Category Archives: Boethius

An Engagement with Philosophical Personhood in Theological Relief

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𝐼𝑛 π‘šπ‘¦ π‘β„Žπ‘–π‘™π‘œπ‘ π‘œπ‘β„Žπ‘¦ π‘œπ‘“ π‘Ÿπ‘’π‘™π‘–π‘”π‘–π‘œπ‘› π‘π‘™π‘Žπ‘ π‘  𝑀𝑒 π‘Žπ‘Ÿπ‘’ π‘Žπ‘™π‘Ÿπ‘’π‘Žπ‘‘π‘¦ 𝑖𝑛 π‘€π‘’π‘’π‘˜ 2. π‘‡β„Žπ‘–π‘  π‘€π‘’π‘’π‘˜ 𝑀𝑒 π‘Žπ‘Ÿπ‘’ π‘’π‘›π‘”π‘Žπ‘”π‘–π‘›π‘” π‘€π‘–π‘‘β„Ž πΊπ‘œπ‘‘’𝑠 π‘Žπ‘‘π‘‘π‘Ÿπ‘–π‘π‘’π‘‘π‘’π‘ , π‘Žπ‘  π‘‘β„Žπ‘œπ‘ π‘’ π‘Žπ‘Ÿπ‘’ π‘β„Žπ‘–π‘™π‘œπ‘ π‘œπ‘β„Žπ‘–π‘π‘Žπ‘™π‘™π‘¦ π‘π‘œπ‘›π‘ π‘‘π‘Ÿπ‘’π‘’π‘‘. π‘‡β„Žπ‘–π‘  π‘€π‘’π‘’π‘˜ π‘€π‘’β€™π‘Ÿπ‘’ π‘’π‘›π‘”π‘Žπ‘”π‘–π‘›π‘” π‘€π‘–π‘‘β„Ž π‘π‘’π‘Ÿπ‘ π‘œπ‘›β„Žπ‘œπ‘œπ‘‘, π‘‘π‘Ÿπ‘Žπ‘›π‘ π‘π‘’π‘›π‘‘π‘’π‘›π‘π‘’, π‘–π‘šπ‘šπ‘Žπ‘›π‘’π‘›π‘π‘’, π‘Žπ‘›π‘‘ π‘œπ‘šπ‘›π‘–π‘π‘œπ‘‘π‘’π‘›π‘π‘’ 𝑣𝑖𝑠 π‘Ž 𝑣𝑖𝑠 πΊπ‘œπ‘‘. π»π‘’π‘Ÿπ‘’ 𝑖𝑠 π‘€β„Žπ‘Žπ‘‘ 𝐼 π‘€π‘Ÿπ‘œπ‘‘π‘’ π‘€π‘–π‘‘β„Ž π‘Ÿπ‘’π‘“π‘’π‘Ÿπ‘’π‘›π‘π‘’ π‘‘π‘œ π‘€β„Žπ‘Žπ‘‘ 𝑖𝑑 π‘šπ‘’π‘Žπ‘›π‘  π‘‘π‘œ 𝑏𝑒 π‘Ž π‘π‘’π‘Ÿπ‘ π‘œπ‘›. π‘Šπ‘’ π‘Žπ‘Ÿπ‘’ 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑇.𝐽. π‘€π‘Žπ‘€π‘ π‘œπ‘›’𝑠 π‘π‘œπ‘œπ‘˜ *𝐡𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓 𝑖𝑛 πΊπ‘œπ‘‘* π‘Žπ‘  π‘œπ‘’π‘Ÿ 𝑑𝑒π‘₯𝑑. π‘†π‘œ, π‘šπ‘¦ π‘Ÿπ‘’π‘ π‘π‘œπ‘›π‘ π‘’ 𝑖𝑠 π‘€π‘–π‘‘β„Ž π‘Ÿπ‘’π‘“π‘’π‘Ÿπ‘’π‘›π‘π‘’ π‘‘π‘œ β„Žπ‘œπ‘€ β„Žπ‘’ 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 *π‘π‘’π‘Ÿπ‘ π‘œπ‘›β„Žπ‘œπ‘œπ‘‘* (𝑖𝑑 𝑖𝑠 π‘Žπ‘π‘‘π‘’π‘Žπ‘™π‘™π‘¦ π‘‘π‘œπ‘œ π‘™π‘œπ‘›π‘” π‘“π‘œπ‘Ÿ π‘œπ‘’π‘Ÿ π‘“π‘œπ‘Ÿπ‘’π‘š, π‘œβ„Ž 𝑀𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝐿𝑂𝐿).

Boethius

I disagree with Mawson out of hand on the entailments of what makes a person a person. Mawson, is taking a classical way, one we would find in Boethius, Aquinas et al. (most of the Latin tradition). To define the base ground of what it means to be a person, on terms of a purely intellectualist or rationalist ground, is to imbibe a philosophical/speculative tradition; indeed. Unfortunately, for my money, to use this type of speculative ground as one’s major premise, in regard to developing an anthropology, can only lead to a speculative conclusion. Indeed, it might be self-referentially coherent, as I think Mawson’s accounting is; but ultimately, in my view, the conclusion is only as sound as the first premise.

As a Christian theist I would argue that personhood ought to be defined by reference to the imago Dei/Christi (image of God/Christ). That is to say, in my view, to understand the entailments of personhood cannot (or at least, should not) begin with an abstract thought, but instead with the concrete givenness of God’s life for the world in the face of His Son, Jesus Christ (see Colossians 1.15). In this way, personhood’s definition finds an antecedent ground beyond the immanent frame, and has a β€˜transcendent’ starting point not from within itself (as an immanent abstraction), but outwith itself in the personhood of the divine Monarchia, as the Father, Son and Holy Spirit (the hypostases/persons of the Godhead coinhere one in the other in a filial and eternal relationship of interpenetrating life). If this mysterious (yet revealed) life becomes the ground by which personhood comes to have definition, at the very least what it means to be a person, is to be in a community of love for the other; living a life of self-givenness, one for the other, wherein what it means to be a person isn’t defined by having β€œrationality” or β€œself-consciousness,” per se, but to be in person-al relationship one with the other. And what serves as the ground of this community-fellowship-based personhood, only can come first, as gift, as God has graciously invited us into participation with His triune-person-grounded life through Jesus Christ.

If I reject Mawson’s definition for personhood, which I do, of course, then his dilemma of attempting to provide nobility or sanctity for humans without brain-activity is non-starting for me.

Based on my first long response, in regard to the constituents of what makes a person a person, I would argue that the triune God is the personalizing person. So, in this frame, can someone be β€œmore” of a person than someone else? That seems to make an attempt at quantifying what it means to be a person in terms of a quality (or substance) or something. God in Christ by the Holy Spirit, I would argue, is the person making person, in eternal relation; which would make Him the archetypal personalizing person maker. In this sense He is the Alpha and Omega. But since He graciously invites us into participation with Him through Christ, at a purely human level, there isn’t one person who is more person than another. God’s life is sui generis. All people are equal, insofar that all people are created in the image of God/Christ.

According to Scripture (John 4.24) β€˜God is spirit,’ and spirit is not gendered, per se. That said, God has Self-revealed Himself as Father of the Son (as Athanasius is wont to press). In the Christian reality God enfleshed came as a Man, as the Son of God (the second person). The Bible refers to God in masculine terms, by and large (except with reference to the Holy Spirit); and for me that ought to be determinative for how we refer to God.

PS. a struggle, which I knew I was bringing to this course of study, is that I am already committed to a certain Christian orientation with reference to thinking God, and everything subsequent. I had attempted to study God philosophically, at a formal level, many years ago now, and found it wanting. Even so, I still think there is value in learning to contemplate and think deeply and rigorously with regard to anything (which is why I paid for the class).