grace, God, takes form most notably in the Catholic theology of Thomas Aquinas. Here we finally get a codification of a burgeoningĀ philosophical frame baptized in the Holy water of the Church. It is the notion of ā€˜quality’ that takes decisive stage, or in fact ā€˜substance’ within an Aristotelian frame whereby Divine grace comes to lose its Divine character, at least in the sense that its reality is necessarily grounded in the triune being of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Once this move is made, as I asserted earlier, we are only a few small steps, a few small centuries away from ā€˜coming of age,’ among other contributing factors during and post-Enlightenment. But I find this abstraction of grace from the Divine life to be an interesting development towards modernity, ironically, even as that is given dye within the early mediaeval and Catholic sitz im leben of Thomas Aquinas (and those who received him, whether Catholic or Protestant Reformational). Helmut Thielicke describes the scenario this way:

We can see clearly at this point that what takes place in man, and not merely what happens to him, has become the object of theological observation. It is again evident, as was clear already with respect to the concept of the imago Dei in man’s original state, that the ontic element in the human ego pushes itself into the foreground. Then the theme of theology is not just the relation between God and man; on the contrary, theology then includes as an independent concern a treatment of ā€œanthropology.ā€ Here is where the fault lies.

The crack, or better, the cracks are themselves produced by the belt of tension which necessarily arises where men attempt to combine ontological and personalistic thinking. The greatest strain and the most evident rupture are undoubtedly to be found at the place where grace ceases to be a divine attribute and becomes an effect distinct from the divine attribute from which it emanates, ie, where grace ceases to be a personal relation to man (the ā€œgracious Godā€) and becomes something which is ontically infused into man and which is thus present in man, demonstrably present. For it is precisely this distinction between the gracious God and the grace given [gratia data] which is the starting point of the distinctively ā€œRomanā€ development of the doctrine of grace. To put it epigrammatically and therefore with tongue in cheek, what men want is not primarily God himself, but ā€œdivine powers which may become human virtues and qualitiesā€ (von Harnack). At this point where grace ā€œvisiblyā€ passes into man in accordance with certain well defined practices, eg, sacramental operation, it ceases to be exclusively a subject and becomes a material object, ā€œmedicine.ā€ This materialization expresses itself in a variety of ways . . . .2

It would surely be reductionistic to blame Thomas and Aristotle for the modern-turn to the self, and what Taylor identifies as ā€˜the coming of adulthood story.’ That is not my intention. I am simply noticing a Christian turn made at least within the lifetime of early mediaeval developments, that can plausibly help explain how this ā€˜enlightened-turn’ finally came to fruition. There are many other contributing ideational and socio-culture pressures that finally brought this turn to consummation, but I think it is notable that we already see these fault lines developing as far back as the Hellenic period of the classical philosophers; and then developed more Christianly with the arrival of Thomas and the Romans.

I am only minimally attempting to illustrate how secular ideas can be traced back to a Christian lineage. Charles Taylor, Michael Gillespie, my personal friend, Derrick Peterson, among others have done further work, more substantially, to demonstrate that my point is not ill founded. Christians have as much to do with the secularity of society as anyone else. Indeed, we might go so far as to say that what it means to be a secular-atheist in the 21st century is really just an expression of a Christian heresy that has attended the Church catholic by way of various expressions; whether those expressions be understood within the Church proper, or in society-at-large as the theater of humanity’s glory, albeit, devoid of the Spirit. Ultimately, when grace is abstracted from God and made a quality capable of being understood purely from the immanent frame of the ā€˜flatlander,’ it is at this point that Genesis 3 once again receives breath to breathe and make another attempt to elevate itself with zigguartic flare to the ā€˜high places’ of the living God.

 

1 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, 580 kindle.

2 Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics: Foundations (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), 238.

 

 

Zwingli, The Pluralist Universalist

I am just finishing up Bruce Gordon’s excellent bookĀ Zwingli: God’s Armed Prophet. In it, Gordon, almost in passing, notes that in Zwingli’s final theological confession, hisĀ Exposition of the Faith,Ā in his dedication to France’s king, Francis I, he writes the following. You will notice the universalistic intonations of Zwingli’s correspondence; Luther, and the Germans most certainly did. Indeed, in the following quotation, Gordon also supplies Luther’s acerbic response to what I would take, similarly, to be a highlyĀ unChristianĀ way to think about the salvation of pagan peoples.Ā Ā 

In his dedication, Zwingli urged the king to rule well, that he might join the heavenly company of exalted monarchs:Ā 

Then you may hope to see the whole company and assemblage of all the saints, the wise, the faithful, brave, and good who have lived since the world began. Here you will see the two Adams, the redeemed and the redeemer, Abel, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Judah, Moses, Joshua, Gideon, Samuel, Phineas, Elijah, Elisha, Isaiah, and the Virgin Mother of God of whom he prophesied, David, Hezekiah, Josiah, the Baptist, Peter, Paul; here too, Hercules, Theseus, Socrates, Aristides, Antigonus, Numa, Camillus, theĀ CatosĀ andĀ Scipios, here Louis the Pious, and your predecessors, the Louis, Philips,Ā Pepins, and all your ancestors, who have gone hence in faith. In short there has not been a good man and will not be a holy heart or faithful soul from the beginning of the world to the end thereof that you will not see in heaven with God. And what can be imaginedĀ more glad, what more delightful, what, finally, moreĀ honourableĀ than such a sight?Ā 

As Luther and others quickly noted, Zwingli’s words were arresting. Alongside the kings of Israel and France, the blessed included Socrates and theĀ Catos. The virtuous pagans would find their place among the elect. From Wittenberg came the caustic reply:Ā 

Tell me, any one of you who wants to be a Christian, what need is there of baptism, the sacrament, Christ, the Gospel, or the prophets and Holy Scripture, if such godless heathen, Socrates, Aristides, yes, the cruel Numa, who was the first to instigate every kind of idolatry at Rome by the devil’s revelation, as St Augustine writes in the City of God, and Scipio the Epicurean, are saved and sanctified along with the patriarchs, prophets, and apostles in heaven, even though they knew nothing about God, Scripture, the Gospel, Christ, baptism, the sacrament, or the Christian faith? What can such an author, preacher, and teacher believe about the Christian faith except that it is no better than any other faith and that everyone can be saved by his own faith, even an idolater and an Epicurean like Numa and Scipio?Ā 

The list was not the first time Zwingli had expressed himself on the salvation of non-Christians. Against his beloved Augustine, he was adamant that unbaptized infants would be saved. On the noble heathen, he had made his point most emphatically in his sermon on providence in 1530, when he claimed that Seneca was ā€˜the unparalleled cultivator of the soul among pagans’. He was a ā€˜theologian’ and his works ā€˜divine oracles’.Ā Ā 

Salvation was not limited to Israel or the visible Church. Zwingli’s conviction was consistent: God is entirely free in election to choose whom he wills with reasons completely beyond human comprehension. Profound attachment to divine freedom led Zwingli to find God working through the deeds and thoughts of non-Christians. God was the source of all goodness, and faith and goodness were to be found among virtuous pagans as they were somehow part of God’s election. Unlike John Milton later, Zwingli felt no need to explain the ways of God to humanity.1Ā 

Interestingly, Zwingli himself, according to Gordon’s commentary, has no problem imposing his soteriology on God’s freedom; this is precisely what Karl Barth would not do. Barth, like Zwingli, had a high view of Divine freedom, but just because of that, definitionally, Barth rightly saw that a person, like Zwingli, could not foreclose on said freedom; and ā€œmakeā€ God’s freedom the cipher by which an array of theologicalĀ adiaphoraĀ might be smuggled into the Divine way. This is what kept Barth et al. from following Zwingli’s apparent universalistic-turn. At most, for Barth, God’s freedomĀ couldĀ allow for a hopeful universalism, but not of the sort that we find, ostensibly, in Zwingli’s absolute, and even pluralistic form of universalism (I say anachronistically after Paul Tillich). Indeed, I find this rather striking; Zwingli seems to have an incipient form of what would later come to be Karl Rahner’sĀ anonymous ChristianĀ notion. Again, to read modern theologians, and their respective categories, back into someone like Zwingli would be, at best, anachronistic. But at a conceptual level it is interesting that there is at least some inchoate corollary between him and some moderns who would follow latterly.Ā Ā 

I found this nugget interesting, and something I didn’t know in regard to Zwingli’s soteriological imagination. Maybe you’ll find this interesting as well, which is why I’ve shared this.Ā Solo ChristoĀ Ā 

 

1 Bruce Gordon, Zwingli: God’s Armed Prophet (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2021), 238-39.

Ā