Contextual Theology, A Reflection for Karl Barth

There is often an attack on the reality that theology is contextual; this is a point that folks often bring out when they want to marginalize a theologian or a theological system that they don’t especially appreciate. This tactic, in my experience, is most often brought in to play when discussing Karl Barth’s theology. Again, as a result of a discussion I had yesterday, I have been prompted to reflect upon this once again. The point is usually made that because Karl Barth’s theology (for example) took shape in lieu of the Kantian ‘Modern’ backdrop, and in particular the Natural Theology abused by the Third Reich and Nazi Germany in World War II; that Barth’s theological approach was shaped ‘in response’ to these all compelling external forces which impinged upon the way Barth theologized. This claim is also made by folks who call themselves ‘post-colonial’ theologians (really post-modern), who want to marginalize what they consider to be an imperialistic hegemony of theological kingsmanship; which is to say that they think that Anglo-European/American dominated theological power-structures have imposed themselves on the way we think theologically, and thus the best way to relativize this power is to identify the ‘power’ that gave shape to the Anglo-European theologies in the first place. In Barth’s case, the usual suspect of “Evangelicals” and “post-Colonialists,” it is again, to go back to Barth’s time and place, and suggest (argue) that because Barth was located where he was; that his theology can really only speak to the context in which he worked. The charge is that the categories that Barth used (like Kantian) place his theology in an obsolete book-shelf somewhere in Berlin wherein the dust and moth-balls ought to have their due-course. The suggestion is that since we can now identify the forces that compelled Barth’s theology into existence; that now we can discard Barth’s theology (or only look at it from a distance) for something “cheezier,” or better — i.e. “their theology.”

Part of a counter-reply I would offer to this non-sense; is that simply identifying the contextual realities that were in place in a particular theologian’s life pretty much is meaningless. If by doing so, the critic thinks he/she has successfully de-legitemized said theologian’s offerings as a theologian. If we followed this practice to its logical conclusion, it would make all theologians irrelevant and incredible; since we are all locally situated in our particular contexts. And yet, these same critics fail to realize that given their own locatedness, that they themselves are making claims that some how transcend their personal situadeness in order to condemn the situadedness, in our case, of Karl Barth. In other words, these critics method is the height of circular reasoning (petitio principii). [Beyond that, these critics, ironically, are appealing to Kantian categories themselves]

Beyond this, some critics can agree with what I just said; but they still, as a result of identifying the contextual forces on Barth, want to challenge his material out-put as a theologian. Meaning that his insights and grammar do not hold sound or credible force for today because his family (theologically) affiliation represents a time and an era that these critics find to be incredible. In other words, they think working through Kant or Heiddeger and others to be an “unsalvagable” move that ultimately denies Barth a voice that says something that is “true.”

My own approach would simply be to respond: Indeed, we are all products of our times; we are all contextualized persons; and we all speak in response to other voices. So what! I would suggest that because of God’s concursus Dei, or his providential work alongside creation (creating situation and space for his purposes to be accomplished within his creation), that it is precisely because of our context and situadedness that we can speak about what matters about God. That through various crises and problems that this world situation throws up at God’s people; that in response to these crises, we encounter God’s Word to us anew. This can be witnessed throughout the history of interpretation in the Church of Christ; most notably, as I reflect, during the times of the Church Councils. The ones that were prompted by heresy against the truth of God’s Word in Christ. We have people like Athanasius who have come to be known as Christians who have stood in the face of dogmatic crises presented by people like Arius and others. Or we have had people like Martin Luther stand up against ecclesiopolitical-doctrinal crises, and in so doing he encounters the Word of God in Christ afresh and anew. Examples can be multiplied exponentially. The point is, is that all of these people were contextually located; and because of their contextual-historico location they were in a providential position wherein they encountered a fresh Word from God that (given one’s perspective) has resulted in a fruitful way forward for the body of Christ catholic (or universal). The ultimate example of this is of course the eternal Word’s incarnation. It was through his particularity and contextual situation (cf. Gal. 4, “the fullness of time”) that he provided universal hope for all times and places. It is this same ‘Word’ that breaks in upon us in our various contexts that allows us to speak theological truth that can have force for “all.” This is how I would seek to salvage Barth from the unsavory approaches that would like to marginalize him.

I, ultimately, don’t agree with everything that Barth has written or taught; but at the same time, the ground upon which I would disagree with Barth (if I do) is not to contextualize his theology out of existence. Instead, I would have to disagree with Barth the same way I would have to disagree with any other theologian—whether that be in 4th century Latin church, or the 21st century Post-modern church—it would have to be on material theological grounds; and not merely on genetic-causal grounds. The task for the theologian-historian is to help describe how a certain theologian’s ideas may have come to be; but the next task for the constructive-critical-theologian is to make a judgment about said theologian’s ideas based upon (for the Protestant theologian) the Reformed principle of sola scriptura. That is, how well does the theologoumena (theologian’s opinions) proximate to the teaching of God’s second Word in Scripture? This is the standard! It is not to make Barth irrelevant by appealing to contextual-cultural forces. If we were consistent with this method; then we could ultimately rub Jesus and the Bible out of the realm of the credible as well. Oh wait, that’s what some have sought to do . . .

I am really just venting here . . . thanks for paying attention 🙂 !

Epiphanius on Trinity

*This is a repost, but I like it.

I have recently been involved in two separate discussions having to do with the centrality of the Trinity to a Christian doctrine of God, here and here; so I was just thinking how co-incidental it is that I am currently reading T. F. Torrance’s “The Trinitarian Faith” (which is very similar to his “The Christian Doctrine of God, One Being Three Persons,” which I read a few years ago now – I must say, I think I actually like The Trinitarian Faith a bit more than The Christian Doctrine of God; which is hard to gauge, because I think The Christian Doctrine of God is one of the best books I’ve ever read on the Trinity ;-) ). As I’ve been reading, I just came across a cool quote that Torrance has provided made by Epiphanius (a Patristic):

God is one, the Father in the Son, the Son in the Father with the Holy Spirit . . . true enhypostatic Father, and true enhypostatic Son, and true enhypostatic Holy Spirit, three Persons, one Godhead, one being, one glory, one God. In thinking of God you conceive of the Trinity, but without confusing in your mind the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. The Father is the Father, the Son is the Son, the Holy Spirit is the Holy Spirit, but there is no deviation in the Trinity from oneness and identity. (Epiphanius, “Anc., 10,” cited by T. F. Torrance, “The Trinitarian Faith,” 234-35)

Good stuff!

My Arminian Upbringing . . .

About 15 years ago I stole my dad’s text book that he used for his Systematic Theology class in his Bible College days at then Southwestern Bible College in Phoenix, Arizona. They used Henry C. Thiessen’s “Lectures In Systematic Theology.” Southwestern is a Conservative Baptist College (now known as Arizona Christian University), I attended there for a semester when I graduated from high school back in 1992. I never totally read through Thiessen’s book, but I have flipped through it and read sections of it. One section was on Thiessen’s development of his doctrine of election. I wanted to quote what he says about election and foreknowledge:

(1) Election and Foreknowledge.  Election is a sovereign act of God; He was under no obligation to elect any one, since all had lost their standing before God. Even after Christ had died, God was not obligated to apply that salvation, except as He owed it to Christ to keep the agreement with Him as to man’s salvation. Election is a sovereign act, because it was not due to any constraint laid upon God. It was an act in grace, in that He chose those who were utterly unworthy of salvation. Man deserved the exact opposite; but in His grace God chose to save some. He chose them “in Christ.” He could not choose them in themselves because of their ill-desert; so He chose them in the merits of another. Furthermore, He chose those who He foreknew would accept Christ. The Scriptures definitely base God’s election on His foreknowledge: “Whom He foreknew, He also foreordained, . . . and whom He foreordained, them He also called” (Rom. 8:29, 30); “to the elect . . . according to the foreknowledge of God the Father” (1 Pet. 1:1, 2). Although we are nowhere told what it is in the foreknowledge of God that determines His choice, the repeated teaching of Scripture that man is responsible for accepting or rejecting salvation necessitates or postulating that it is man’s reaction to the revelation God has made of Himself that is the basis of His election. May we repeat: Since mankind is hopelessly dead in trespasses and sins and can do nothing to obtain salvation, God graciously restores to all men sufficient ability to make a choice in the matter of submission to Him. This is the salvation bringing grace of God that has appeared to all men. In His forknowledge He perceives what each one will do with this restored ability, and elects men to salvation in harmony with His knowledge of their choice of Him. . . . (Henry C. Thiessen, Lectures In Systematic Theology, 344-45)

Thiessen articulates a pretty classic version of an Arminian understanding of election: God’s choosing of individual people for salvation is based upon His foreknowledge and ability to look down the corridor of time and see who will place their faith in Him; and it is on this basis that God elects these individuals, and as corrollary, reprobates those who choose to stay in unbelief. You’ll notice that Thiessen is careful to frame this in a way that underscorse the fact that the person’s capacity to place their faith in Christ comes from God’s grace given to them; which then opens up a person’s ability to deliberate whether they want Christ or don’t. So we have an Arminian version of prevenient grace at play as well.

This is what I was taught about election, and things from early on in my life. My influence was pretty much Arminian theology like that articulated by Thiessen. Yet, it was somewhat of a hybrid form of Arminianism, since it also had a strong doctrine of the eternal security of the believer; which of course is why I was taught that our view was simply an “Biblicist” approach 😉 .

Theological Science, Against Dualisms

Thinking “scientifically” is also thinking “theologically,” and vice versa:

. . . theological science and natural science have their own proper and distinctive objectives to pursue, but their work inevitably overlaps, for they both respect and operate through the same rational structures of space and time, while each develops special modes of investigation, rationality, and verification in accordance with the nature and the direction of its distinctive field. But since each of them is the kind of thing it is as a human inquiry because of the profound correlation between human knowing and the space-time structures of creation, each is in its depth akin to the other . . . natural science and theological science are not opponents but partners before God, in a service of God in which each may learn from the other how better to pursue its own distinctive function . . . (Paul Molnar quoting Thomas Torrance [The Ground and Grammar of Theology],”Thomas F. Torrance: Theologian Of The Trinity,” 24)

This is an important principle to wrap the mind around. Torrance is always concerned with undercutting the dualistic ways of thinking that we typically operate out of; in other words, he wants to make sure that the “object” under consideration is always tied to the “subject” considering the “object.” Or, that the “subject” is not allowed to impose some foreign mode of thinking upon the “object” under consideration; thus, in effect, warping the “object,” and not allowing it (or Him) to determine its own shape and emphasis. This then can be applied to the “natural” or “theological” realms of inquiry.

Christianity has failed to grasp this critique in general; thus we continue to go down a road that is largely dualist in orientation —- whether that be from the proactive side (like theological liberalism might represent) or on the reactive side (like theological fundamentalism may represent).

Delayed-Immediate Gratification: Biblical Studies & Systematic Theology, where shall the twain meet?

I just had a thought: What’s the difference between a “Biblical Studies” type person, and an “Systematic Theology” type person (I generalize)? I think that the Bib Studies people are delayed gratification people, and the Systematic Theologian types are immediate gratification. I make this observation as one who is seemingly more predisposed to the “ST” side. And I say this because I often read “Bib S” blogs (and materials), and I find it interesting that they often are wrestling through issues like the Apostle Paul’s christology or something, or John’s;  or the kind of stuff that “ST” type folk figured out centuries ago 😉 .

There are pros and cons to either side of this chasm, but I think as an anecdote there is some truth here. Ideally the two, in the “body dynmaic,” should complement each other; I usually don’t see this happening so much, unfortunately (although I have read some constructive works lately — like Suzanne McDonald’s “Re-imaging Election” — wherein they work at doing a complementary-disciplinary project).

Thought Experiment: Theological Methodologies and Grandmas

I was just thinking (danger zone); wouldn’t it be just like the LORD to confound the wisdom of the wise with what the wise consider to be foolishness? Except get this: Instead of the usual dualism that this kind of thinking is usually thought through — like Church-world, or sacred-secular — what if the reference was actually Church-Church, or sacred-sacred? So that what the wise in the Church consider to be wisdom; and obversely, what the wise in the Church consider to be foolish, turns out to be the wisdom of God. I have been thinking a lot about Dispensationalism  lately, and it strikes me that most biblical exegetes and systematic/dogmatic theologians today (Christian ones) consider Dispensationalism to be the “common-man’s” religon; or the untrained dilettante’s attempt to provide a “sophisticated” theological construct (based on “common sense” literalism) for their beliefs. Wouldn’t it be ironic if the dispensationalism so often mocked turned out to be the most proximate to how it actually is?

I am persuaded that at least classic dispensationalism is not the way it is. But then again, I could be wrong. I’m not admitting of an relativism in my approach, or that we cannot come to any kind of critically real understandings of theological hermeneutical reality. I’m just thinking out-loud about the possibility that so many theological trajectories, for all their respective gusto, could be terribly wrong; and of course I am thinking of theological adiophra or secondary musings elaborated and articulated by theologians and biblical exegetes (i.e. theolougemena); not about essential teachings elaborated by the Church ecumenical (i.e. I’m not entertaining some sort of nihilistic hermeneutic).

I’m just positing the idea that for all the collective wisdom amongst all of the collective theologians and biblical exegetes out there; grandma who sits in the pew with her common-woman understanding could be more wise than the “Wise.” A humbling prospect . . .

The Search For The Historical Adam, Weak Science

Science is not a system of thought free from metaphysical foundations. It is not a discipline that is itself, at a first order level, grounded upon its own second order methodology; in other words, science itself (and of course I am referring to the “Natural Sciences”) cannot justify its own existence as a discipline upon emperical observational grounds.

The following will be my attempt to provide an evaluative matrix through which some unsatisfied soul might have an intellectual apparatus in place that will allow him/her to critically engage the recent article written by Richard N. Ostling at Christianity Today entitled The Search For The Historical Adam. The article, in a nutshell, surveys the attempt by certain Christian scientists (like Francis Collins) to argue their belief in theistic evolution. One of the casualties of this endeavor is none other than Adam (and Eve) himself. For these Christian scientists, in order for their position to work (that is macro-evolution), Adam cannot be one of two literal original humans (the other being Eve) from whence all of humanity has descended. According to them, and the “evidence,” humanity had to have descended from multiple humanoids. Thus, the Adam and Eve story becomes a myth, an allegorical parable, intended to communicate that at some point humanity was thrust into a life of moral decline and sin — and Adam and Eve become the literary tools by which God has chosen to communicate this state of affairs. Here is how Francis Collins frames this according to Hostling (Collins is the scientist who decoded the human genome and was nominated by Obama to be head of the National Institute of Health, who is also an Evangelical Christian and spear-heading a movement that seeks to promote theistic evolution):

Collins’s 2006 bestseller, The Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief—which so vexed those secularist critics—reported scientific indications that anatomically modern humans emerged from primate ancestors perhaps 100,000 years ago—long before the apparent Genesis time frame—and originated with a population that numbered something like 10,000, not two individuals. Instead of the traditional belief in the specially created man and woman of Eden who were biologically different from all other creatures, Collins mused, might Genesis be presenting “a poetic and powerful allegory” about God endowing humanity with a spiritual and moral nature? “Both options are intellectually tenable,” he concluded.

The fact that Christianity Today is choosing to run a story on this illustrates the impact that this is having within the “Evangelical” community. Some are, of course, comparing this to when Copernicus and Galileo argued—against the Church—that we in fact lived in a helio-centric not geo-centric galaxy.

What I am going to do now, as I alluded to above, is to provide an apparatus through which to think about what is being communicated by folks like Francis Collins (and his foundation Biologos). It is my belief that he, and those like him, have accepted what is called Weak Scientism. The following is going to be a very long quote that will describe what that entails (Weak Scientism), and then I will follow with a brief closing comment (this is a long post, 1, 788 words). Here we go:

Scientism, expressed in the quotation by Rescher [what I quote in the post before this one] at the beginning of the chapter, is the view that science is the very paradigm of truth and rationality. If something does not square with currently well-established scientific beliefs, if it is not within the domain of entities appropriate for scientific investigation, or if it is not amenable to scientific methodology, then it is not true or rational. Everything outside of science is a matter of mere belief and subjective opinion, of which rational assessment is impossible. Science, exclusively and ideally, is our model of intellectual excellence.

Moreland and Craig briefly describe two forms of scientism, “Strong and Weak.” We will skip their comments on strong and move to their discussion on weak; since this is what I believe is applicable to the approach being followed by someone like Collins, and those like him. Here’s what they say about weak scientism:

Adovocates of weak scientism allow for the existence of truths apart from science and are even willing to grant that they can have some minimal, postive rationality status without the support of science. But advocates of weak scientism still hold that science is the most valuable, most serious and most authoritative sector of human learning. Every other intellectual activity is inferior to science. Further, there are virtually no limits to science. There is no field into which scientific research cannot shed light. To the degree that some issue or belief outside science can be given scientific support or can be reduced to science, to that degree the issue or belief becomes rationally acceptable. Thus we have an intellectual and perhaps even a moral obligation to try to use science to solve problems in other fields that, heretofore, have been untouched by scientific methodology. For example, we should try to solve problems about the mind by the methods of neurophysiology and computer science.

Not that advocates of weak scientism are not merely claiming that, for example, belief that the universe had a beginning, supported by good philosophical and theological arguments, gains extra support if that belief also has good scientific arguments for it. This claim is relatively uncontroversial because, usually, if some belief has a few good supporting arguments and later gains more good supporting arguments, then this will increase the rationality of the belief in question. But that is not what weak scientism imples, because this point cuts both ways. For it will equally be the case that good philosophical and theological arguments for a beginning of the universe will increase the rationality of such a belief initially supported only by scientific arguments. Advocates of weak scientism are claiming that fields outside science gain in they are given scientific support and not vice versa. . . . If weak scientism is true, then the conversation between theology and science will be a monologue with theology listening to science and waiting for science to give it support.

Here now, the authors of my reference (Moreland and Craig) give argument for why scientism (strong or weak) is not a sound methodology or approach:

[F]irst, scientism (in both forms) does not adequately allow for the task of stating and defending the necessary presuppositions for science itself to be practiced (assuming scientific realism). Thus scientism shows itself to be a foe and not a friend of science.

Science cannot be practiced in thin air. In fact, science itself presupposes a number of substantive philosophical theses which must be assumed if science is even going to get off the runway. Now each of these assumptions has been challenged, and the task of stating and defending these assumptions is one of the tasks of philosophy. The conclusions of science cannot be more certain than the presuppositions it rests on and uses to reach those conclusions.

[W]eak scientism misconstrues their strength in its view that scientific propositions have greater epistemic authority than those of other fields like philosophy. This would mean that the conclusions of science are more certain than the philosophical presuppositions used to justify and reach those conclusions, and that is absurd. In this regard, the following statement by John Kekes strikes at the heart of weak scientism:

A successful argument for science being the paradigm of rationality must be based on the demonstration that the presuppositions of science are preferable to other presuppositions. That demonstration requires showing that science, relying on these presuppositions, is better at solving some problems and acheiving some ideals than its competitors. But showing that cannot be the task of science. It is, in fact, one task of philosophy. Thus the enterprise of justifying the presuppositions of science by showing that with their help science is the best way of solving certain problems and acheiving some ideals is a necessary precondition of the justification of science. Hence philosophy, and not science, is a stronger candidate for being the very paradigm of rationality.

Here is a list of some of the philosophical presuppositions of science: (1) the existence of a theory-independent, external world; (2) the orderly nature of the external world; (3) the knowability of the external world; (4) the existence of truth; (5) the laws of logic; (6) the reliability of our cognitive and sensory faculties to serve as truth gatherers and as a source of justified beliefs in our intellectual environment; (7) the adequacy of language to describe the world; (8) the existence of values used in science (e.g. “test theories fairly and report test results honestly”); (9) the uniformity of nature and induction; (10) the existence of numbers. (J. P. Moreland & William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations For A Christian Worldview, 346-48)

I would contend that Collins, and those who are proposing that Adam and Eve are not real historical people, are operating from a weak scientism as just described. They have placed science over scripture in a monological way, so that scripture becomes science’s wax-nose. Whichever way the “empirical” data portends to go, so must scripture in regards to what scripture writers presuppose for many of their theological arguments to hold (like Paul’s 1st/2nd Adam motif etc. or the Lukan account of Jesus’ lineage as the son of God in Luke 3). As the writers above highlight though, science itself is available for serious critical scrutiny. That is, its very existence as a dicipline is itself grounded upon non-emperical assumptions. This, at least, should humble those who would make the very audacious claims that they are making about what the scriptures teach themselves. This is not similar to heliocentrism, because the issue under concern did not have to do with something of the magnitude that this current issue presents. The heliocentrism issue certainly had to do with some interpretive issues and church authority in that period; but it does not parallel the theological impact that this current proposal (about Adam) could have both theologically and exegetically. Nevertheless, my primary point with this post was to provide something to evaluate the approach that I believe Collins & co. have taken. I believe that they are weak scientists. And thus I believe their approach is “weak!” I am not at all persuaded by their general premises and theory. They have made multiple inductive and interpretive steps, shaped by their prior committment to said assumptions [like some of those 10 points listed above by Moreland and Craig], in order to arrive at the conclusions that they have about the historicity of Adam and Eve. Yet, the assumptions that have helped to inform their conclusions are themselves assumptions that are not self-evident, and are certainly not “scientific.” At the very least they should be much more circumspect in their presentation and conclusions given the gravity of their proposal.

American Evangelicals and Schleiermacher

Karl Barth opines on the power of impact that Friedrich Schleiermacher, so called Father of Theological Liberalism, has on all of the readers of theology and the Bible in his early 20th century German/continental context. I think what Barth says here is just as applicable for many in my own “Evangelical” Free Church context. My own upbringing resonates more with the von Zizendorf, Jacob Phillip Spener pietistic (and thus realized Schlieremacherean pietism) spirituality than that of some sort of hybrided Reformed spirituality in mood. I’m not really going to get into that, but I think what Barth says about Schleiermacher has relevance for many “Evangelicals” in America today (even if “Evangelical” meant something different in the German context than it does in the American — I see plenty of over-lap). Here’s Barth:

[L]ittle need be said about the importance of the subject and the legitimacy of devoting a whole semester to it. Scheiermacher merits detailed historical consideration and study even if only because he was the one in whom the great struggle of Christianity with the strivings and achievements of the German spirit in 1750–1830, in whose light or shadow we still stand today, took place in a way which would still be memorable even if he were dead and his theological work had been transcended. None of his contemporaries with the possible exception of Hegel took up that struggle so comprehensively or with such concern, and none of the theologians of his age has anything like the same representative siginificance for what took place at that time. But Schleiermacher is not dead for us and his theological work has not been transcended. If anyone still speaks today in Protestant theology as though he were still among us, it is Schleiermacher. We study Paul and the reformers, but we see with the eyes of Schleiermacher and think along the same lines as he did. This is true even when we criticize or reject the most important of his thelogoumena or even all of them. Wittingly and willingly or not, Schleiermacher’s method and presuppositions are the typical ferment in almost all theological work; I need only mention the basic principle, which is so much taken for granted that it is seldom stated, that the primary theme of his work, both historically and systematically, is religion, piety, Christian self-consciousness. Who is not at one with Schleiermacher in this regard? In 1859 the Bremen preacher F. L. Mallet wrote concerning Schleiermacher: “It once seemed [even then!] as though his day was over, as though he had done his work. . . . But it is not the same with Schleiermacher as with the discovering of thinking faith [Paulus in Heidelberg]: he has a tenacious life, and to the surprise of his detractors and despisers he is suddenly remembered in a way and from an angle which cannot be overlooked or missed” (“Biographie,” 16). (Karl Barth, “The Theology Of Schleiermacher,” xiii)

This was written back in 1923/24 during Barth’s Lectures at Gottingen; so clearly this is removed both from our era, and then region (me writing as an American in the early 21st century). Nevertheless, I think there is something very ironic and parallel about all of this. Much of American “Evangelicalism” finds its rootage in the pietist background, in ethos (and of course pietism is not monolith, so I generalize). There is a certain mood wherein personal fulfillment and spiritual experience are at the center of even American Evangelical Christian spirituality. It is this mood that I think would feel very comfortable with much of Scheliermacher’s own method and spirituality (his being more thoughtful and articulated, in most cases). I think this makes for an interesting thought-experiment; viz. to try and see some analogous relationship between then in Germany, and now in America. I think many American Evangelicals today are going full circle right back to a Schleiermacherean pietistic spirituality wherein “my feeling” is the norm for “my theological existence;” one that is shaped by a “me and my Jesus,” “me and my Bible,” “holy huddle” mode. It seems to me that Karl Barth, for many American Evangelicals, could be the perfect antidote for such an ailment. We’ll see, I’ll keep reading and let you know ;-).

PS. I don’t really think The Gospel Coalition is the answer. (You know . . . Evangelical Calvinism is able to fit into the mood that could very much so be part of the antidote that Karl Barth also helps to provide . . . in fact maybe even better 😉

An Intensively christocentric Way to Interpret Scripture, Karl Barth

On the heels of my last post, I thought I would provide a bit more in regards to explicating what it means to be “more like Barth” in our approach to biblical exegesis. In order to do that I thought I would quote David Gibson a bit futher on how Barth’s so called principial-intensive (meaning intentionally starting with Christ and Barth’s unique understanding of election-incarnation at the center of his method) approach looks like. Here we go:

A good example can be found in the way Barth approaches Romans 9–11. When his thesis of biblical text as witness to revelation is read in conjunction with his understanding of Jesus Christ as the object of that witness, and with his understanding of Jesus Christ as therefore the electing God and the elected man, then a particular set of theological lenses for reading Romans 9–11 come into view. Barth’s approach is well stated by Douglas Sharp:

[Barth’s] exegesis [of Rom. 9–11] presupposes the identity of revelation/incarnation and election, and can be seen to consist in the interpretation of an objective reality (Israel and the Church) which he finds imaged in the text. The truly significant element of the exegesis is the fact that it is not so much the intepretation of biblical revelation as it is an interpretation of a medium which is itself an interpretation of revelation. This is to say that the exegesis of Romans 9–11 is an interpretation of an interpretation. Jesus Christ is the revelation, and Barth views the existence of the community as an interpretation of that revelation. Thus Barth interprets the community in its two forms in terms of the primary reality of Jesus Christ’s election.

This argument corresponds with what we discovered in reading Barth’s exegesis of Romans 9–11. The two forms of the community, Israel and the church, were read by Barth as witnesses to the two-fold determination of Jesus Christ for both judgment and mercy; here Christology intensively occupies the horizon of interpretation. We may recall how different this is to Calvin’s approach. Calvin’s covenant hermeneutic for Romans 9–11 (arguably the most salient feature of his exegesis) is influenced by Christology. But his hermeneutic is not christologically intensive, because he does not see Christology as the meaning of certain verses where Christ himself is not mentioned or as providing the typological structures for Israel and the church within the details of the text.

It is now clear that Barth’s reading of the Bible displays a heremeneutical paradigm that is created not just by Barth’s doctrine of election as it has emerged out of his reading of the Johannine Prologue, but just as closely by a tightly related set of well developed and consistently applied hermeneutical convictions that have operated at least as far back as CD I/2. As Barth comes to provide extended exegesis of biblical texts as part of his doctrine of election, his understanding of interpretive freedom and responsibility ensures that his exegesis of election will be carried out in a manner that may be described as intensively christocentric. This is because his account of the required subordination of the biblical interpreter to the witness of revelation is itself intensively christocentric. [David Gibson, Reading The Decree: Exegesis, Election, and Christology in Calvin and Barth, (London: T&T Clark, A Continuum imprint, 2009), 190-91]

So we can see how Barth’s approach is truly and “intensively” christocentric because Barth assumes that the point of Scripture is to witness and testify to its reality; and thus its witness bearing points beyond itself to its reality who is God’s self-Revelation and self-interpreting-Word, Jesus. It is this assumption that gives shape to Barth’s exegesis; so while Barth’s approach may not reflect typical grammatical-historical exegesis (although as Gibson notes later this is still an aspect of Barth’s approach within his explicatio, yet this takes on different emphases as Barth’s theory of Revelation shifts even this consideration from epistemological/revelational concerns per Calvin’s more classic approach to soteriological/meditational contours), he still moves and breathes within that sphere; albeit given shape by a theological vantage point, that then informs his particular method of reading the whole text and history of salvation.

There is really a lot more to this, but I wonder if those of you who said they would be more like Barth; if you would still be comfortable in saying that after reading this? I am. T. F. Torrance follows a similar path here, in fact Adam Nigh, contributor to our forthcoming book, has an excellent chapter entitled: Chapter 3,  The Depth Dimension of Scripture: A Prolegomenon to Evangelical Calvinism, where he develops a “depth” hermeneutic something similar to Barth’s, yet sketched with greater detail provided by T. F. Torrance’s thought in particular; and then of course modified as an “Evangelical Calvinist” approach to hermeneutics (just another reason to pick up our book once it comes out, Adam does an awesome job with this topic [his PhD is also dealing with TFT and Scripture/hermeneutics]). Anyway, this will probably be the last post I put up in relation to Gibson’s book on Barth and Calvin (if you ever have the chance and wherewithal, and money, I would suggest that you give this book a read).

The Power of Protestant Presuppositions and Magisteriums

Why does any of this even matter, I mean what I mostly discuss here at the blog? Isn’t this whole discussion one that has been going on ad nauseam for centuries; i.e. the debate between Calvinists, Arminians, and all of the rest of the theological abstractions? Isn’t reading and knowing the Bible enough? Why do I need to get into a “distraction” that no one has been able to figure out anyway; I mean Theology, in general, and this Calvinist stuff in particular?

Glad you asked. Your questions presuppose some things, like: 1) You approach Scripture without a prior commitment to theological suppositions and constructs, 2) That history of interpretation that has taken place in the history of the Church’s formation, to this point, is of no consequence and unrelated to the Holy Spirit’s work of building the body of Christ, 3) That the Bible’s interpretation is an individualist approach and thus the self is the center of Biblical interpretation, 4) That the Bible is not interpreted, it’s just immediately clear to you as the reader, 5) etc. etc.

This is why I feel it is important to continue to discuss this stuff. Because everyone interprets the Scriptures, no one does so without being committed (at some level) to prior theological constructs (no matter how un-defined that might be), we all have pre-understandings that we can possibly read into the Text if we are unaware that we have them. I am afraid that this point is all too quickly lost on us Protestants. It behooves us to continually recognize that we are all interpreters, that our “denomination” does not necessarily have a corner on THE interpretation (unless they hold to Evangelical Calvinism 😉 ), and that it can be highly beneficial to be self-critical in our approaches to the Scripture. There is no doubt that for the Protestant Christian the Scriptures represent the norming norm for all of our thoughts about Jesus Christ, but we should continue to remember that we are all interpreters who never come naked to the TEXT of Scripture.

I know you all know this, I just like to reiterate this point every now and again.