A Telling of an Evangelical Calvinism [contra Westminster Calvinism] by T.F. Torrance

TF Torrance was and remains the inspiration for what me and Myk Habets have called Evangelical Calvinism (after TFT). Torrance maintains that the evangelical Calvinism he affirms was really just representative of a Scottish development that unfolded concurrently alongside the development of Westminster Calvinism. Torrance argues that the themes he elevates as representative of an evangelical Calvinism are all present within the history and development of Reformed theology in the 16th and 17th centuries. Some would want to assert that TF is overreading the history, and eisegeting it through a Barthian lens. But this is misplaced. Yes, TFT was a (doctoral) student of Barth’s; yes, TF affirmed much of Barth’s theology (particularly election); but Torrance’s reading of the Reformed tradition, as he makes clear in his book, Scottish Theology, is a critical reading of the Reformed heritage as that developed in the Scottish motherland. Even if what TF says about Reformed theology sounds like strange teaching, that is only because (if you think so) you have been indoctrinated into the faulty supposition that the Reformed tradition is pretty much a monolithic machine—as that has been distilled in so-called Post Reformed orthodox theology. TFT is simply understanding that the Reformed trad is multivalent, and fulsome with multiple lines of development that aren’t as manageable as some would like to imagine.

In the following we have TF discussing the entailments of what he considers an evangelical Calvinism contra the Federal/Westminster Calvinism which he believes did untold damage to the Reformed tradition, particularly in TFT’s native Scotland (but elsewhere as well). You will notice as you read this that Torrance essentially counters all of the points of a Westminster Calvinism by offering biblically rich themes as those have come to light in the Self-revelation of God in Jesus Christ. Since TF is committed to allowing Scripture speak for itself, as it is regulated by the reality of Jesus Christ, he ends up trafficking in themes that focus on God’s universal and unilateral love, as that is fitting to who God is as triune Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. So, you should notice, then, the type of alternative prolegomenon that TFT is working from as he arrives at his kerygmatic-rich notions vis-à-vis dogmatic points. Here is Torrance:

. . . Several comments on this understanding of Christ’s sacrifice may be in place. While traditional forensic language is used, the atoning sacrifice is not to be understood as fulfilled by Christ merely as man (which would imply a Nestorian Christology), but of Christ as the one Mediator between God and man who is himself God and man in one Person. This means that ‘the joyful atonement made between God and man by Christ Jesus, by his death, resurrection and ascension’, is not to be understood in any sense as the act of the man Jesus placating God the Father, but as a propitiatory sacrifice in which God himself through the death of his dear Son draws near to man and draws man near to himself. It is along these lines also that we must interpret the statement of the Scots Confession that Christ ‘suffered in body and soul to make the full satisfication for the sins of the people’, for in the Cross God accepts the sacrifice made by Christ, whom he did not spare but delievered him up for us all, as satisfication, thereby acknowledging his own bearing of the world’s sin guilt and judgment as the atonement. As Calvin pointed out in a very important passage, God does not love us because of what Christ has done, but it is because he first loved us that he came in Christ in order through atoning sacrifice in which God himself does not hold himself aloof but suffers in and with Christ to reconcile us to himself. Nor is there any suggestion that this atoning sacrifice was offered only for some people and not for all, for that would imply that he who became incarnate was not God the Creator in whom all men and women live and move and have their being, and that Jesus Christ our Lord and Saviour was not God and man in the one Person, but only an instrument in the hands of the Father for the salvation of a chosen few. In other words, a notion of limited atonement implies a Nestorian heresy in which Jesus Christ is not really God and man united in one Person. It must be added that the perfect response offered by Jesus Christ in life and death to God in our place and on our behalf, contains and is the pledge of our response. Just as the union of God and man in Christ holds good in spite of all the contradiction of our sin under divine judgment, so his vicarious response holds good for us in spite of our unworthiness: ‘not I but Christ’. . . .[1]

The reduction should be clear: TFT’s understanding of Reformed theology is Christ conditioned, and explicated from that vantage point. As a result, an emphasis on God’s love for the world, just as He is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, stands at the fore of TF’s thinking when it comes to a theory of the atonement, and its soteriological implications. This is at odds, of course, with Federal theology’s framing of a God-world relation as that is provided for by the legal contract of a Covenant of Works/Grace. Federal theology, as TFT presses, thinks God in terms of a pure being, and thus in categories that are metaphysically juridical and thus impersonal by nature. As a result, as TF also intones, since this notion of God relates to the world through impersonal, distant, and abstract decrees, when Christ comes to the world, under these conditions, Christ becomes simply an instrument in the hands of a wrathful Father. One significant Christological implication of this, as TF shows, is that the work of God in Christ is ruptured from the person of God in Christ, and thus we end up with a Nestorian-like dualism at play in Jesus of Nazareth.

You would hope by now that classical Calvinists would have come to realize the many errors of thinking God in decretal terms. You would have hoped that these same people would have repented of this by now, and turned to what TFT is describing and developing with reference to an Evangelical Calvinism. Unfortunately, this isn’t the case. That’s okay, some types only go out by prayer.

[1] T. F. Torrance: From John Knox to John McLeod Campbell, 18-19.

 

Is Evangelical Calvinism Compatible with Free Grace Theology?

Free Grace theology was what I grew up with as a Conservative Baptist pastor’s kid. We didn’t call it that, but that is, effectively, what it was. Later Zane Hodges, as a counter to John MacArthur’s Gospel According to Jesus, would write his book: Absolutely Free. He simply codified what many of us in that sphere had lived with, soteriologically, for our whole Christian lives. Essentially Free Grace theology is the notion that all that is required for salvation is that you simply believe in Jesus Christ, and once you do that you are eternally secure and eternally saved/justified before God. It is generally a non-Calvinist, what some used to call biblicist way of thinking soteriology; clearly coming out of a style of conversionist, revivalist, and even Kesweckian piety and spirituality.

Free Grace contrasts with something like Five Point Calvinism, which of course MacArthur’s ‘Gospel According to Jesus’ is. Contrary to Five Point Calvinism, Free Grace argues that salvation doesn’t require ‘repentance’ as a condition of salvation; it argues that a person is eternally secure (without so-called ‘good works’); it makes the distinction between salvation and disciple (so a hard distinction between justification and sanctification), which entails the notion that there are such things as ‘carnal Christians’; it argues that the warning passages in the New Testament pointed towards Christians aren’t referring to loss of salvation (which both Calvinists and Arminians take them as), but to loss of reward (which also includes loss of ruling and reigning with Christ during the millennium). There are other distinctions, but those are the primary ones. You might be able to see how this would differ from a Five Point Calvinism of the type that someone like JMac would endorse.

But how would an Evangelical Calvinism dovetail, or not, with Free Grace soteriology? I think there are many points of contact between an Evangelical Calvinism and Free Grace theology, but it requires the person to put on their theology thinking caps. Evangelical Calvinism, like Free Grace, sees salvation purely grounded in the promise and person of Jesus Christ. We, like Free Grace, do not see any conditions for salvation other than simply placing your faith in Jesus Christ. Once this has obtained a person is indeed eternally secure, and assured of salvation, simply because they are now in union with the One who is indeed secure, and eternal life in Himself. Once this Rubicon (from being lost to found) has been crossed, the impossibility of “losing” salvation would be as great as the eternal Son no longer being the incarnate man from Nazareth.

And yet the Evangelical Calvinist, or Athanasian Reformed, goes to a depth dimension in a way that Free Grace doesn’t. An Evangelical Calvinism grounds salvation in the person and work of Jesus Christ. So we don’t see salvation as something we “acquire,” but as a person, God the Son, who has acquired us in His gracious assumption of humanity (assumptio carnis). We press into the idea, into the logic of the homoousion, that Christ’s humanity is vicarious humanity for all. This results, further, in the idea that Christ first believed for us by the Spirit in His humanity, as archetypal humanity, such that when we say Yes, and not No, to salvation we are only echoing His Yes and amen for us. An Evangelical Calvinist anchors salvific belief in God’s salvific belief for us; this would be something of an ordo salutis for us. This might help clarify how an Evangelical Calvinism isn’t at necessary odds with Free Grace soteriology, but it also should indicate how we texture and deepen things on the theological side in ways that a Free Grace thinker might not. If I was still pure Free Grace I don’t think I would look at what I am communicating here and conclude that it is at odds with my position as a Free Grace thinker, but it might make me wonder about the hermeneutic an Evangelical Calvinist is using juxtaposed with my own as a Free Gracer.

One stark difference, because an Evangelical Calvinism doesn’t make a hard distinction between justification/sanctification, that is, not in the way that Free Grace does, this might represent a point of departure for the Free Gracer. I should qualify and say, an Evangelical Calvinism does make a distinction between justification and sanctification (we are Protestant after all), but that along with Calvin’s duplex gratia (double grace) soteriology, which sees Jesus alone embodying both justification and sanctification for us, we see the whole enchilada as grounded in Christ’s vicarious life for us. The guarantee of both of these realities obtaining, was actualized first in the life of Christ for us. It is as we come into union with Him, participate with Him that its reality becomes apparent as we keep in step with the Spirit in Him as we live out our Christian existences as disciples of Jesus Christ. We might say it like this: the justification Jesus has won for us in His vicarious humanity is the ground upon which sanctification is pollinated from as we either submit to Him, or don’t, even as Christian people. Again, this could be parsed in a way that is not at odds with Free Grace soteriology.

In the end, an Evangelical Calvinism and Free Grace theology have more in common, by way of mood, than not. We reject the juridical or forensic emphases that fund Five Point Calvinist soteriology. We emphasize that it is God for us in Jesus Christ, personally, that stands as the basis for a sound understanding of soteriology (contra the decretum absolutum of Calvinism). We are both prone towards thinking God in very warm-hearted and pietistic-relational ways. It’s just that I think an Evangelical Calvinism ends up being much more theologically developed and open that way than is a Free Grace theology (which is very biblicist by orientation). And maybe I’m being a little more charitable towards Free Grace than they would be towards me; maybe I’m a bit sentimental. I could offer a harder critique of Free Grace, probably, but I think the things I’ve hit upon here reflect areas that we might have certain general commonalities on. One critique I might make of Free Grace would be that their entire hermeneutic stands or falls on a dispensational hermeneutic being the correct one (which implicates the way they develop their understanding of rewards and ruling and reigning with Jesus Christ during the millennium). I might also critique them for what I take to be an inherent dualism that plagues not just them, but of course the classical Calvinists, Arminians, and the whole of the Latin theological tradition. But I won’t make those critiques here, I’m being charitable. 🙂

Anyway, just some free floating thoughts on what Free Grace theology is (after Zane Hodges), and how an Evangelical Calvinism may or may not cohere with it at certain levels.

Evangelical Calvinism’s God of Love V Classical Calvinism’s God of Law

When I have the strength again, I plan on writing a book, an accessible book, that explains what Evangelical Calvinism offers as an alternative to what most think of classical or 5 point Calvinism. I still think this is a needed corrective for many out there who are enmeshed in classical Calvinism because they think it’s their only orthodox alternative. Evangelical Calvinism starts with the revealed premise that God is triune love, as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Versus classical Calvinism which starts with the premise that God is a unitary God of law, and who thus relates, primarily, to creation through legal contact points (like the through an absolute decree of predestination so on and so forth). Evangelical Calvinists start with the notion that God relates to us, the apple of His creational eye, as an eternal Father relates to an eternal Son by an eternal Holy Spirit; it is purely relational, gracious, and loving rather than forensic, cold, and causally deterministic as we get in classical Calvinism (and Arminianism).

Thomas Aquinas’ semi-Pelagianism; Augustine of Hippo’s Relationalism; and Evangelical Calvinism’s Reception of Latin Theology

There is a lot of talk these days in certain (Baptist) sectors about retrieving the theology of Thomas Aquinas. The focus of discussion is typically on his Prima Pars—of his Summa Theologiae—and less on the full scope of Thomas’ theology. But what in fact is being retrieved, if in fact the ultimate desire is to recover Aquinas’ theology in a total way? What about Thomas’ theological anthropology, and as corollary, doctrine of sin; are these foci fulgently available for the Protestants to recover as well? If we look back into the 16th and 17th centuries of what is called the Post Reformed Orthodox development of Reformed (or Calvinist) theology what we find is an affirmative in regard to recovering more than just a doctrine of God from Thomas Aquinas. And so, Thomas’ theology, at least if we move beyond the 21st century Baptists, with an eye towards the Post Reformed Orthodox theologians (like William Perkins et al.), is indeed intent on bringing many of Thomas’ theological themes into the development of their own respective projects as Federally Protestant theologians. In order to gain a better understanding on Thomas’ (and Anselm’s, as the case may be) doctrine of sin let us turn to RN Frost’s treatment of that in his book Richard Sibbes: God’s Spreading Goodness. Frost writes (at length):

Aquinas on privative sin

The first major proponent of privative sin in the medieval period is Anselm whose pioneering work was followed and developed by Aquinas. In a matter crucial to the development of the nomist tradition, Anselm based his doctrine on Augustine’s early doctrine of privatio rather than his post-Pelagian view. The implication picked up by Pelagius—that salvation requires a free act of the volition in choosing God—was assimilated roughly a century later by Aquinas.

Aquinas, as a student of Augustine, was apparently alert to Augustine’s shift on the issue of privatio: he attributed privatio to Anselm and a positive definition (sin as habitus) to Augustine. Aquinas, in fact, sought to synthesize the views of Augustine and Anselm through an analogy much like Augustine’s lost-food solution: “As in a bodily illness there is privation, in that the balance of health is upset, yet also something positive, the disturbed bodily humours, so also in original sin there is privation [privatione], the lack of original justice, yet along with this there are the disturbed powers of the soul.” In this explanation, however, he failed to adopt Augustine’s solution that grace is God’s presence in the elect by the Spirit. This followed Aquinas’s premise that human nature and divine being are wholly incommensurate—a topic taken up in the next chapter. Significantly, Aquinas believed that Adam’s original state of righteousness was not something natural to his humanity but a gift of supernatural grace (donum gratiæ):

Original righteousness [justitia originalis] was a definite gift of grace [donum gratiæ] divinely bestowed upon all human nature in the first parent, which, indeed, the first parent lost in the first sin. Hence even as that original righteousness would have been transmitted along with human nature to the offspring of the first parents, so the opposite disorder is in fact transmitted.”

Thus, subsequent sin in humanity resulted from an incapacity, the loss of Adam’s original righteousness that the donum gratiæ had maintained. Adam had squandered humanity’s golden opportunity by failing to guard his original righteousness.

Aquinas, in these discussions, located privatio within nature, viewing sin as the loss of a created quality. The symmetrical cure for sin, with sin defined as a privatio gratiĂŚ, is a resupply of grace. To this end, Aquinas held that grace has dual aspects, one created and the other uncreated. This doublet allowed him to resolve the tension between original sin and actual sin. When Adam fell he lost the created grace of original righteousness. The implicit ground for his fall was an absence of uncreated grace that was needed because of his human mutability.

This two-stage arrangement assumed that morality is defined by the use of a free will to choose either good or evil. Thus it was God’s purpose to generate a vulnerability in Adam in order to test and affirm his morality. His failure was then transmitted to his progeny by the absence of original righteousness. Privatio, in this arrangement, was twofold: a lack of uncreated grace that led to, but did not compel, Adam’s fall; and a subsequent lack of created grace after the fall due to Adam’s loss of original righteousness. Adam was therefore culpable because of his own initiative in the fall. After the fall Adam’s progeny now lack the grace, both created and uncreated, necessary for righteousness. We are therefore helpless and God’s twin resources of grace are needed for salvation.

Among the Puritans these were points of conversation. Perkins adopted the Thomistic solution with its reliance on a duality of grace. He believed it offered the most coherent solution to the problem of sin when sin is defined as privatio. Sibbes, however, came to see sin as self-love even though he first held Perkins’ view. And with that he also took up Augustine’s view of grace as God’s relational bond to the elect.[1]

We can see the way Frost is arguing in regard to making a distinction between two Puritans, William Perkins and Richard Sibbes, respectively. For our purposes what stands out in this treatment is the development of Aquinas’ doctrine of sin (and grace), as Frost identifies an Anselmian (and Aristotelian, not explicitly referenced in this context) background to said doctrine. What is significant, to my mind, is how Aquinas, if Frost’s treatment is accurate, thought of grace to begin with. What was needed, in his frame, for salvation to obtain in an individual person, was created grace. But this notion, even while funded by the broader reality of an ‘uncreated’ grace, was thought of in qualitative or substantial terms. And so we end up with a necessary separation between the work of God in salvation, and the person of God. This occurs, in the Thomist sense, insofar that grace is not in fact the act of God’s person for the world in Jesus Christ. And that the person of Christ by the Spirit is not understood, then, as the basis of what grace is in itself (ontologically). So grace becomes, in a Thomist sense, something that the elect must manage or cooperate with in order to appropriate God’s salvation for them. And it can become a ‘thing’ that is dispensed through the Catholic mass, as the Eucharistic body is given to the faithful. Frost will argue that the Federal theology of someone like William Perkins retrieved this Thomist frame for thinking grace, and built it into his own style of Federal (Covenantal) theology. That this frame, indeed, funds the theology of the Westminster Confession of Faith in general.

But there is a better way to think grace, even as that is understood in an Augustinian key (as Frost also argues). Personally, I think the best way to think grace in a relational frame is to do so in an Athanasian key; that is, to think it as distinctively relational and personal. What is interesting about Frost’s work is that he develops that possibility from Augustine himself. TF Torrance believes that Augustine is guilty of what TFT calls the ‘Latin Heresy.’ That is a type of nascent dualism as Augustine thinks the work of God vis-à-vis the person of God. But this might be too hasty of a characterization by TFT. If Frost is right about Augustine, in regard to his relational and ‘affective’ understanding of grace, then what we have in Augustine, while still neo-Platonic (thus TF’s charge that Augustine is engaging in the ‘Latin heresy’), is the very type of personalist and ontological understanding of grace that TFT attributes exclusively to Athanasius (and the Nicene trad). In other words, maybe there was more availability in Augustine’s theology, in regard to an ontological and relational understanding of grace, than TFT gave Augustine credit for. Based on Frost’s work it would appear, in certain ways, that TFT may have been reading Augustine through the Thomist and Westminster reception rather than reading Augustine himself. If so, this would open the door for an Evangelical Calvinism to have a good basis for working not just with Athanasian themes, but also with Augustinian ones as well. An Evangelical Calvinism is more concerned with recovering the ‘reverend teaching’ than it is with the genealogy of said teaching, per se.

Either way, Thomas’ doctrine of sin, based on an Anselmian theme, is not commensurate with an Evangelical Calvinism. And so, we must continue to eschew a Thomism, a Federal or Westminster Calvinism, a classical Arminianism so on and so forth. Evangelical Calvinists are focused, along with Frost’s Augustine, with understanding God from God as immediately Self-revealed by the Holy Spirit in Jesus Christ. An Evangelical Calvinist thus cannot endorse a Thomist doctrine of sin, nor any other receptions of that as that is developed in juridical and commercial ways as primarily observed in the theology of the Post Reformed Orthodox Protestants.

[1] RN Frost, Richard Sibbes: God’s Spreading Goodness (Vancouver, WA: Cor Deo Press, 2012), 124-26 (based on Frost’s PhD dissertation written at King’s College, University of London, 1996).

Against ‘Penal Substitution’ and Transactional Models::For an Ontological Theory of Atonement

Matthias Grebe continues in his trek of offering a critique of Barth through Barth in regard to the loci of election and atonement. In his task he offers up a description, here in summary form, of various atonement theories propounded by the church fathers. He points out, rightly, that the fathers, in the main, (barring Augustine) would have rejected the penal substitutionary atonement (PSA) theory, and instead operated with a Christus Victor model, generally. He argues that the ’victim theory’ (his language for PSA) would not have been countenanced by them, and that instead something like Thomas F. Torrance’s theory of an ‘ontological atonement’ would have been the consensus patrum among these primarily Eastern ancient theologians. I agree with Grebe’s treatment, and thus wanted to share it.

However, the ‘Victim’ theory fails to grasp the breadth of the atonement, especially the second aspect of Christ’s death bringing humanity back to God. This in itself is problematic and thus led to a legal/forensic and practical as well as a transactional understanding of the atonement in much Western thought, emphasizing the human act of Jesus’ appeasement of the Father’s wrath. There is no doubt that the New Testament presents the death of Christ as a sacrifice (an idea based on the Old Testament cult), but the idea of appeasement rests upon an interpretation of the Old Testament cult in chiefly transactional terms. In contrast, for much Eastern scholarship the “cultus is much less a matter of sacrificial transaction than of mystical transplantation,” highlighting the death of Christ as the rescue and the cure from sin and the conclusion in the filial fellowship with God. Thus the answer to Cur Deus Homo? is therefore not only ‘mori missus,’ but also involves Christ’s entire life, death, resurrection and the ascension of humanity to the right hand of God, as well as the sending of the Spirit of Pentecost. . .. We will argue in this chapter that the atonement is not simply a dealing with something or rescuing from something, but a bringing into something. The New Testament testifies to the fact that we are not only brought out of darkness into light but are made sons and co-heirs of Christ and thus partakers of the divine communion (see Rom 8:17; Gal 4:7; Titus 3:7).[1]

Based on the closing clauses of Grebe’s we can see the direction he will be arguing. What he describes as the Eastern orientation over against the Western, in generalities, is key to understanding the type of alternative that an Athanasian Reformed (or ‘Evangelical Calvinist’) theory of salvation presents. It isn’t that ‘substitution’ is rejected, but that its frame isn’t forensic or ‘penal,’ rather it is ontological and re-creational. As such, the nature of the atonement itself is intrinsically tied to the incarnation, insofar that it is the total Christ, from before the foundations of the world, to their re-creation, that the atonement is entailed by. This offers a depth, and thus ontological dimension to a theory of salvation that the Augustinianly hued theory, of the Latin West, generally fails to grasp. Thomas Torrance, as alluded to, thinks, of course!, from the Eastern orientation; even as a Scottish Reformed theologian. Note TFT:

It is above all in the Cross of Christ that evil is unmasked for what it actually is, in its inconceivable wickedness and malevolence, in its sheer contradiction of the love of God incarnate in Jesus Christ, in its undiluted enmity to God himself—not to mention the way in which it operates under the cover of the right and the good and the lawful. That the infinite God should take the way of the Cross to save mankind from the pit of evil which has engulfed it and deceived it, is the measure of the evil of evil: its depth is revealed to be ‘absymal’ (literally, ‘without bottom’). However, it is only from the vantage point of God’s victory over evil in the resurrection of Christ, from the bridge which in him God has overthrown across the chasm of evil that has opened up in our violence and death and guilt, that we may look into the full horror of it all and not be destroyed in the withering of our souls through misanthropy, pessimism, and despair. What hope could there ever be for a humanity that crucifies the incarnate love of God and sets itself implacably against the order of divine love even at the point of its atoning and healing operation? But the resurrection tells us that evil, even this abysmal evil, does not and cannot have the last word, for that belongs to the love of God which has negated evil once and for all and which through the Cross and resurrection is able to make all things work together for good, so that nothing in the end will ever separate us from the love of God. It is from the heart of that love in the resurrected Son of God that we may reflect on the radical nature of evil without suffering morbid mesmerization or resurrection and crucifixion events, which belong inseparably together, has behind it the incarnation, the staggering fact that God himself has come directly into our creaturely being to become one of us, for our sakes. Thus the incarnation, passion, and resurrection conjointly tell us that far from evil having to do only with human hearts and minds, it has become entrenched in the ontological depths of created existence and that it is only from within those ontological depths that God could get at the heart of evil in order to destroy it, and set about rebuilding what he had made to be good. (We have to think of that as the only way that God ‘could’ take, for the fact that he has as a matter of fact taken this way in the freedom of his grace excludes any other possibility from our consideration.) It is surely in the light of this ontological salvation that we are to understand the so-called ‘nature of miracles’, as well as the resurrection of Jesus from death, for they represent not a suspension of the natural or created order but the very reverse, the recreation of the natural order wherever it suffers from decay or damage or corruption or disorder through evil. God does not give up his claim that the creation is ‘good’, but insists on upholding that claim by incarnating within the creation the personal presence of his own Logos, the creative and ordering source of the creation, thereby pledging his own eternal constancy and rationality as the ground for the redemption and final establishment of all created reality.[2]

TFT’s long statement offers something of a magnum opus in summary, in regard to the entailments of what we might call an ‘Athanasian’ theory of salvation. But this extensive passage was offered up to help illustrate how it is that a Reformed theologian, of TFT’s stature, thinks along the lines that Grebe is describing for us vis-à-vis the consensus patrum of the Eastern church fathers. Salvation requires something more than, not less than a forensic frame. If the human condition is fallen, it isn’t simply a bail payment that is required, but an absolute resurrection and/or re-creation of all of reality; primary of which is humanity simpliciter. This is what Western or Latin notions of penal substitution fail to grasp, and what the Eastern fathers understood all too well. If the fallen human being is going to be ‘saved’ in the depths of their being, and the Western model is understood as the definitive theory of salvation, then salvation has not obtained, and we are of all people those to be pitied. It has not obtained because genuine salvation requires more than a legal payment, since this only has to do with external behavioral failures, it requires a depth ontological reorientation (and thus re-creation) insofar that this represents the relational breach between the triune God and us. Without this new creation of humanity in Christ’s humanity, in the ‘wonderful exchange,’ we cannot countenance God who is Holy.

[1] Matthias Grebe, Election, Atonement, and the Holy Spirit (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2014), Kindle ed. Loc., 5312, 5316, 5321, 5325.

[2] Thomas F. Torrance, Divine And Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 115-16.

The scholastics Reformed and the Socinians in Current Disputation: Trueman, Carter, and Fesko V the Doctor, James White

The brouhaha never ceases! This time though it is internecine. I have been attempting to alert Macites (followers of John MacArthur), Reformed Baptists, even many Presbyterians, both online and via our coedited books, that their theological framework is broadly (and even pointedly) funded by an antecedent development of what Richard Muller calls Christian Aristotelianism. Whenever I would bring this up to the Macites over at Phil Johnson’s group blog, the Pyromaniacs, and this years and years ago (circa 2005), they would balk and scream hysterically at me. Now the scholastics Reformed, that is, those who are self-consciously confessional, covenantal (federal) theological, of the 16th and 17th centuries, respectively, Post Reformed orthodox development, are informing their so-called Baptists Reformed, like James White, the Macites, Founders Ministry (of a dwindling branch in the SBC) that they don’t have their beloved “5 Points of Calvinism” without the categories produced by appropriation of Aristotelian categories (largely as those were synthesized by Thomas Aquinas for Christian usage). And yet, now, these same types, the “Baptist types,” are hurling abuse and noise back at people like Carl Truman, Craig Carter, John Fesko et al.; and especially towards Baptists like Matthew Barrett, Lucas Stamps, and other SBC Baptists who are acknowledging and accepting the role that some form of Thomist reception has played in their respective adherence to the type of Reformed theology that they breathe in and out every day of their live long days. If you are interested to listen in on the skirmish you can do so here (The Mortification of Spin podcast with: Carl Trueman, Todd Pruitt, Craig Carter, and John Fesko), and here (The Dividing Line vlogcast with: James White).

In a way, it feels a bit like sweet justice on my end. The scholastics Reformed (whether Presbyterian, Baptist etc.) are informing the others, who claim to also be Reformed, that they aren’t Reformed without the categories of Aristotle funding their respective adherence to the theology of Dordt and its 5 Points (as those were so named in the 20th century). Like I said, I spent cartridges and cartridges of e-ink letting the 5 Point Baptists know that they were implicitly committed to an Aristotelian Gospel, and not just a scriptura nuda (naked Scripture) like they like to think. At the moment I am simply sitting back and watching the drama unfold. The scholastics Reformed are alerting the 5 Pointers to what I was alerting them to for decades; viz. that they are Thomists (or some version thereof). The problem for the 5 Pointers is that they cannot imagine that they have been committed to an interpretive tradition all their lives. They cannot admit that they have so conflated an interpretive tradition with their exegesis of Scripture that they no longer can see the difference. And since they are unwilling to see the difference, they will continue to push back against anyone who claims that they are indeed reading Holy Scripture from a certain theological background; namely, Christian Aristotelianism. The scholastics Reformed have owned this reality—that they are Christian Aristotelians—for decades, mostly stemming from the work of Richard Muller. But the 5 Pointers have never been self-critical and self-aware enough to recognize or admit this.

Trueman, in the linked podcast, calls such 5 Pointers, Socianians. In the urban dictionary for theological cusswords, this is right at the top of the list (right next to Pelagian). White, takes serious issue with this, and responds vociferously in the linked aforementioned vlogcast. If you don’t know, in short, the Socinians were a 16th century people, following an Italian theologian named, Faustus Socinus, who was, some would argue, an original rationalist. His basic premise was that Scripture should be read without reference to any confessional or churchly tradition and be read on its own [naked] terms. Thus, for him, and his followers, this resulted in the abandonment of belief in the Trinity and the deity of Jesus Christ, among other orthodox doctrines. So, when Trueman says that people like White (although he doesn’t name him) are Socinian it ought to become apparent as to why White gets so triggered. But, in reality, what Trueman is saying, I think, is that the hermeneutic, the prolegomenon, the theological methodology, the interpretive tradition most proximate to the one that the 5 Pointers adhere to vis-à-vis a doctrine of Scripture, and all its consequents, is most closely related to the one we find the Socinians deploying; I don’t disagree.

There is a better way, I have spent decades outlining that here at the blog, and along with Myk Habets, with our coedited books on Evangelical Calvinism (what I like, these days, calling it: Athanasian Reformed). To some this whole squabble seems idiosyncratic, and potentially silly. The reason it isn’t is because doctrine has consequences, good or bad consequences in proportion to whether or not it is good or bad doctrine. The evangelical churches in North America, not to mention the West in general, are involved in a sea change in almost apocalyptic-like ways, at the moment. There is this seeming binary of either being mainstream, progressive evangelical, or conservative evangelical (and Reformed). On the latter side of this split, as we have been detailing in this post, there is a rift occurring. I take that rift to be somewhat superficial, in reality. The 5 Pointers simply are unwilling to admit what the scholastics Reformed have known and accepted for their whole theological existence. Either way, this seems to be what Christians in the main are being presented with, as if the above sketch is all there is available to them theologically. I am here to tell you that that is not true! Reformed theology (not to mention Lutheran) is not as monolithic or Deus ex machina as the above would have you believe. There is nuance and doctrinal lines of development within the Reformed trad that the above simply bulldozes over, whether that be in order to caricature, and thus demonize, or to accept and live by. Evangelical Calvinism is one example of how it is possible to operate as an evangelical Christian, but from within different ambits of theological development as that has obtained in the history. Another, and yet related, is one my former historical theology prof and [current] mentor calls Affective Theology. The point is, there is no reason for the Christian to dig in on either side of the binary as that is being presented to you in the evangelical churches. There are ways to think orthodoxly, historically, and church catholically without becoming engrossed in the above binary (i.e., between mainstream evanjellybellism and/or scholastics Reformed / -5 Pointism). Be encouraged!

Christologicam Determinatam, Christologically Determined Rather than Decretively

In our Protestant Reformed circles, we often orbit around terms like unconditional election, and its causal theory of determinism, as that is funded more broadly by an Aristotelian theory of causation. For classical Calvinists this total locus can be described as, what Barth identifies in the Latin as, the decretrum absolutum (absolute decree) of double predestination. This is the idea, roughly, that God, based on the gratuitous purposes of His own inner-divine will, chooses some (the narrow few) for election, and others (the broad many) for reprobation, and an eternal conclusion that results in the conscious torment of hell. This, in nuce, is how classical Calvinists (and Arminians, from different emphases) understand a doctrine of election and reprobation; they think it from God’s decree vis-à-vis individual people in abstraction from God’s humanity for them in Jesus Christ.

Alternatively, as an Athanasian Reformed, I would propose an understanding wherein all of humanity is Christologicam determinatam (‘Christologically determined’). This is really nothing new, if you have been reading me (or Barth or Torrance) for any amount of time. But I think this reality needs to be constantly reiterated, insofar that the deus ex machina of classical Calvinist doctrina on theological determinism is simply presumed at every turn in such environs. In an effort to re-alert the reader to what just in fact it means for humanity to be Christologicam determinatam, I thought it would be prudent to hear from Karl Barth, once more, as he cogently distills just what it means for God to choose all of humanity for Himself; that is, to choose all of humanity as first His humanity as primordially pre-destined for Himself the ‘Word to be incarnate’ (Logos incarnandus). He writes:

The true man who lived and lives here as the man of God and therefore in direct unity with God as the God of man, did not and does not live for himself, but as the “first-born of all creation” (Col 1:15), as the last Adam who in order is the first (1 Cor 15:45), he lived and lives for all men in the place of all. All people, therefore, are elected, justified, sanctified and called in Him.[1]

And:

In Jesus Christ there is no isolation of man from God or of God from man. Rather, in Him we encounter the history, the dialogue, in which God and man meet together and are together, the reality of the covenant mutually contracted, preserved and fulfilled by them. Jesus Christ is in His one Person, as true God, man’s loyal partner, and as true man, God’s. He is the Lord humbled for communion with man and likewise the Servant exalted to communion with God. He is the Word spoken from the loftiest, most luminous transcendence and likewise the Word heard in the deepest darkest immanence. He is both, without their being confused but also without their being divided.[2]

This type of determination doesn’t come from an abstract gratuitous decree of God ‘behind the back of Jesus,’ instead this is a trinitarian determination, a pre-destination of God’s life for the world that He freely determined for Himself, and thus His history for the world in the person of Jesus Christ. This determination is personalist and thus dynamic, and not ontologically independent or at competition with who He is in se (‘in Himself’). Christological determinism, if we should call it that, is one that sees the person and work of God in Christ for the world together rather than apart. In contrast to the ‘absolute decree,’ that thinks humanity from some abstract determination of God apart from who He is for the world in Jesus Christ, Christological determinism is rife with the resplendence of God’s one being (ousia) working as One God, in perichoretic and coinherent union, for the one genuine humanity before God, as that has been freely assumed (assumptio carnis) by the eternal Son, Jesus Christ. The Christological determination to be with us, is first funded by His choice to be us, as both the electing God, and elected human as Barth so eloquently articulated this previously.

I set these two courses before you this day. Is it the decretum absolutum or the Christologicam determinatam? The former ends up separating the work of Jesus from the person of Jesus, thus reducing Jesus to an organan, a mere instrument of salvation. In this schemata Jesus becomes the ‘means’ by which God (the Father) purchases the elect for eternal justification. As such, Jesus might as well be a demi-urge of Gnostic flora and imagination in the absolute decree environ. While latterly, to be Christologically determined entails the notion that Godself, in all of his ineffable resplendence has stooped down in His person and done the work of salvation that we could not do ourselves. He came and personally personalized us in His person for us in Jesus Christ (an/ -enhypostasis). Christological determination thinks God, and His acts, from God rather than from an absolute decree as that is understood through the vestiges of God ostensibly littered about throughout the created order (can-o-worms).

Choose wisely.

 

[1] Karl Barth, The Christian Life, 125 cited by Jeff McSwain, Simul Sanctification: Barth’s Hidden Vision for Human Transformation (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2018), 57.

[2] Karl Barth, Humanity of God, 46-7 cited by Jeff McSwain, Simul Sanctification, 58-9.

St. Bernard of Clairvaux as the Patron Saint of Luther and Calvin, Not Thomas

A friend just reminded, once again, of the role that St. Bernard of Clairvaux played in the formation of both Martin Luther’s and John Calvin’s theology, respectively; the latter quoted or alluded to Clairvaux in his Institutes more than any other author. It was this spiritual, even mystical tradition that stood in the background to the foremost of these magisterial Protestant Reformers; it wasn’t Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle. I am bringing this up within the ambit of my last post with reference to the retrieval work being done by people like Matthew Barrett and Craig Carter, for the Baptists. When they retrieve the Great Tradition, they ought to nuance their approach such that the historical theology they are said to be retrieving entails the variety of ideational trails present within the theologizing of history’s various and respective thinkers; this includes lines of tradition that are at odds with the mood, and even material offering of someone like Thomas Aquinas. And yet, for some reason, these folks have fixated on Aquinas, and his Aristotelian heritage.

Here is a sampling of Clairvaux; pay attention to what he is saying about God and knowledge of God. Reflect on whether he sounds like a speculative theologian like Aquinas, or if he sounds more like an Athanasius who is committed to a kataphatic and revelational theology of God’s Word.

Once God was incomprehensible and inaccessible, invisible and entirely unthinkable. But now he wanted to be seen, he wanted to be understood, he wanted to be known. How was this done, you ask? God lay in a manger and lay on the Virgin’s breast. He preached on a mountain, prayed through the night, and hung on a cross. He lay pale in death, was free among the dead, and was master of hell. He rose on the third day, showed the apostles the signs of victory where nails once were, and ascended before their eyes to the inner recesses of heaven. . . . When I think on any of these things, I am thinking of God, and in all these things he is now my God.[1]

This is not the theology of Aquinas. Here is Aquinas’ way to God:

. . . the proposition that “God exists” is self evident in itself, for, as we shall see later, its subject and predicate are identical, since God is his own existence. But, because what it is to be God is not evident to us, the proposition is not self-evident to us, and needs to be made evident. This is done by means of things which, though less evident in themselves, are nevertheless more evident to us, by means, namely of God’s effects.[2]

Aquinas is an apophatic theologian who reasons his way to God (see his Prima Pars) discursively through reflection on the ostensibly given vestiges of God in the created order. His is not a committed theology of the Word that is contingent on God’s intensive Self-revelation in the manger, but one that arises from a latent capacity within humanity to think God from a created grace infused into the elect’s accidents of human being. In other words, for Aquinas, to think God does not require the Word of God, per se, it instead is an ecclesiologically based knowledge of God as the Church’s supposition within a hierarchical chain of being, as that finds its primal orientation in its first cause, God, ostensibly supplies the theoretical bases for the Christian, such as Aquinas, to think God in abstraction from God’s Self-revealed Word in Jesus Christ, as that is attested to in Holy Scripture.

What Barrett, Carter, Sytsma et al. are doing, whether that be on the Baptist or Presbyterian side of the coin, is a repristination effort. It would be one thing if they were engaging in a constructive dialogue with the past, allowing the kerygma, the risen Christ as God’s Word to regulate said discussion; but they aren’t! Instead, they are engaging in a just is, which is another way to say, in a natural theological approach to Church History, and said history’s ideas. They are simply presuming that just because there is such an amorphous thing known as the Great Tradition, that just because it has been seemingly allowed to develop, that God must have been providentially supervening in this development, such that it now has His imprimatur stamped on it as a reality from Him. And so, in the final analysis, what is being done, ironically, is a species of the theology being retrieved itself. It ostensibly imbibes a natural theology, as that is uncritically received as the just is mode of theological endeavor, only to find a theologian like Thomas Aquinas, the theologian of natural theology, and sees in him a patron saint of a long lost orthodoxy. And yet how ironic! Thomas Aquinas is a Roman Catholic theologian who thinks God from a theory of ecclesial authority that is itself funded not by a robust theology of the Word, but by a commitment to a philosophical notional construction of God known as the actus purus (pure being) tradition, in regard to thinking God and everything following.

I am here to help apply the brakes. I am a committed Protestant and Reformed Christian who maintains that a robust theology of the Word, that the ‘Scripture Principle’ ought to fund how a Protestant Christian does Protestant theology. To take on the baggage of Thomas’ synthesis of Aristotle, even if some Post Reformed orthodox theologians did this, is neither safe nor sound. And yet these various theologians are engaging in just this practice, and, apparently, unwittingly foisting Catholic theological categories upon their various students, and whomever will listen to their rallying cries on the highways and byways. I would simply ask you to reconsider the way they are taking you, and ask if maybe, just maybe, there isn’t a thread of Protestant historical development that doesn’t repose upon Thomas’ synthesis. There is; and that is exactly why this blog and our books came to exist. That is, to alert people to an alternative and genuinely Protestant, and dare I say, Christian way to think God. To think God in the way that we saw Bernard of Clairvaux thinking God earlier in this article. Both Luther and Calvin had Clairvaux’s christological concentration when it came to thinking God, and this is most surely at odds with Thomas’ synthesis and the repristinational effort currently underway by those noted (and others not).

 

[1] Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermo in nativitate Beatae Mariae: de Aquaducto, ed. J. Leclerq and H. Rochais, S. Bernardi Opera 5 (Rome: Cistercienses, 1968), 11 cited by Michael Allen in, Justification.

[2] Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 7

The Last Word on a Reformed Doctrine of Election and Reprobation

You go online in the Reformed space, and you get the same old trope on a doctrine of election and reprobation; you essentially get the L (imited Atonement) of the TULIP served up as the ‘hard teaching’ Gospel truth reality about the way God relates to part of humanity in a God-world relation. I am here to set the record straight once and for all! This is simply not how God has related to the world, and this based on the analogy of the incarnation. We aren’t groping around in the darkness for snipes, but as Christians, instead, we have been given God’s Self-revelation in Jesus Christ in the incarnation. This is a sui generis (non-analogous) event that itself stands behind all epistemic efforts, at a primordial level, to know God. In other words, to know God is to be reconciled to God; and to be reconciled to God comes unilaterally from God’s free decision of Grace to become human (Deus incarnandus) for us that we might know Him as He has first known us in the Son (the eternal Logos). That said, if knowledge of God is slavishly tagged to God’s becoming for us in Jesus Christ, then to think God, and thus all corollary doctrines, in abstraction from God’s Self-givenness for us is neither safe nor Christian. Based upon this pre-Dogmatic reality we have capacity to move into a discussion on election/reprobation.

Christian Election and Reprobation

If we are to think election/reprobation from within the Chalcedonian frame of the homoousion of God’s life as both fully Divine and fully human in the singular person of Jesus Christ, and we follow the Apostle Paul’s teaching that ‘He who knew no sin became sin for us that we might become the righteousness of God in Him’ (mirifica commutatio ‘wonderful exchange’), then we will think of reprobation as the general human status, post-lapse, that the eternal Logos assumed (assumptio carnis) in the assumption of our ‘fallen-flesh.’ As such, to think the reprobate status from this concrete revealed status of humanity is to think all of humanity, the only type of humanity present in the incarnation, as reprobate. But the force and anhypostatic ground of the enhypostatic person of the Son of Man, Jesus Christ, was such that its grandiose power, of the resurrection type, its “election and electing” power as it were, could not be resisted by the reprobate humanity that the Christ assumed. In other words, whilst Christ became fallen humanity, in the assumption of our humanity, the total humanity, or the massa, as Christ put ‘death to death’ (cf. Rom 8.3) in His humanity for us (pro nobis), His elect humanity as the ‘Greater, the Second Adam’ was always already going to win the day. That is to say, the everythingness of God’s triune life as active in God incarnate (Deus incarnatus), as the ground of the person, Jesus Christ, has no rival in the nothingness of the fallen humanity that was assumed in the Son’s enfleshment for the world.

This is the implication of the incarnation when applied to a doctrine of election/reprobation. We necessarily think such locus from God’s Self-revelation in Jesus Christ. Instead of wandering around in the wilderness, as if in exile because of disobedience, we flourish under the fount of God’s Self-knowledge as we have been invited into that in the banqueting table of His Holy and Triune Life. Interesting, isn’t it? This is where a discussion like this, on a topic like this, takes us. Typically, when people enter this fray, whether academic or popular, what is almost immediately bypassed is a consideration of how a properly understood Dogmatic taxis, or order, is necessary to acknowledge prior to downstream material discussions on a soteriological doctrine like election/reprobation represents. In other words, people too quickly gloss past the formal considerations that end up, latterly, informing their material theological conclusions when in fact they are ostensibly “theologizing.” When this type of Ramist, or loci styled schemata is uncritically adopted, when the ‘work of God’ comes to be abstracted, and thus separated from the ‘person of God in Jesus Christ’ we can end up thinking something like a doctrine of election/reprobation as if a procrustean bed; we can imagine a theological system wherein Christology can be thought of in abstraction from soteriology, and vice versa. This is how so-called (as I’ve called it) classical Calvinism and Arminianism has arrived at its conclusions in regard to election/reprobation in a God-world relation.

Conclusion

The moral of the story is this: When election/reprobation is thought slavishly from God’s Self-revelation in Jesus Christ, when it is thought of in terms of God’s humanity in the Chalcedonian register, what we end up with is something that is in line with what the biblical categories operate from with reference to election/reprobation (as these categories themselves are intended to map onto the biblical categories of ‘those being saved’ ‘those being destroyed’ see I Cor 1.18). What we end up with is the idea that Jesus Christ is both the electing God and elected human, and that by His free choice to become human, by His free choice to take on our ‘poverty’ we come to have the capacity to participate, ontically, in the riches of His elect humanity status as that is actualized in His resurrection from the dead (cf. II Cor 8.9.

Whatever the consequences of adopting this approach to election/reprobation turns out to be, one thing the exegete can rest assured of is that they are thinking in terms of the ecumenical grammar, the ‘creedal grammar’ of the Church catholic. If this is important to the exegete, then wherever this type of ‘Christo-logic’ might lead, said exegete will repentantly follow. Insofar as Jesus thought that the canon of Holy Scripture referred to Him (cf. Jn 5.39), then it behooves the exegete to imagine that their respective repose in the Chalcedonian grammar, constructively received, will present them with solid footing, no matter where that proverbial climb of theological endeavor might lead them. Further, when following Jesus’ lead, as far as thinking the res or ‘reality’ of Holy Scripture, our relative ascription to this or that ‘party theological tribe’ will end up taking second, if not third and fourth seats. In other words, the ‘catholicism’ of Christ’s life requires that a person is willing to think outside (if that’s what ends up happening) of their pet theological demarcations. That is to say, once a person adopts the hermeneutic proposed by the creedal grammar of something like Chalcedon, however that might be constructively received, it is the adoption into this hermeneutical family that said person will be formed by for the rest of their days. If this leads them, in explicit terms, to abandon say something like their beloved classical Calvinism, then so be it. There is no creed but Christ.

 

What is Real Reformed Theology?: My Constructive Confessionalism

Abstract, Introduction

My personal journey into what we came to call Evangelical Calvinism, after TF Torrance’s usage of that language in his book Scottish Theology, didn’t start with Karl Barth or TF Torrance. My entrée into this Reformed iteration started in seminary under the tutelage of my historical theology and ethics professor, who would later become a mentor and supervisor of mine, Dr. Ron Frost. He introduced me to the wonderful world of historical theology with particular reference to patristic, late mediaeval, magisterial reformation, and Puritan aspects of this varied world of the Christian history of ideas. It was through Frost’s doctoral work on Richard Sibbes, and the history leading up to and following Sibbes, that alerted me to the fact that the Reformed house is in fact, and always has been a ‘divided house.’ That is to say, I first came to realize, through Frost, that the Reformed development, in the history, has various eddies and streams of development that cannot be easily fitted into a singular narrative framework, as it is often presented to us. Frost shows, along with Janice Knight and others, that Puritan theology, as an iteration of English and American Post Reformed theology, was woven together with concerns others than those we so often receive as the pure milk of Reformed theology as that is expressed in something like the Westminster Confession of Faith. Frost showed me, historically, that the Reformed development cannot be fitted into the Christian Aristotelianism of Richard Muller’s Post Reformed orthodoxy that so many contemporary retrievers of Reformed theology would have us believe.

The Affective-Turn and Variances

Conversely, Frost showed me that theologians like Sibbes, Cotton, Preston et al. were concerned with presenting a theology proper that properly focused on God’s Trinitarian and relational nature; a God who is theistically personal, winsome, and who desires relationship through marriage, with us, His creaturely creatures recreated in the humanity of Jesus Christ. Frost identified this stream of development within the Reformed house as Affective theology, Janice Knight identifies the same thing as The Spiritual Brethren (in contrast to the Westminster types who she calls The Intellectual Fathers). These designations ought to alert the careful reader to something indicative of the distinctions being drawn: Frost, Knight et al. have identified, what is at base, a theological anthropological difference between our respective houses in the Reformed development. That is to say, as was true to the day and development, a tripartite faculty anthropology (i.e. affections, intellect, will), and the way that was disparately developed, respectively, by the competing factions, finally gave way to the sort of various eddies within the Reformed house I have been alluding to heretofore. The Affective theologians, as Frost so eloquently argues, were those who saw the affections as the defining component of what it means to be human before God (coram Deo); whereas the ‘Intellectual Fathers’ (the Westminster Calvinists), following their reception of Thomas’ synthesis of Aristotelian categories into Christian theology, necessarily saw the intellect/will as definitive of what it means to be human before God. Indeed, the Intellectual Fathers, believed that at the Fall, the affections (i.e. heart) was the weak “emotional” part that drug the pristine elevated part of what made humanity human down into the dregs of rupture between God and humanity. As such for the Intellectual Fathers, in a grace/nature – disease/remedy symmetry salvation comes when a created grace is ‘shed abroad’ in the elect’s life such that they can cooperate with God, within a Federal or Covenantal schemata of course, meeting the legal requirements of God’s law, thus being restored or re-conciled with God through the restoration of their broken (but not completely dead) intellect/will; insofar as the weakness of the affections polluted what it truly means to be human. It is this superadditum of grace, in the ‘intellectualist’ frame, that gives the elect the salvific energy to habituate [habitus] (or persevere) in a life of godliness, which finally obtains in an eternal justification and thus glorification (think of the Tridentine distinction between iustitia Dei and iustitia Christi and the attendant viator theology).

Contrariwise, as Frost describes what was originally called Free Grace theology, as articulated by people like Richard Sibbes, William Erbery et al. focused on the affections as the point of contact wherein God disclosed Himself to the waning heart of a fallen humanity and invites them into an intimate relationship of triune love that heretofore could never have been imagined. Frost writes, in descriptions of Sibbes’ ‘affective theology’:

While Sibbes acknowledged some biblical support in calling Christians to obedience as a duty (Erbery’s category of ‘low and legal’ preaching) Sibbes clearly understood that duty can only be sustained if it is supported by the motivation of desire. Thus, Sibbes featured God’s winsome love more than his power: the Spirit accomplishes both conversion and sanctification by a single means: through the revelation of God’s attractiveness by an immediate, personal disclosure. This unmediated initiative was seen to be the means by which God draws a response of heartfelt devotion from the elect.”1

Notice the anthropological variance from what we have described as the intellectualist version of Reformed theology, as defined and articulated by the Westminster divines, among others. The focus for the Spiritual Brethren or Affective theologians is on the affections, on a renewed heart, of the sort that we find in the New Covenant language of both the Old and New Testaments in Holy Scripture (cf. Jer. 31; Ez. 36; II Cor. 3; Heb. 8 etc.). For the Sibbes’ school, and thus a whole traditional development within historic Reformed theology, the point of contact between God and humanity was through an immediate disclosure of God’s overflowing love for them as demonstrated and actualized in His incarnation in Jesus Christ. For this tradition it was a matter of wooing, invitation and response to God, to enter into the halls of Holy Matrimony with God, such that the elect might experience what it truly means to be human before God, as that is realized in participatio Christi (participation with Christ). Frost goes on to differentiate between these two houses of Reformed development, respectively:

In this framework some additional theological assumptions were revised. For instance, Sibbes understood grace to be God’s love offered immediately (rather than mediately) by the Spirit to the elect. By identifying grace primarily as a relational characteristic of God—the expression of his goodness—instead of a created quality or an empowerment of the will, Sibbes insisted that God transforms human desires by the Spirit’s immediate love and communion. Faith, for Sibbes, was not a human act-of-the-will but a response to God’s divine wooing. God’s laws, Sibbes argued, must be ’sweetened by the gospel’ and offered within a framework of ‘free grace.’ He also held a moderately developed form of affective anthropology. . . .2

This ought to suffice in alerting the reader to the antecedents of my type of Evangelical Calvinism. It is representative of a historic iteration and development within 16th and 17th century Calvinism that emphasized God’s triune life of relational and personal love as that took shape within the inner and singular life of the Monarxia. Indeed, as both Frost and Knight have persuasively argued, this iteration and development of Reformed theology was in fact the ‘orthodox’ version over-and-against what has become the dominant and received form today, that being the intellectualist or Christian Aristotelian type of Calvinism as codified in something like the Westminster Confession of Faith, attended by a decretal and metaphysically Law-shaped God of monadic origination.

The Barthian-Torrancean-Turn

With the aforementioned understood, and there is more to that development, but time and space constraints keep me from commenting further, I came to Thomas F. Torrance and Karl Barth (circa 2006 in earnest). Thomas Torrance, a Scottish theologian primarily of the 20th century, could be known as the theologian of Trinitarian theology par excellence. As I began to read Torrance, his books A Christian Doctrine of God and Scottish Theology, I came to realize that Frost wasn’t the only person seeing the variegated tapestry of Reformed development in the history. Torrance made many similar critiques of Westminster Calvinism, as Frost et al. were making, albeit from a different entrée point, and he did so by emphasizing the winsome, relational triune nature of God with a soteriological focus on unio cum Christo (union with Christ). I came to realize that TFT could serve, at least, as a complement, a constructive theological complement to what I had already come to understand through Frost’s tutelage (and Frost is neither a Torrancean or Barthian, to be clear). One of the primary points of contact between Frost’s insights and TFT’s, respectively, was their focus on John Calvin’s theology of union with Christ, and duplex gratia (double grace) soteriology. As I kept reading Torrance, I also started to read Barth in depth. Both Barth and Torrance fit well with Frost, in both their critiques of Christian Aristotelian styled Reformed theology, the God of the decretum absolutum, and their respective focuses on a theistically personalist God who desires a love grounded fellowship or koinonia with us. There of course is some pretty substantial variance between Frost and Barth/Torrance, particularly as that comes to a head in Barth’s reformulation of election, but there is enough overlap, at least in the way that I have constructively received them, such that when properly cross-pollinated much fruit can be produced and made ready for harvest for whosoever will. The piece that was missing in Frost, and was present in Barth/Torrance, was a focus on a robust doctrine of the vicarious humanity of Jesus Christ. Frost’s offering works from purely Augustinian themes, whereas Barth/Torrance work from largely Athanasian themes; at least when it comes to a focus on a God-world relation in the analogy of the incarnation.

Concluding Remarks

The aforementioned represents the antecedents and constructive foci of my type of Evangelical Calvinism—what I am now calling Athanasian Reformed theology. The broad framework is historically derived; it originally comes from an Augustinian development but ends up with an Athanasian hue; there is a Christological concentration that starts in both Luther and Calvin, threads through some of the Puritans Frost focuses on, and on some Scots that TFT identifies, and eventuates in the work of Karl Barth and Thomas Torrance, respectively. The primary foci doctrinally are on God’s Triune nature as the ground and grammar of everything; on a doctrine of union with Christ through a personalist understanding of God-world relation; all grounded in a radical Christ concentration as the warp and woof of all theological development. These various themes and developments, as noted, are not foreign, but intimate to the broader Reformational developments proper. No matter how much the 21st century Reformed machine asserts that the so-called ‘Intellectual Fathers’ version of the Reformed faith, just is the confessional and only form of Reformed theology available, under scrutiny this simply falls as the house-of-cards that it is.

Evangelical Calvinism, or Athanasian Reformed theology, while its antecedents are firmly rooted in the historical developments of Reformational theology, is a constructive iteration of Reformed theology in the 21st century. It works within the confessional making ‘always reforming’ (semper Reformanda) spirit of the best of Reformed theology. It rejects the calcification-model offered by the so-called retrievers of Reformed theology today, wherein the thesis is that the only real way to be faithfully Protestant, and thus Reformed, is to cull the history through the intellectualist-Reformed lens, and repeat (or repristinate) what is found in the variegation of the various ‘orthodox’ theologians culled. Athanasian Reformed theology is grounded in the reality of Holy Scripture, rather than the speculations of the schoolmen, insofar that its categories and emphases are derived from a radical focus on God’s Self-revelation in Jesus Christ; indeed, as that is attested to in doxological key within Holy Writ. We do not believe in imposing speculative categories for thinking God, as the Intellectual Fathers do, by borrowing from Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas in order to think God in an ostensibly intelligible way. We are slavishly committed to thinking God from God, Light from Light, and allowing His Self-exegesis as that comes from the womb of the Father in Christ (cf. Jn. 1.18) to inform all that we do say and think to the glory of God coram Deo.

 

1 Ron Frost, The Devoted Life, quoting from: William Erbery, The Testimony of William Erbery (London: n.p. 1658).

2 Ibid., 82.