God’s Freedom, Goodness and Necessity in Philosophical and Theological Convivium

More thoughts on the properties of God for my philosophy of religion class. As I have been responding, this week, surrounding God’s omniscience, eternality freedom, goodness, and necessity. These are my last three responses.

  1. What is freedom? Does it make sense to talk about maximal or perfect freedom? If yes, how should this be defined? If not, why not?
  2. Do you agree that the ability to do what is morally wrong is a power for human beings but a liability for God? Answer the question by laying out the argument for this as you understand it, or asking any questions about parts that you don’t understand. Then give your reasons for why you think that this is either a good argument or not a good argument.
  3. Could it just be an accident that there is, or that there is not, a God? If not, why not?

Freedom is that aspect to be able to do or not to do. It makes sense to talk about perfect freedom vis-Γ -vis God. God is maximally or perfectly free in the sense that he literally and absolutely and personally has the capacity within himself (his in se life) to bring this or that to pass, at will. On classical theism, God’s total properties, working one within the other, grounds the fact of divine freedom. That is to say, that God, on this accounting, has libertarian agency, so to speak, to do this or that without contingence or constraint. Or it might be said, that God’s freedom has no constraint other than the consistency of his own inner-life in simple relation.

On the other hand, as Mawson develops, human freedom, finite as it is, given its lack of divine properties, by definition, are not able to be perfectly free. This is the case since human agency is conditioned by its own β€œfinity.” Meaning, human agents are not β€œomni” relative to the powers of God (on classical theism). This entails, that human freedom cannot be perfectly free insofar that it is necessarily limited by its contingency. For example, human beings have the capacity to supererogate or not; to go beyond the perceived limits of this or that good. This implies that human agents have a lack in their freedom.

[From a Christian theistic perspective, as a theological aside, here is how one of my favorite theologians, Karl Barth, refers to Divine Freedom:

According to the biblical testimony, God has the prerogative to be free without being limited by His freedom from external conditioning, free also with regard to His freedom, free not to surrender Himself to it, but to use it to give Himself to this communion and to practise this faithfulness in it, in this way being really free, free in Himself. God must not only be unconditioned but, in the absoluteness in which He sets up this fellowship, He can and will also be conditioned. He who can and does do this is the God of Holy Scripture, the triune God known to us in His revelation. This ability, proved and manifested to us in His action, constitutes His freedom. (Karl Barth,Β Church Dogmatics II/1 Β§28 The Doctrine of God: Study EditionΒ (London: T&T Clark, 2009), 47]

Goodness β€œis a matter of behaving as one ought in one’s relations with other peopleβ€”and creatures more generallyβ€”and perfect goodness is a matter of doing the best thing that one can for them whenever there is a best and doing one of the best things that one can whenever two or more things are β€˜joint best’ for them, i.e. are equally good and none is better” (Mawson, 57–8). Good is the objectively understood rightness (or we might say, righteousness) on the classical theistic account. Perfect goodness, on God, is that standard of what counts for right versus wrong. Indeed, wrong is only the privation of right. In other words, there could be no perception or conception of wrong without right being prior to it. That is to say, we understand wrongness only as it is measured against rightness (or goodness). I agree that in ethics there are grades of wrong vis-Γ -vis the good. At points, in given situations and circumstances, it can be a power for humans to choose a wrong, in order to amplify the good. We might think of Corrie Ten Boom, and her family in the Netherlands during WW2. They hid Jews from the Nazis in their home, and β€œillegally” found safe passage for some of them out of the country. In a relative sense this could represent a human power, in the sense that the sanctity of life was amplified, in the face a certain dark evil. I.e., on a grade, the sanctity of life is a greater good than is the lesser wrong of lying in order to ensure the good in this case. Such is the human dilemma, at times. Since we aren’t all powerful, all knowing, everywhere present at the same time in the same way, as God is, we must attempt to see what is the greater than rather than the lesser than in any given ethical dilemma, and choose the greater than of life, even if it might require the lesser than wrong in order to ensure the continuance of life rather than death. God is not faced with such dilemmas; again, because, on classical theism, he is β€œomni,” and much more.

Necessity. God is necessary. Not in a god-of-the-gaps type of way (i.e., as an explanation to fill in the gaps in our logically-deductive schemes to explain reality, per se), but in a necessary way; in the sense that the world itself, contingent as it is, requires an explanation greater than itself to explain its existence in the first place. Or the universe/cosmos as a finite (ever expanding) entity does not have the resources within itself to explain its origin (where it came from, why it continues, and where it is going, if anywhere). Contingency implies a prior non-contingent ground upon which the contingent is contingent. Without the non-contingent prius there can be no contingent after and remainder.

An Engagement with Philosophical Personhood in Theological Relief

𝐼𝑛 π‘šπ‘¦ π‘β„Žπ‘–π‘™π‘œπ‘ π‘œπ‘β„Žπ‘¦ π‘œπ‘“ π‘Ÿπ‘’π‘™π‘–π‘”π‘–π‘œπ‘› π‘π‘™π‘Žπ‘ π‘  𝑀𝑒 π‘Žπ‘Ÿπ‘’ π‘Žπ‘™π‘Ÿπ‘’π‘Žπ‘‘π‘¦ 𝑖𝑛 π‘€π‘’π‘’π‘˜ 2. π‘‡β„Žπ‘–π‘  π‘€π‘’π‘’π‘˜ 𝑀𝑒 π‘Žπ‘Ÿπ‘’ π‘’π‘›π‘”π‘Žπ‘”π‘–π‘›π‘” π‘€π‘–π‘‘β„Ž πΊπ‘œπ‘‘’𝑠 π‘Žπ‘‘π‘‘π‘Ÿπ‘–π‘π‘’π‘‘π‘’π‘ , π‘Žπ‘  π‘‘β„Žπ‘œπ‘ π‘’ π‘Žπ‘Ÿπ‘’ π‘β„Žπ‘–π‘™π‘œπ‘ π‘œπ‘β„Žπ‘–π‘π‘Žπ‘™π‘™π‘¦ π‘π‘œπ‘›π‘ π‘‘π‘Ÿπ‘’π‘’π‘‘. π‘‡β„Žπ‘–π‘  π‘€π‘’π‘’π‘˜ π‘€π‘’β€™π‘Ÿπ‘’ π‘’π‘›π‘”π‘Žπ‘”π‘–π‘›π‘” π‘€π‘–π‘‘β„Ž π‘π‘’π‘Ÿπ‘ π‘œπ‘›β„Žπ‘œπ‘œπ‘‘, π‘‘π‘Ÿπ‘Žπ‘›π‘ π‘π‘’π‘›π‘‘π‘’π‘›π‘π‘’, π‘–π‘šπ‘šπ‘Žπ‘›π‘’π‘›π‘π‘’, π‘Žπ‘›π‘‘ π‘œπ‘šπ‘›π‘–π‘π‘œπ‘‘π‘’π‘›π‘π‘’ 𝑣𝑖𝑠 π‘Ž 𝑣𝑖𝑠 πΊπ‘œπ‘‘. π»π‘’π‘Ÿπ‘’ 𝑖𝑠 π‘€β„Žπ‘Žπ‘‘ 𝐼 π‘€π‘Ÿπ‘œπ‘‘π‘’ π‘€π‘–π‘‘β„Ž π‘Ÿπ‘’π‘“π‘’π‘Ÿπ‘’π‘›π‘π‘’ π‘‘π‘œ π‘€β„Žπ‘Žπ‘‘ 𝑖𝑑 π‘šπ‘’π‘Žπ‘›π‘  π‘‘π‘œ 𝑏𝑒 π‘Ž π‘π‘’π‘Ÿπ‘ π‘œπ‘›. π‘Šπ‘’ π‘Žπ‘Ÿπ‘’ 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑇.𝐽. π‘€π‘Žπ‘€π‘ π‘œπ‘›’𝑠 π‘π‘œπ‘œπ‘˜ *𝐡𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓 𝑖𝑛 πΊπ‘œπ‘‘* π‘Žπ‘  π‘œπ‘’π‘Ÿ 𝑑𝑒π‘₯𝑑. π‘†π‘œ, π‘šπ‘¦ π‘Ÿπ‘’π‘ π‘π‘œπ‘›π‘ π‘’ 𝑖𝑠 π‘€π‘–π‘‘β„Ž π‘Ÿπ‘’π‘“π‘’π‘Ÿπ‘’π‘›π‘π‘’ π‘‘π‘œ β„Žπ‘œπ‘€ β„Žπ‘’ 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 *π‘π‘’π‘Ÿπ‘ π‘œπ‘›β„Žπ‘œπ‘œπ‘‘* (𝑖𝑑 𝑖𝑠 π‘Žπ‘π‘‘π‘’π‘Žπ‘™π‘™π‘¦ π‘‘π‘œπ‘œ π‘™π‘œπ‘›π‘” π‘“π‘œπ‘Ÿ π‘œπ‘’π‘Ÿ π‘“π‘œπ‘Ÿπ‘’π‘š, π‘œβ„Ž 𝑀𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝐿𝑂𝐿).

Boethius

I disagree with Mawson out of hand on the entailments of what makes a person a person. Mawson, is taking a classical way, one we would find in Boethius, Aquinas et al. (most of the Latin tradition). To define the base ground of what it means to be a person, on terms of a purely intellectualist or rationalist ground, is to imbibe a philosophical/speculative tradition; indeed. Unfortunately, for my money, to use this type of speculative ground as one’s major premise, in regard to developing an anthropology, can only lead to a speculative conclusion. Indeed, it might be self-referentially coherent, as I think Mawson’s accounting is; but ultimately, in my view, the conclusion is only as sound as the first premise.

As a Christian theist I would argue that personhood ought to be defined by reference to the imago Dei/Christi (image of God/Christ). That is to say, in my view, to understand the entailments of personhood cannot (or at least, should not) begin with an abstract thought, but instead with the concrete givenness of God’s life for the world in the face of His Son, Jesus Christ (see Colossians 1.15). In this way, personhood’s definition finds an antecedent ground beyond the immanent frame, and has a β€˜transcendent’ starting point not from within itself (as an immanent abstraction), but outwith itself in the personhood of the divine Monarchia, as the Father, Son and Holy Spirit (the hypostases/persons of the Godhead coinhere one in the other in a filial and eternal relationship of interpenetrating life). If this mysterious (yet revealed) life becomes the ground by which personhood comes to have definition, at the very least what it means to be a person, is to be in a community of love for the other; living a life of self-givenness, one for the other, wherein what it means to be a person isn’t defined by having β€œrationality” or β€œself-consciousness,” per se, but to be in person-al relationship one with the other. And what serves as the ground of this community-fellowship-based personhood, only can come first, as gift, as God has graciously invited us into participation with His triune-person-grounded life through Jesus Christ.

If I reject Mawson’s definition for personhood, which I do, of course, then his dilemma of attempting to provide nobility or sanctity for humans without brain-activity is non-starting for me.

Based on my first long response, in regard to the constituents of what makes a person a person, I would argue that the triune God is the personalizing person. So, in this frame, can someone be β€œmore” of a person than someone else? That seems to make an attempt at quantifying what it means to be a person in terms of a quality (or substance) or something. God in Christ by the Holy Spirit, I would argue, is the person making person, in eternal relation; which would make Him the archetypal personalizing person maker. In this sense He is the Alpha and Omega. But since He graciously invites us into participation with Him through Christ, at a purely human level, there isn’t one person who is more person than another. God’s life is sui generis. All people are equal, insofar that all people are created in the image of God/Christ.

According to Scripture (John 4.24) β€˜God is spirit,’ and spirit is not gendered, per se. That said, God has Self-revealed Himself as Father of the Son (as Athanasius is wont to press). In the Christian reality God enfleshed came as a Man, as the Son of God (the second person). The Bible refers to God in masculine terms, by and large (except with reference to the Holy Spirit); and for me that ought to be determinative for how we refer to God.

PS. a struggle, which I knew I was bringing to this course of study, is that I am already committed to a certain Christian orientation with reference to thinking God, and everything subsequent. I had attempted to study God philosophically, at a formal level, many years ago now, and found it wanting. Even so, I still think there is value in learning to contemplate and think deeply and rigorously with regard to anything (which is why I paid for the class).

Bad Perceptions versus God’s Perceptions in a Culture Awash in Self-worship

Perceptions don’t dictate the truth, per se. The truth is the truth without contingence upon our relative perceptions. Perceptions might dictate a variety of things in society writ large, but never the truth, per se. Perceptions are really and only self-projections of our dispositions and their forming pressures, as those have developed in our personal circumstances and experiences in the world. Nevertheless, we aren’t slavishly trapped within our perceptions, per se. But our only hope is to come to participate in the extra life of God; and begin to grow in the grace and knowledge of Jesus Christ. This way our perceptions will no longer merely be contingent upon the winds of our experiences, per se, but instead upon the solidity of God’s eternal and triune life, of which we have become participants through union with the vicarious humanity of Jesus Christ. As our perceptions come to be formed, more and more, by His anchoring reality, from within His life, which is Truth, we can begin to see things as they are, rather than how we would prefer them to be. There are good perceptions and bad perceptions. The former are formed by an ongoing relationship with the living God in and through the risen and ascended Christ. Bad perceptions are simply formed by living ensconced in the immanent world of our own making; as if we are like God.

The Captivity of God: Against Scholastic and Philosophical Theology

Just to reiterate, once again, the way scholastic theology, particularly with reference to Thomas Aquinas directly, and the scholastic trad after Thomas (whether Catholic or Protestant) indirectly, affects the way contemporary orthodox theologians do theology, let me share a passage from David Kelsey as he sketches the entailments of scholastic methodology vis-Γ -vis the β€˜revelation’ found in Holy Scripture. In this instance it is with reference to the way that Aristotelian metaphysics are deployed in an effort to explicate the loci deposited in Holy Scripture. What is of import for our purposes is to notice how God’s Self-revelation becomes a predicate, by way of explanatory apparatus, of a purely philosophical construct developed by way of the human powers of reflecting on β€œbeing-as-such.”

The first question Thomas takes up in Part 1a of the Summa concerns the distinctive nature of theology or β€œsacred doctrine.” There is a β€œscience” whose subject matter is God, viz., β€œdivine doctrine.” What is distinctive about that β€œscience” is that it argues from first principles that are scripturally revealed. Such β€œdivine doctrine” is fundamentally different from the philosophical science of metaphysics whose subject matter is not God, but being-as-such. The first principles of metaphysics are discovered, not in revelation, but by rational analysis of the most general features of the concretely actual instances of β€œbeing” that human experience encounters. It can study God only indirectly as the β€œfirst cause” implied by the existential contingency of all concretely actual instances of β€œbeing” that we experience. God does not fall under β€œbeing-as-such,” i.e., is not one sort of β€œinstantiation” among others of β€œbeing-as-such.” That is why the science of metaphysics cannot study God directly. On the other hand, the questions about God that follow the first two questions in Part 1a of the Summa are directly about God, i.e., are β€œdivine doctrine” and not β€œmetaphysics.” That holds true even though, based on scripturally revealed first principles, they nonetheless freely make analogical, use of the conceptuality that is developed in the β€œscience” of metaphysics to analyze β€œbeing-as-such.”[1]

It is an interesting set of gymnastics one must engage in in order to finally arrive at the punch line: in the end sacra doctrina becomes an explicate of a humanly discovered metaphysics. Even though, as Kelsey notes, because the theologian feels compelled to, God cannot ultimately be known by way of a naked metaphysics, and yet, the theologian, in their frailty, must use the next best thing towards speaking and thinking God; i.e., the discovery the profane philosophers have ostensibly made in finding the β€˜first principles.’

This continues to be the way evangelical, Reformed and Lutheran theologians attempt to renew the Protestant churches. They place an ad hoc value on what has come before, as if it is the only orthodox way possible for the churches to be refreshed in the good news of the Gospel. And yet, as Kelsey illustrates through his sketch, by way of implication, God’s Self-revelation is held captive to the discoveries of the pagans; i.e., that is in regard to thinking β€˜being’ as actus purus (β€˜pure act’). As a Bible reader I don’t recognize the god discovered by the philosophers as the God Self-revealed in Jesus Christ; as God who is my Father.

I understand that the machine known as Protestant orthodoxy will never go away. But it is important, at least from my lights, to continue to call it out, and offer alternative ways to think and speak God directly from His Self-revelation in Jesus Christ; from the β€œrationality” inherent to the Gospel Hisself; from the concrete actualism that we in fact have been provided with by God through His Self-given cruciformed life for the world in Jesus Christ. If guys and gals want to do philosophy of religion and scholastic theology, great. But don’t deceive yourselves and others into thinking that it comes close to touching the surface, with providing an actual point of contact between the living God and humanity. The only concrete place of that happenstance is found in the hypostatic union of God and humanity in the Man, Jesus Christ. It is His life that sets the terms, the categories, the emphases by which the Christian can come to truly (kataphysically) andΒ  evangelically know the triune God.

The secret things belong to theΒ LordΒ our God, butΒ the things revealed belong to us and to our sons forever, that we may observe all the words of this law. –Deuteronomy 29:29

[1] David H. Kelsey, Human Aguish and God’s Power (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 215–16.

A Psychology on the Theological Rationalist

The following is a post I wrote ten years ago that has been buried on a tumblr account I once had. I thought I would repost it here (there are some grammatical errors present, but I’m too lazy to fix them).

Here is a short reflection on what I would like to callΒ Theological Rationalism.Β 

In order to reflect upon what it means to be rationalistic; it is best to, at the outset, recognize that in my usage there is a difference between being a rationalist and being rational. The former smacks of an anthropology that is grounded in an intellectualism, meaning that a person or human being can be reduced down to their intellect or mind as their defining feature for what it means to be human (so an essentialism of the mind and its constituent properties)–what we might (and do) find in someone like Thomas Aquinas’ anthropology or even more pointedly in Rene Descartes’ epistemological (ontological) project ofΒ cogito ergo sumΒ (β€˜I think, therefore I am’). This is the kind of anthropology that funds what it is to be a rationalist. I see this as distinct from being rational in that being ‘rational’ simply means that someone is reasonable (by whatever standards that might presuppose) in the way they think, communicate, and act; but being rational does not mean that someone’s ‘being’ can be reduced to their mind and its capacity to actively assign meaning to reality in an essential fashion.

With this distinction in mind, I would like to apply what it means to be a rationalist to theological practice and activity. For me in my experience as a Christian person, when rationalism is applied, as it is, in my North American Christian (and Protestant) context, is that we end up with a form of Christian Fundamentalism. I think the most stalwart and able representative of this kind ofΒ theological rationalismΒ might be someone like Carl Henry. Although Henry was actually more informed and aware of his theological surroundings and history than who I really have in mind with this post.

In this post, I am thinking more of the kind of Christian I am most familiar with at a popular level. What happens for the North American Christian, often, is that all of their Christian identity can be reduced to one or two overarching totalizing meta-narrative or stories through which they compress and seek to interpret all else. In this way, they feel a sense of control, indeed even power over the circumstances of their life, and in particular, over their relation to God. The key to what I am getting at (without getting into some concrete examples) is to recognize that these kinds of theological rationalists have been trained and conditioned to think in this way; in other words, it is not that they are intentionally seeking to control their relation to God (although they are sometimes), it is that they have been sold a bill of goods that reduces God and his acts to their preconceived theological framework, which is based upon their own active intellect’s which believes that all of reality can be compressed therein. The emphasis then is placed upon their minds, and their capacity to provide propositional explanation for God, and all of the theological related to him.

The slavery enters into this situation at a very basic level; these theological rationalists believe that they are worshipping God, but who they are really worshipping is a construal of God and his acts which they have constructed and conjured up in a way wherein their understanding of God becomes the essential basis wherein God is assigned his being/person. The terrible reality of this is that this person is stuck in a vicious circle; because they might realize (at some point) that they are not living in a true refreshing kind of freedom, and so they desperately look to God for help. But this is the paradoxical problem, when they look to God, they have already denuded God of any Lordly and contradictory and transformative force in their lives, because they have captured God by the power of their own minds; they have made God contingent upon their capacity to explain God in the terms that their minds (and the history of ideas this associated with) have actively constructed, and all this in the name of God in Christ.

The only escape from this, from the absolutized subjectivity is to start fresh. It is, as Thomas Torrance might say, to engage in a dialectic and process of repentant thinking. It is to repudiate any kind of theological rationalism, and its anthropology, and to adopt a new attitude wherein the God who has revealed himself in Christ no longer is held captive by our own psyches and their desires to be comfortable and in control. It is to finally rest in the fact that God is God, and that he has contradicted all of our reason by way of the cross. Once we are able to renounce/repent of our wayward flesh made absolute; it is here where the theological rationalist finally will have the capacity to be theologically reasonable–and this, based upon a dynamic love of Christ that is not contingent upon me and my mind, but upon God and his relation as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

 

Balaam’s Ass and Ludwig Feuerbach: Critiquing the Idol-God

Ludwig Feuerbach, a German philosopher (if his name didn’t give it away), offered a critique of religion, particularly the Christian religion, that ought to have weight as we self-criticize our own understanding of God. Karl Barth took Feuerbach’s critique to heart as he saw in it a critique of natural theology. Here is a key passage from Feuerbach that synopsizes his critique:

Religion, at least the Christian, is the relation of man to himself, or more correctly to his own nature (i.e., his subjective nature); but a relation of it, viewed as a nature apart from his own. The divine being is nothing else than the human being, or, rather, the human nature purified, freed from the limits of the individual man, made objectiveβ€”i.e., contemplated and revered as another, a distinct being. All the attributes of the divine nature are, therefore, attributes of the human nature.[1]

For Feuerbach God is simply a self-projection of the inner-man. Ironically, what people like Feuerbach et al. are doing is simply living out the metanarrative of Genesis 3, and the original serpentine lie. That we can be like, or construct God or gods.

But here’s where this becomes relevant, particularly for Christians in the main. Insofar that Christians attempt to imbibe the culture, even if in the name of Jesus, they end up, like the culture at large, under the influence of someone like Feuerbach; self-projecting a notion of God who confirms them in their inner-desires. In other words, they are living the life of an idolater, even in the name of Jesus Christ (which is the actual way the LORD’s name is taken in vain). Further, when people abandon the Christian faith it is because they recognize or β€˜feel’ (subconsciously) that the God they have been worshipping is no longer needed, since He already affirms all of their wants or desires anyway; or, because the God they are presented with comes from the self-projections of the philosophers, and thus cannot actually live up to what the Gospel claims to be as the power of God.

Barth was right to appropriate Feuerbach, since all Feuerbach was doing, from his materialistic vantage point, was confronting the idolatry of the human heart. If God can speak through Balaam’s ass, He can speak through Ludwig Feuerbach.

[1] Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. George Eliot (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), 14.

A Response to Plato’s Impact on the Great Tradition of the Church

Earlier this morning I listened to Credo Magazine’s podcast in which Matthew Barrett interviews Louis Markos, the author of From Plato to Christ, among other books. You can listen to that podcast here. They were discussing, of course, the role and impact that Plato had, and continues to have on the development of Christian theology. Barrett often likes to refer to the Great Tradition of the Church, which of course is really more of a Latin way to think about things theological and ecclesial (the Greeks have the Consensus Patrum, ha!) I of course repudiate the general prolegomenon, or theological methodology that broadly funds said Tradition. The following were some thoughts I ticked off, in response to the podcast, while at work, in a moment of free-time, and then posted them on my Twitter and Facebook accounts, respectively. I thought I’d share that here too.

One problem with the so-called Great Tradition of the Church, is its methodological direction; insofar that it offers one. It allows the shadowland of the philosophersβ€”the accidents of history as givenβ€”to lead to the being of all reality in Jesus Christ. It supposes that there are vestigial logoi of God generally diffuse in the created order, and that profane humanity itself has the capacity to see it by way of an abstract and methodologically speculative reasoning. It then allows this framework to shape our respective knowledge of God when we are confronted with God’s β€œspecial revelation.” As if the heavens themselves declare the glory of the LORD in a way that is intellectually discernible outwith God’s Self-revelation in Jesus Christ. In other words, an actus purus (pure being) notion of godness (as the Great Trad is supposedly funded by vis-Γ -vis a doctrine of God) presupposes upon the reality of a natura pura (pure nature) wherein grace and nature are asymmetrically independent domains of God’s greater reality. The result is that nature simply is awaiting, even as it supplies the preparation and mediation, of its own perfection as God comes to it in the grace of Jesus Christ. And yet nowhere in canonical reality do we see this supposition operative. β€˜In the beginning God created the heavens and earth’ … and in the beginning the seed of the women would crush the serpent’s head while bruising its heel. The canonical reality, just as creational reality in general, has always already been suffused by the concreto of God’s Grace. His first Word of creation was from and for the Word who was with God, and was God. As such the Great Tradition allows the creation itself to predicate God’s perfection, as if the instrument of nature’s perfection; instead of understanding that God has always already been creation’s inner reality just as sure β€œas the world was created so that Christ might be born.”[1]

I need to refine my thinking a bit further, but all-in-all I think what I have posited above represents a type of critique I would make of the Great Tradition’s grace-nature dualism whereby we get things like the analogia entis, among other loci.

[1] I stole the quote β€œthe world was created so that Christ might be born,” from Scottish theologian, David Fergusson. I often refer to this quote, and thought it was a nice way to close out my previous thoughts leading into it.

Self-worship as the Modern Form of Humanity: Both Cultural Christianity and Secular Paganism

Self-made drama is corollary with worshipping a self-projected god; this is more antiquely known as idolatry. I just wrote that as a Tweet, yesterday. I had something like Romans 1:18ff in mind, but also Ludwig Feuerbach’s famous critique of religion in mind as well; which isΒ the following in nuce: β€œGod did not, as the Bible says, make man in His image; on the contrary man, as I have shown inΒ The Essence of Christianity, made God in his image.”1 Thomas F. Torrance describes the inner-mechanics of this, as he details β€˜the problem with modern theology,’ thusly:

The problem with modern theology, however, is that the second feature has to out of hand, for when the element of personal relation to God is not controlled by critical testing on the analogy of faith it degenerates into a gross personalism in which we obtrude ourselves into the place of God, making our relations with God the sole content of theological knowledge. That is the problem that faces us everywhere today in the so-called β€˜new theology’ in which statements about God are reduced to anthropological statements. Whenever we try to transcend a subject-object relation or replace it by a β€˜pure’ subject-subject relation, we are unable to distinguish God from ourselves, and lapse into irrationality, and then into the bitter futility of God-is-deadness.2

You will have to infer what TFT is referring to as the β€˜second feature’ (I don’t feel like treating that now). But what should, at least, be clear is when Torrance refers to β€˜subject-subject relation,’ this is the modern mode of immanentizing all reality to the absolutism of β€˜self’; ie β€œturn-to-the-subject.” Modernity likes to think it has β€˜come of age,’ that it has finally transcended the magics and mythologies of the superstitious past; its proof-of-transcendence is ostensibly revealed in our β€œscientific advancements,” primarily experienced concretely in technologies. Its nostra theologia (β€˜our theology’) is then only capable of worshipping the self as that is individualistically and collectivistically projected into the various and empirically visible achievements of the indomitable human spirit. β€œOur feelings” give pathos to the life and verve of the verity of tech we interact with day in and out; it has become the β€˜subject-subject relation,’ the sacramental balm that modern humanity immerses itself into in self-actualistic orgasm.

The genuinely Christian response to this is to repent! Bow the knee to the risen Christ, humble yourself, through the humility of God in Christ for you, and know that He is God, and that we are not! It is only in this repentant affection that a person can truly think reality as it is, and thus operate as the type of theological realist that Christ is for us. We will come to recognize that there is an object over against us who turns out to be the subject for us; the humanizing reality that allows us to stand before the living God in His iustitia aliena (β€˜alien righteousness’), and come to understand what it genuinely means to be human from the ec-static life of God for usβ€”a life constantly given to and for us in the vicarious humanity of Jesus Christ as that is gifted to us by the Holy Spirit.

 

1Β Ludwig Feuerbach,Β Lectures on the Essence of Religion.Β 

2 Thomas F. Torrance, Theological Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), x-xi.

 

 

The Hellenic, the Neo-Thomist Origins of Modernity

When Divine grace is separated from its reality in God, when grace becomes a thing, a substance, a quality infused into the accidents of humanity, it is only one small step removed from being integrated into the essence of what it means to be human. If this step is taken, and it has been in the β€˜modern-turn,’ the turn-to-the-subject, the Gifter of grace no longer remains necessary, in a transcendent sense, as graceΒ becomes materialized, immanentized, horizontalized into an β€˜immanent frame,’ as Charles Taylor grammarizes. Indeed, Taylor writes with reference to what it means to be human in a frame wherein grace has become the possession, the generative reality of what it means to be a self-determined, self-constructed modern person in the 21st century:

There is another facet of this narrative of secularity which it is worth mentioning here, because of its ubiquity and importance in the β€œclosed” spin on immanence. The story line here is this: once human beings took their norms, their goods, their standards of ultimate value from an authority outside of themselves; from God, or the gods, or the nature of Being or the cosmos. But then they came to see thatΒ these higherΒ authorities were their own fictions, and they realized that they had to establish their norms and values for themselves, on their own authority. This is a radicalization of the coming to adulthood story as it figures in the science-driven argument for materialism. It is not just that freed from illusion, humans come to establish true facts about the world. It is also that they come to dictate the ultimate values by which they live.1

Once the secular person came to imagine, through their new β€˜social imaginary’ (cf. Taylor) that in fact the classical God was really just a projection of their own imagination, an inner to outer extrapolation of their best selves onto a cipher by which they might live and adjudicate life, they were able to bring diremption for themselves and determine that in fact they were God and thus gods after all. What secularism ultimately brings, this ostensible β€˜come of age’ moment, is really just another expression of polytheism, a serpentine belief that humanity itself possesses godness, and thus are the creators of their own reality and existence (in a world where existence and essence have become a singular reality).

As I suggested at the beginning there is a theological origin story behind the secular-turn. Ironically, this turn has a Christian source, albeit as that source has been dressed down by a synthesis of Christian theology with speculative philosophical categories; such categories derived from the classical philosophers like Aristotle et al. The abstraction of grace from the giver or reality of grace, God, takes form most notably in the Catholic theology of Thomas Aquinas. Here we finally get a codification of a burgeoningΒ philosophical frame baptized in the Holy water of the Church. It is the notion of β€˜quality’ that takes decisive stage, or in fact β€˜substance’ within an Aristotelian frame whereby Divine grace comes to lose its Divine character, at least in the sense that its reality is necessarily grounded in the triune being of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Once this move is made, as I asserted earlier, we are only a few small steps, a few small centuries away from β€˜coming of age,’ among other contributing factors during and post-Enlightenment. But I find this abstraction of grace from the Divine life to be an interesting development towards modernity, ironically, even as that is given dye within the early mediaeval and Catholic sitz im leben of Thomas Aquinas (and those who received him, whether Catholic or Protestant Reformational). Helmut Thielicke describes the scenario this way:

We can see clearly at this point that what takes place in man, and not merely what happens to him, has become the object of theological observation. It is again evident, as was clear already with respect to the concept of the imago Dei in man’s original state, that the ontic element in the human ego pushes itself into the foreground. Then the theme of theology is not just the relation between God and man; on the contrary, theology then includes as an independent concern a treatment of β€œanthropology.” Here is where the fault lies.

The crack, or better, the cracks are themselves produced by the belt of tension which necessarily arises where men attempt to combine ontological and personalistic thinking. The greatest strain and the most evident rupture are undoubtedly to be found at the place where grace ceases to be a divine attribute and becomes an effect distinct from the divine attribute from which it emanates, ie, where grace ceases to be a personal relation to man (the β€œgracious God”) and becomes something which is ontically infused into man and which is thus present in man, demonstrably present. For it is precisely this distinction between the gracious God and the grace given [gratia data] which is the starting point of the distinctively β€œRoman” development of the doctrine of grace. To put it epigrammatically and therefore with tongue in cheek, what men want is not primarily God himself, but β€œdivine powers which may become human virtues and qualities” (von Harnack). At this point where grace β€œvisibly” passes into man in accordance with certain well defined practices, eg, sacramental operation, it ceases to be exclusively a subject and becomes a material object, β€œmedicine.” This materialization expresses itself in a variety of ways . . . .2

It would surely be reductionistic to blame Thomas and Aristotle for the modern-turn to the self, and what Taylor identifies as β€˜the coming of adulthood story.’ That is not my intention. I am simply noticing a Christian turn made at least within the lifetime of early mediaeval developments, that can plausibly help explain how this β€˜enlightened-turn’ finally came to fruition. There are many other contributing ideational and socio-culture pressures that finally brought this turn to consummation, but I think it is notable that we already see these fault lines developing as far back as the Hellenic period of the classical philosophers; and then developed more Christianly with the arrival of Thomas and the Romans.

I am only minimally attempting to illustrate how secular ideas can be traced back to a Christian lineage. Charles Taylor, Michael Gillespie, my personal friend, Derrick Peterson, among others have done further work, more substantially, to demonstrate that my point is not ill founded. Christians have as much to do with the secularity of society as anyone else. Indeed, we might go so far as to say that what it means to be a secular-atheist in the 21st century is really just an expression of a Christian heresy that has attended the Church catholic by way of various expressions; whether those expressions be understood within the Church proper, or in society-at-large as the theater of humanity’s glory, albeit, devoid of the Spirit. Ultimately, when grace is abstracted from God and made a quality capable of being understood purely from the immanent frame of the β€˜flatlander,’ it is at this point that Genesis 3 once again receives breath to breathe and make another attempt to elevate itself with zigguartic flare to the β€˜high places’ of the living God.

 

1 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, 580 kindle.

2 Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics: Foundations (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), 238.

 

 

Samuel and the Serpent: The Origin Story of the Modern Divinity

I’ve been working my way ever so slowly through Charles Taylor’s big bookΒ A Secular Age.Β There are parts that I fully agree with, and other parts that I don’t. The primary thing I agree with him on is his take on secularity, and how that has developed in the history of ideas (which of course he has masterfully, and even originally been developing). I want to highlight a theme from him that is also a theme in other related studies, in regard to the development of modernity (such as Michael Gillespie’s book TheΒ Theological Origins of Modernity), that has to do with what Taylor identifies as the β€˜immanent frame.’ What he is describing, from a canonical background, finds corollary with what Moses penned in Genesis 3:

NowΒ the serpent wasΒ more craftyΒ than any other beast of the field that theΒ LordΒ God had made.Β He said to the woman, β€œDid God actually say, β€˜YouΒ shall not eat of any tree in the garden’?” 2Β And the woman said to the serpent, β€œWe may eat of the fruit of the trees in the garden,Β 3Β but God said,Β β€˜You shall not eat of the fruit of the tree that is in the midst of the garden, neither shall you touch it, lest you die.’” 4Β But the serpent said to the woman, β€œYou will not surely die.Β 5Β For God knows that when you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil.” 6Β So when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise,Β she took of its fruitΒ and ate, and she also gave some to her husband who was with her,Β and he ate.Β 7Β Then the eyes of both were opened,Β and they knew that they were naked. And they sewed fig leaves together and made themselves loincloths.

This divinely breathed narrative account of things remains the case today; indeed, modernity reflects this attitude of self-divinity in living color. Charles Taylor writes:

There is another facet of this narrative of secularity which it is worth mentioning here, because of its ubiquity and importance in the β€œclosed” spin on immanence. The story line here is this: once human beings took their norms, their goods, their standards of ultimate value from an authority outside of themselves; from God, or the gods, or the nature of Being or the cosmos. But then they came to see thatΒ these higherΒ authorities were their own fictions, and they realized that they had to establish their norms and values for themselves, on their own authority. This is a radicalization of the coming to adulthood story as it figures in the science-driven argument for materialism. It is not just that freed from illusion, humans come to establish true facts about the world. It is also that they come to dictate the ultimate values by which they live.1

We read of a similar β€˜come of age’ story in Samuel:

When Samuel became old,Β he made his sons judges over Israel.Β 2Β The name of his firstborn son was Joel, and the name of his second, Abijah; they were judges in Beersheba.Β 3Β Yet his sons did not walk in his waysΒ but turned aside after gain.Β They took bribes and perverted justice.Β 4Β Then all the elders of Israel gathered together and came to Samuel atΒ RamahΒ 5Β and said to him, β€œBehold, you are old and your sons do not walk in your ways.Β Now appoint for us a king to judge us like all the nations.” 6Β But the thing displeased Samuel when they said, β€œGive us a king to judge us.” And Samuel prayed to theΒ Lord.Β 7Β And theΒ LordΒ said to Samuel, β€œObey the voice of the people in all that they say to you,Β for they have not rejected you,Β but they have rejected me from being king over them.Β 8Β According to all the deeds that they have done, from the day I brought them up out of Egypt even to this day, forsaking me and serving other gods, so they are also doing to you.Β 9Β Now then, obey their voice; only you shall solemnly warn themΒ and show them the ways of the king who shall reign over them.” —I Samuel 8:1-9

Modern humanity believes it has evolved past the primitive humanity, in their come of age story, as that shapes modernity (and thus a form of secularity). And yet, instead, it fits into the narrative frame we have described for us in Genesis 3, and played out, in this instance, in the Samuel narrative. The human heart has never changed. The human heart is just as primitive as it was the moment Eve and Adam believed the Serpent’s word over God’s Word. Enlightened humanity is just as darkened as the day that Jesus took it to the cross with Him.

I think the thing that stands out to me most starkly, with reference to Taylor, is how modern humanity is shaped by the idea that they in fact were God all along. That being enlightened in the immanent frame entails the idea that being enlightened is the simple recognition that humanity had really been worshipping a prop of their own projection; and that to recognize this, and then collapse that prop (or the classical divine attributes) into their own composition as human beings, is the true way forward for humanity. But this move is simply mimicking something like what the Israelites did under Samuel’s leadership. It is a move to displace God, and replace Him with the β€˜kingship’ of humanity’s own lights. But this only gets us back to the original proto-aevangeliumΒ of the Serpent’s β€œgood news” about the inner divinity of humanity. The β€˜teacher’ has said β€˜there is nothing new under the sun.’ The teacher is right!

 

1Β Charles Taylor,Β A Secular Age,Β 580 kindle.Β