Union with Christ: Reframing Theology and Ministry for the Church

To my surprise, I just received a message from J. Todd Billings at my Facebook account (we are friends on FB πŸ™‚ ). He is Associate Professor of Reformed Theology at Western Theological Seminary in Holland, Michigan. And his area of passion has to do with Union With Christ theology (or the Apostle Paul’s “in Christ” theology). Billings is a historical theologian, and a Calvin scholar. He has another book (which I am still supposed to do a review for here at the blog, since Oxford University Press kindly set me a review copy quite some time ago), which is his published ThD dissertation from Harvard Divinity entitled:Calvin, Participation, and the Gift: The Activity of Believers in Union with Christ. This book is outstanding, I will hopefully be able to put up a review of it within a weeks time here at the blog. But what Todd was alerting me to, and what I primarily want to feature through this post; is his newest book entitled: Union With Christ: Reframing Theology and Ministry for the Church. Lord willing I will be receiving a review copy of this book too; at which point I will promptly read, and provide a report to you all about its contents. Until that time, Todd pointed me to four promo videos that he did for his publisher (Baker Publishing); which provide a great sketch of what the book is about, and how Todd fleshes out this most awesome theme, Union With Christ. The first time I ever heard this phrase, ‘union with Christ’, was in seminary from my prof and mentor, Dr. Ron Frost (another historical theology guy, his guy was/is Sibbes). I had already been immersed in this concept for years (simply because I had been reading and memorizing so much scripture); but it was the introduction to this phraseology that revolutionized the way that I thought about intimacy with Jesus, and it drew me into the evocative reality of Paul’s mystical marriage language (cf. Eph. 5) like never before. Anyway, below are the four videos from Dr. J. Todd Billings on his new book “Union With Christ” (you can’t go wrong with a title like that!). Once I get the book I will be quoting from it as I read it, and finally writing a short review of it for the blog. Stay tuned. And thank you Todd Billings for alerting me and us to your most wonderful new title.

ht: J. Todd Billings

‘Father’

Here is a quote on God as ‘Father’ versus ‘Creator’, this is important, so I am quoting this in length:

. . . The center of the New Testament is the relationship between Jesus Christ and the One he addresses as Father. The communion between Jesus and his heavenly Fatherly is an utterly unique relationship, of which we can know nothing apart from Jesus’ own testimony.

God is thus Father not by comparison to human fathers, but only in the Trinitarian relation, as Father of the Son. Whenever Father is used of God it means “the One whom Jesus called Father.” The paradigm text is John 1:18: “No one has ever seen God. It is God the only Son, who is close to the Father’s heart, who has made him known.” In Greek, the word for “made him known” is exegesato. Jesus “exegetes” or “interprets” the Father. The term does not denote a generic title for God outside of the Father-Son relationship. Father thus functions in Trinitarian language not as a descriptive metaphor but as a proper name, whose home is the relationship that exists from all eternity between the first and second Persons of the Trinity. That is a relationship to which we as creatures have not immediate knowledge or access.

But by an astonishing gift of grace, Jesus invites us to be united with himself in the power of the Holy Spirit so that in union with him we may come to share in his utterly unique relation of Sonship to the Father. By ourselves we have absolutely no right or ground to address God as “Father.” It is only as we are united with Christ, partaking of his communion with the Father, that we can truthfully address God in this way ourselves. In Paul’s words,

For all who are led by the Spirit of God are children of God. . . . When we cry, “Abba! Father!” it is that very Spirit bearing witness with our spirit that we are children of God, and if children, then heirs, heirs of God and joint heirs with Christ. (Rom. 8:14-17)

We know God only in and through Christ’s relationship of Sonship, into which he invites us as participants (“Pray then like this: Our Father, who art in heaven . . .”). This means that salvation is understood as our communion with the Father through the Son in the power of the Holy Spirit. As Fanny Crosby’s hymn put it, “O come to the Father through Jesus the Son, and give him the glory: great things he hath done!” Our knowledge of God and our hope for salvation are directly Trinitarian in their scope.

The traditional naming of the Trinitarian God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is sometimes replaced today by the functional titles of Creator, Redeemer, and Sustainer. This works as an occasional use, describing God’s acts, but not as a substitute for the Trinitarian Name. The Fatherhood of God is tied utterly to Jesus’ naming of his own relationship to God, into which relationship we, by the Spirit, participate.

It was St. Athanasius who noted that the only reason we have for calling God “Father” is that God is so named by Jesus in the Bible. This points to the historical shape that the Gospels too: Christian faith is a biblical faith and a Jesus-based faith. God’s Fatherhood was understood relationally in an through Jesus Christ as self-giving love, and not as a human image or concept projected onto God. There is, in fact, an appropriate “thinking away” of that which is inappropriate in this terminology. By this we mean explicitly thinking away all biological and sexual imputation whatsoever into the theological concept of God. God the Father revealed in Scripture is Spirit. God has no sexual identity; sexuality, after all, is part of creation. The imago Dei (image of God) is not reversible; God is not created in our likeness! The personalized language of Trinitarian theology intends to bear witness in Christ to the liberation of humankind from all patriarchal idols and divinized ideologies. Where this did not and does not happen, there is a perversion of intent that must be utterly rejected on the ground of the nature and reference of Trinitarian language itself. (Andrew Purves and Mark Achtemeier, “Union in Christ: A Declaration for the Church,” 34-36)

There is so much in this that could be noted. I am only going to touch on some of the implications of what is being said here; I am going to reflect (below) with (1) Theological Implications, and then (2) Pastoral Implications.

Theological Implications

Certainly it should at least be highlighted that thinking like that articulated in the quote flows from a prior commitment to a certain mode of theological discourse, in fact methodology or prolegomena. Purves and Achtemeir are in the, what Barth has called, analogia fidei (or analogy of faith) versus the Traditional approach, best articulated by Thomas Aquinas called the analogia entis (or analogy of being). Instead of discussing what the distinctions are, in general here, I am going to focus on how these two disparate approaches play out theologically; and for our purposes, Confessionally. What happens if a particular theologian, or school of theologians, follows Aquinas’ approach versus the more Luther[an], Calvin[ian], Barth[ian], Torrance[an] approach? Here’s how the WCF starts out discussion on God and Trinity:

I. There is but one only,[1] living, and true God,[2] who is infinite in being and perfection,[3] a most pure spirit,[4] invisible,[5] without body, parts,[6] or passions;[7] immutable,[8] immense,[9] eternal,[10] incomprehensible,[11] almighty,[12] most wise,[13] most holy,[14] most free,[15] most absolute;[16] working all things according to the counsel of His own immutable and most righteous will,[17] for His own glory;[18] most loving,[19] gracious, merciful, long-suffering, abundant in goodness and truth, forgiving iniquity, transgression, and sin;[20] the rewarder of them that diligently seek Him;[21] and withal, most just, and terrible in His judgments,[22] hating all sin,[23] and who will by no means clear the guilty.[24] (WCF, 2/I)

And the Belgic Confession:

Article 1: The Only God

* We all believe in our hearts and confess with our mouths that there is a single and simple spiritual being, whom we call God — eternal, incomprehensible, invisible, unchangeable, infinite, almighty; completely wise, just, and good, and the overflowing source of all good.

Article 8: The Trinity

* In keeping with this truth and Word of God we believe in one God, who is one single essence, in whom there are three persons, really, truly, and eternally distinct according to their incommunicable properties– namely, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The Father is the cause, origin, and source of all things, visible as well as invisible. (Belgic Confession)

Contrast the above with the Heidelberg Catechism:

Of God The Father

9. Lord’s Day

Question 26. What believest thou when thou sayest, “I believe in God the Father, Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth”?

Answer: That the eternal Father of our Lord Jesus Christ (who of nothing made heaven and earth, with all that is in them; (a) who likewise upholds and governs the same by his eternal counsel and providence) (b) is for the sake of Christ his Son, my God and my Father; (c) on whom I rely so entirely, that I have no doubt, but he will provide me with all things necessary for soul and body (d) and further, that he will make whatever evils he sends upon me, in this valley of tears turn out to my advantage; (e) for he is able to do it, being Almighty God, (f) and willing, being a faithful Father. (g) (Heidelberg Catechism)

And the Scots Confession:

Chapter 1 – God

We confess and acknowledge one God alone, to whom alone we must cleave, whom alone we must serve, whom alone we must worship, and in whom alone we must put our trust; who is eternal, infinite, immeasurable, incomprehensible, omnipotent, invisible; one in substance and yet distinct in three persons: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; by whom we confess and believe all things in heaven and earth, visible and invisible to have been created, to be retained in their being, and to be ruled and guided by his inscrutable providence for such end as his eternal wisdom, goodness, and justice have appointed, and to the manifestation of his own glory. (Scot’s Confession, 1560)

At first blush there might not be much discernable difference between the WCF/BC and the HC/SC, but that’s what I want to reflect on for a moment. The “Westminster” tradition starts talking about God by highlighting His “attributes,” these are characteristics that are contrasted with who man is not. We finally make it to Him as “Father, Son, Holy Spirit,” but not before we have qualified Him through “our” categories using man (“analogy of being”) as our mode of thinking about “Godness.” This is true for both the WCF/BC. Contrarily, the HC/SC both immediately speak of God as Father; which is to say that these approach God through an (“analogy of faith” to speak anachronistically). Meaning that the emphasis is on the economic Revelation of God in Christ as the ‘eternal Son of God’ who exegetes God’s inner-life as loving Father, Son, by the Holy Spirit as the shape of his ‘being’ (ousia).

I hope the significance of this is not lost on you. It almost seems nit-picky, I am sure for some of you, that I would try and draw this distinction; but I want to assure you, that it is real — and that it would serve as one of the reasons that Purves and Achtemeir felt it necessary to make the point they do in the quote I provide from them above. The next question might be, what difference does this shift in “emphasis” and approach make in real life; in “pastoral situations?”

Pastoral Implications

I have a friend who is in the midst of “hellish” personal circumstances (a divorce with extraordinary circumstances surrounding it). We meet almost weekly to talk and pray. He has previously (for the past few years) sat under teaching that is self-consciously promoting theology that lines up with the Westminster approach to articulating God; his pastors teach through the theological grid that both John MacArthur and John Piper provide (in general). He is totally relying on the Lord, for this is really all he has, through this terrible season. And often, in our conversation he brings up the issue of “why” if God is sovereign would He allow or decree or appoint or cause the things that are happening to happen in his life in the way that they are. It is hard for my friend to conceptualize a God who is loving Father before He is sovereign Creator. So, like the “WCF” my friend primarily thinks about God through God’s attributes; instead of think of God through His relationship as Father, Son, Holy Spirit. This has real life consequence upon how my friend is trying to process his circumstances, and I must say not for the good. I am glad that I have been able to point him to a way to think about God as loving Father who is sovereign in relation to His Son versus thinking about God as sovereign Creator who deals with humanity through his unqualified attributes as if this is what defines the “essence” of “who” God is. My friend, I think, is starting to see what a difference this makes in trying to think about God in right ways!

Contextual Theology, A Reflection for Karl Barth

There is often an attack on the reality that theology is contextual; this is a point that folks often bring out when they want to marginalize a theologian or a theological system that they don’t especially appreciate. This tactic, in my experience, is most often brought in to play when discussing Karl Barth’s theology. Again, as a result of a discussion I had yesterday, I have been prompted to reflect upon this once again. The point is usually made that because Karl Barth’s theology (for example) took shape in lieu of the Kantian ‘Modern’ backdrop, and in particular the Natural Theology abused by the Third Reich and Nazi Germany in World War II; that Barth’s theological approach was shaped ‘in response’ to these all compelling external forces which impinged upon the way Barth theologized. This claim is also made by folks who call themselves ‘post-colonial’ theologians (really post-modern), who want to marginalize what they consider to be an imperialistic hegemony of theological kingsmanship; which is to say that they think that Anglo-European/American dominated theological power-structures have imposed themselves on the way we think theologically, and thus the best way to relativize this power is to identify the ‘power’ that gave shape to the Anglo-European theologies in the first place. In Barth’s case, the usual suspect of “Evangelicals” and “post-Colonialists,” it is again, to go back to Barth’s time and place, and suggest (argue) that because Barth was located where he was; that his theology can really only speak to the context in which he worked. The charge is that the categories that Barth used (like Kantian) place his theology in an obsolete book-shelf somewhere in Berlin wherein the dust and moth-balls ought to have their due-course. The suggestion is that since we can now identify the forces that compelled Barth’s theology into existence; that now we can discard Barth’s theology (or only look at it from a distance) for something “cheezier,” or better — i.e. “their theology.”

Part of a counter-reply I would offer to this non-sense; is that simply identifying the contextual realities that were in place in a particular theologian’s life pretty much is meaningless. If by doing so, the critic thinks he/she has successfully de-legitemized said theologian’s offerings as a theologian. If we followed this practice to its logical conclusion, it would make all theologians irrelevant and incredible; since we are all locally situated in our particular contexts. And yet, these same critics fail to realize that given their own locatedness, that they themselves are making claims that some how transcend their personal situadeness in order to condemn the situadedness, in our case, of Karl Barth. In other words, these critics method is the height of circular reasoning (petitio principii). [Beyond that, these critics, ironically, are appealing to Kantian categories themselves]

Beyond this, some critics can agree with what I just said; but they still, as a result of identifying the contextual forces on Barth, want to challenge his material out-put as a theologian. Meaning that his insights and grammar do not hold sound or credible force for today because his family (theologically) affiliation represents a time and an era that these critics find to be incredible. In other words, they think working through Kant or Heiddeger and others to be an “unsalvagable” move that ultimately denies Barth a voice that says something that is “true.”

My own approach would simply be to respond: Indeed, we are all products of our times; we are all contextualized persons; and we all speak in response to other voices. So what! I would suggest that because of God’s concursus Dei, or his providential work alongside creation (creating situation and space for his purposes to be accomplished within his creation), that it is precisely because of our context and situadedness that we can speak about what matters about God. That through various crises and problems that this world situation throws up at God’s people; that in response to these crises, we encounter God’s Word to us anew. This can be witnessed throughout the history of interpretation in the Church of Christ; most notably, as I reflect, during the times of the Church Councils. The ones that were prompted by heresy against the truth of God’s Word in Christ. We have people like Athanasius who have come to be known as Christians who have stood in the face of dogmatic crises presented by people like Arius and others. Or we have had people like Martin Luther stand up against ecclesiopolitical-doctrinal crises, and in so doing he encounters the Word of God in Christ afresh and anew. Examples can be multiplied exponentially. The point is, is that all of these people were contextually located; and because of their contextual-historico location they were in a providential position wherein they encountered a fresh Word from God that (given one’s perspective) has resulted in a fruitful way forward for the body of Christ catholic (or universal). The ultimate example of this is of course the eternal Word’s incarnation. It was through his particularity and contextual situation (cf. Gal. 4, “the fullness of time”) that he provided universal hope for all times and places. It is this same ‘Word’ that breaks in upon us in our various contexts that allows us to speak theological truth that can have force for “all.” This is how I would seek to salvage Barth from the unsavory approaches that would like to marginalize him.

I, ultimately, don’t agree with everything that Barth has written or taught; but at the same time, the ground upon which I would disagree with Barth (if I do) is not to contextualize his theology out of existence. Instead, I would have to disagree with Barth the same way I would have to disagree with any other theologian—whether that be in 4th century Latin church, or the 21st century Post-modern church—it would have to be on material theological grounds; and not merely on genetic-causal grounds. The task for the theologian-historian is to help describe how a certain theologian’s ideas may have come to be; but the next task for the constructive-critical-theologian is to make a judgment about said theologian’s ideas based upon (for the Protestant theologian) the Reformed principle of sola scriptura. That is, how well does the theologoumena (theologian’s opinions) proximate to the teaching of God’s second Word in Scripture? This is the standard! It is not to make Barth irrelevant by appealing to contextual-cultural forces. If we were consistent with this method; then we could ultimately rub Jesus and the Bible out of the realm of the credible as well. Oh wait, that’s what some have sought to do . . .

I am really just venting here . . . thanks for paying attention πŸ™‚ !

“Who’s Reformed, And Who Cares?”

I always like it when someone thinks that I have made a good point πŸ˜‰ ; so I thought I would share a comment that soon to be PhD from Aberdeen, Darren Sumner, just made on an older post of mine (and in response to one that Stephen Norris made on the same thread). The point that Darren believes is a good one, has to do with how we should define what it means to be included within the Reformed Faith of Protestant Christianity. This is somewhat of a debated issue (in-house), and so I think it would be helpful to share what Darren has shared on the topic. I will do that here, and then offer a few brief thoughts of my own. By the way, there are many classically Reformed proponents today who collapse what it means to be ‘Reformed’ into a fixed set of agreed upon Reformed Confessions (the so called Three Forms of Unity — viz. The Heidelberg Catechism, The Belgic Confession, and The Canons of Dort); if someone cannot sign off on even one of these ‘forms’ in toto, then their “Reformedness” is probably non-existent. The quote from Darren challenges this conception:

[B]obby, I think you make a good point, and it’s something to which I’m growing increasingly sensitive. What are the core principles of Reformed orthodoxy? Are these primarily doctrines (e.g. election and divine sovereignty construed in a particular way), or are they primarily ethics of the way in which theology is to be carried out (e.g. semper reformanda)?

While we may want to specify a handful of doctrines, my sense of the tradition and its founding is that the latter ethics are decisive. That’s why there is no single confessional statement of Reformed orthodoxy (as with the Lutheran Formula of Concord), but rather a broad tradition of regional confessions that share a great deal of doctrinal similitude. Even where we would specify some doctrines as necessary to what it means to be in the Reformed tradition β€” such as election and the sovereignty of God β€” the ethic requires that these allow for a range of interpretive positions and not a fixed doctrinal expression. This gives Reformed thinkers the freedom to continually re-examine and re-express the truths that are encountered in Scripture.

Not everyone will draw these boundaries quite the same, but the point is that Reformed thought allows for a range of options β€” similar to how George Hunsinger describes the Council of Chalcedon as permitting a range of orthodox talk about the Incarnation and not fixing a single expression. On these grounds, one must certainly judge Karl Barth as squarely within the broader Reformed tradition, even if his theology is not ultimately judged as part of β€œclassic Reformed orthodoxy.” The greatest value of classic Reformed orthodoxy, in my view, is that classic Reformed orthodoxy does not have the last word.

I agree with Darren. I think Darren’s very last sentence sums this up nicely. As Karl Barth develops in his The Theology of the Reformed Confessions, the principled way of being ‘Reformed’ (versus Lutheran for example) is found in the Reformed’s insistence upon subordinating everything to the Holy Scriptures. Thus, all Confession making becomes subordinate (and thus only proximate, at their best) to the clarity of God’s Word to us in Scripture. The consequence of this is that there is nothing static or ‘fixed’ (as Darren has said) to appeal to when trying to define the parameters for what it means to be ‘Reformed’; and I should say nothing fixed in reference to looking to certain Reformed Confessions as the canon for what it means to be included within the family of the Reformed Faith. So the question for what it means to be Reformed is not an issue of Dogmatic import, but instead, as Darren has identified (along with Barth and others), the barometer is one that is found in the realm of the ethical; or we could say, that defining this issue, using ‘Reformed principles’, becomes a question that is ‘personal’ and not abstract and/or institutional.

In closing, I would say that the classically Reformed amongst us define the Reformed Faith in static ways, as symptomatic of their doctrine of God. Doesn’t everything come back to this? So ultimately, this issue does come back to a Dogmatic question; since even a person’s ethics are a result of how they conceive of God.

In closing, closing, let me suggest a reason why this even matters (e.g. who’s included in the ‘Reformed Faith’). It matters because truth matters. It matters because the principles of the Reformed Faith, if employed consistently (semper reformanda), would actually militate against what it means to be ‘Reformed’ (in some sectors, like Westminster Theological Seminary or the United Reformed Churches); and thus calls into question the validity of their Reformed status.

After Calvin : A Wee History

Here is a little paper/article I put together (rather quickly — a couple years ago) on the history surrounding the debate between understanding Calvin as either 1) a Calvinist, or 2) not a Calvinist. I wanted to put this up again, because I think it still, at least, illustrates some of things at stake in this rather technical/sticky issue. It’s probably an issue that most could care less about (and to be honest I don’t care as much about it either anymore, but I still think it’s important).

The following represents a mini-paper I just wrote on the issue of Calvin vs. the Calvinists. What I want to provide for you all is what is at stake for Evangelical Calvinism and her place in the complex known as “Calvinism” or “Reformed” theology. The following is just an introduction to the major approaches to how we understand and frame this issue. I will be following this up with later posts, providing more flesh to the bones that this post present us with. The reason this is important is because if we follow the reading provided exclusively by Richard Muller, Evangelical Calvinism cannot be fitted into the framework known as “Calvinism,” in general. That is problem, 1) because it is not accurate relative to the history, but more importantly 2) because it mutes a rich conceptual and “doctrinal” heritage from being considered ‘orthodox’ by the broader body of people known as “Reformed orthodox.” What I will ultimately seek to demonstrate, of which this paper is only an introduction to, is that Muller does indeed provide a helpful corrective to some of what has been said by the “older scholarship;” but that he is inconsistent with his own thesis of “continuity,” because he in fact fails to include strains of Calvinism within the “Reformed orthodox” tradition. He says that he is only really concerned with methodology, and that he just wants to give us the real “history” around this issue; but upon further reading (which I’ll bring out later), he actually smuggles the conceptual back into his project — the very thing he accuses the “older scholarship” of doing. In other words, Muller demonstrates that his motivation is as much “theological” as those he accuses this of, and seeks to correct through his historizing. Anyway, here’s what I have thus far:

Introduction: Stating the Problem, Complexity and Conceptuality in the Readings of the β€˜Reformed Tradition’

Engaging the period of Protestant history known as the β€˜Reformed period’ has many and complex issues involved with it. Not least of which is how we should understand the relationship between what Richard Muller has called the β€˜early’, β€˜high’, and β€˜late’ eras of this broader category that makes up the β€˜Reformed period’. In other words, in the literature there has been reconstruction of this period, and the inter-relationship that inheres between the β€œthree eras” just noted, that is in competition.

The β€œcompetition” revolves around how we should understand the continuity or discontinuity between the earlier Reformers and the high and later Reformers (the latter two classifications known as the β€˜post-Reformed orthodox’). The so called older school of interpretation made up by folks like Thomas Torrance and Brian Armstrong (and even Karl Barth) are caricatured to have interpreted this issue in overly simplistic form, and through a biased dogmatic appropriation of the β€œhistory.” Muller says,

The older scholarship, exemplified by the writings of Ernst Bizer, Walter Kickel, Brian Armstrong, Thomas Torrance, and others has typically modified the term β€œorthodoxy” with the pejorative terms β€œrigid” and β€œdead,” and modified references to β€œscholasticism” with the equally pejorative terms β€œdry” or β€œarid.” Such assessment bespeaks bias, but it also reflects a rather curious sequence of metaphors. The implied alternative to such a phenomenon as β€œscholastic orthodoxy” would, perhaps, be a flexible and lively methodological muddle of slightly damp heterodoxy. . . .[1]

Muller takes issue with these β€œolder approaches,” and seeks to clarify this issue by revisiting and sharpening how the key language of β€œscholastic” and β€œorthodox” should be understood within their historical context. He believes that the β€œolder scholarship” has too quickly and anachronistically read their respective theological agendas into the history, thus subverting the history for their own usage; in the end what they give us, according to Muller is a revisionist reconstrual of the actual history.

Carl Trueman along the lines provided by Muller forwards the same thesis in regards to the way this issue has been framed and interpreted by the β€œolder” school. He believes that people like Torrance and Armstrong have co-opted the β€œhistory” to provide credibility to their own theological constructive work; he seeks to correct this paradigm,

In the last twenty-five years many scholars . . . have moved away from the traditional models whereby Protestant scholasticism was judged by the standards of later theology, whether Barthian, neo-Calvinist or whatever, to developmental models which attempt to set the movement within the context of its own times and within the ongoing Western theological tradition. . . .[2]

It is this problematic that Muller, Trueman, and company seek to β€œrevise” through providing, what they believe is the proper way to frame and understand this oversimplified approach that the older school has bequeathed upon us.

I will seek to elucidate how Muller, specifically, seeks to reify the understanding provided by the β€œold school,” and what in fact he believes is the proper way for moving forward. But, before we get there we should visit, for a moment, how this β€œolder scholarship” sought to appropriate the β€œhistory” represented by the β€œReformed period.” What is it that Muller and others are protesting in regards to the ways that these elder β€œtheologians” and β€œchurch historians” approached this salient issue?

Answering this question is really not that difficult, at least not for Muller; he holds that the oversimplification provided by the β€œold school” was both a definitional and methodological quagmire. That is that the β€œold way” of interpretation was shaped by over-simply framing the issue by a misunderstanding of what β€œscholasticism” actually was, and by trying to orientate all of their reconstruction around how the β€œpost-Reformed orthodox” (the β€˜high and late’ reformers) related, or not, to John Calvin. In other words, their error, according to Muller is that they tried to correlate Calvin’s theology and methodology with the β€˜reformers’ who followed him; and insofar as the post-Calvin reformers failed to cohere with Calvin’s β€œapparent” theological approach, this became the point of departure that served to disrupt and in fact thwart the β€œdoctrinal” focus set by the early Reformers (e.g. Luther, Zwingli, Calvin, et al.). In short, the early Reformers were focused on confessional and christological concerns; while the latter Reformers became embroiled with rationalistic and speculative concerns that were not in continuity with the trajectory that was seminally set early on. Here’s Muller,

Scholarly perspectives on the phenomenon of post-Reformation Protestantism have altered dramatically in the last three decades. Studies of the Reformed or Calvinistic theology of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries written before 1970 or even 1975 tended to pose the Reformation against Protestant orthodoxy or, in the phraseology then common to the discussion, β€œCalvin against the Calvinists.” This rather radical dichotomy between the thought of the great Reformer and even his most immediate successors — notably, Theodore Beza — was constructed around a particular set of highly theologized assumptions, concerning the Reformation and Protestant orthodoxy, humanism and scholasticism, piety and dogma. At the heart of the dichotomizing argument was a contrast between the β€œbiblical humanism” and christological piety of John Calvin and the Aristotelian scholasticism and predestinarian dogmatizing of nearly all of the later Reformed theologians, the sole exceptions being those who followed out the humanistic patterns of Calvin’s thought into fundamentally antischolastic modes of thought.[3]

Thomas Torrance, in line, somewhat, with Muller’s characterization certainly held that people like Muller (or the view that he represents) were the ones who have revised the β€œhistory” around this pivotal period; and in fact for the same reasons that Muller says that people like Torrance tried to revise this period — viz. for theological purposes. Torrance says in the context of his β€œScottish church”,

. . . It was the imposition of a rigidly logicalised federal system of thought upon Reformed theology that gave rise to many of the problems which have afflicted Scottish theology, and thereby made central doctrines of predestination, the limited or unlimited range of the atoning death of Christ, the problem of assurance, and the nature of what was called β€˜the Gospel-offer’ to sinners. This meant that relatively little attention after the middle of the seventeenth century was given to the doctrine of the Holy Trinity and to a trinitarian understanding of redemption and worship. Basic to this change was the conception of the nature and character of God. It is in relation to that issue that one must understand the divisions which have kept troubling the Kirk [church] after its hard-line commitment to the so-called β€˜orthodox Calvinism’ of the Westminster Standards, and the damaging effect that had upon the understanding of the World of God and the message of the Gospel. . . .[4]

We see Torrance exemplifies exactly what Muller charges him, and others like him with; and that is the notion that Torrance believes that the β€œfederal system of thought” (or the post-Reformed orthodox) placed the β€œReformed church” on a problematic trajectory, a trajectory discontinuous with the original shape set by John Calvin.

This is too simple according to Muller. Similarly, Brian Armstrong — another β€œhistorian” in Muller and Trueman’s cross-hairs — follows suit with Torrance’s conception, and in fact up until Muller came along represents the scholarship which articulated a view that placed Calvin against the later β€œCalvinists.” His basic thesis, and the one that Muller seeks to problematize and correct is that once Calvin went off the scene, his successor in Geneva, Theodore Beza reintroduced Aristotelian scholasticism into the β€œReformed” project, at odds with Calvin the Humanist (which was a method which sought to go back to the β€œsources” ad fontes or scripture and the Church Fathers), and schematized Reformed theology by what has been called the centraldogma. This was the idea that we could construe God through a rigid and deductive system of thought oriented and shaped around a deterministic supralapsarianism (or double-predestination) which was incompatible with his predecessor’s (Calvin’s) own understanding. Furthermore, Armstrong believes that Beza’s orientation was motivated by his devotion to Aristotle. Let me quote Armstrong at length:

This brief look at Calvin’s religious thought [which Armstrong just sketched] should make it clear that his whole theological program is at odds with the orientation of scholasticism as it has been characterized above. In general we must say, however, that scholasticism, not Calvin’s theology, prevailed in Reformed Protestantism. We are not here prepared to judge why Reformed theology developed as it did but only to recognize the phenomenon itself. Men like Martyr, Zanchi, Beza, Antoine de Chandieu, and Lambert Danaeus represent this divergence from a theology which had been carefully constructed by Calvin to represent faithfully the scriptural teaching and so usually presented a certain tension or balance of doctrines. . . . Of these men it was probably Beza who was most influential, and for this reason one may lay much of the blame for scholasticism at his feet. His very influential position as professor of theology at, and unquestioned supervisor of, the Genevan Academy gave him uncommon opportunity to direct the theological program of the Reformed Church. It was he who was responsible for the return to Aristotelian philosophy as the basis of the Genevan curriculum in logic and moral philosophy. As is well known, it was Beza who refused the humanist Peter Ramus a teaching post at the Genevan Academy because of Ramus’ anti-Aristotelian program.[5]

It is clear from Armstrong’s assertion that Muller has understood both of his interlocuters correctly in regards to their view of the Calvin and the Calvinists. Both Torrance and Armstrong believed that Calvin, conceptual-doctrinally, presented a different flavor and emphasis when juxtaposed with those who have come to be known as the “Calvinists.”

What I will argue later is that Muller is right to highlight the fact that the precision that folks like Torrance and Armstrong use in articulating their thoughts on this is probably too precise, and in fact comes short in doing justice to how this whole complex should be understood. Nevertheless, what I will point out, relative to Muller, is that even though he will try and argue that the issue of discontinuity that supposedly is present between Calvin and the Calvinists is simply one of different methodology and not one of conceptuality. More than that though, he wants us to believe that even though there is discontinuity between Calvin and the Calvinists on methodological concerns (e.g. Calvin being ‘confessional’ and the Calvinists being “dogmatic”); that when this issue is broadened what becomes apparent is that even method (between all of the early Reformers [not just Calvin] and the high and later Reformers) should be construed as continuous, and that the context for understanding this needs to be placed back into the late medieval period, and not simply from the ‘early Reformed era’ (as Torrance and Armstrong have done). When we do this we will see a thread of methodological concern that weaves all the way through the whole period; starting with the appropriation of Aristotelian method, which is consonant with both Agricolan and Ramist place logic and dialectical methodology. What is interesting about Muller’s argument, as I have already alluded to, is that he wants to say that all of this discontinuity talk — between Calvin and the Calvinists — should be jettisoned because of what I just mentioned (that the “old school” thesis faltered because they are short-sighted in their thinking, and they believe that the issue revolves around the “apparent” conceptual and material difference that obtains between Calvin and the Calvinists). Yet, what comes later in his book After Calvin is that Muller says that, in fact, by-and-large Aristotelian philosophy of some appropriation or form is present in most of the “later Reformers” who supposedly merely developed Calvin’s thinking (which of course the difference, previously, according to Muller was just a methodological one given the different historical concerns they were faced with). What this tells me is that Muller is playing fast and loose here. I think, and I’ll argue some of this later, that he is right in noting that there is more complexity and background than Torrance and/or Armstrong allowed into their interpretation of this issue; but that he is inconsistent because he actually smuggles “conceptual” stuff back into the criteria for adjudicating the question of continuity or discontinuity between Calvin and the Calvinists.

An aside: It is rather strange to me, when I first started this blog I had some very knowledgeable guys on this stuff reading here; they informed me that I was naive, and needed to read more of Muller (and now I have read all of the books they said I should of Muller, and in fact more — like many of his journal essays). The assumption was, that once I read more of him I would repent, and see it their way on this issue; yet, what is becoming more and more clear to me is that Muller, in some ways, plays fast and loose with his framing of this rather daunting historical conundrum. In short, I can appreciate, quite a bit more relative to the past, some of Muller’s more general themes that he helps to correct in this area; but I can now also more critically see where his thinking is flawed, and not sustainable at certain points (which I will have to get to later).


[1] Richard A. Muller, β€œAfter Calvin: Studies in the Development of a Theological Tradition,” 25.

[2] Carl R. Trueman and R. S. Clark, β€œProtestant Scholasticism: Essays in Reassessment,” xviii.

[3] Richard A. Muller, β€œAfter Calvin,” 3.

[4] Thomas F. Torrance, β€œScottish Theology: From John Knox to John McLeod Campbell,” x-xi)

[5] Brian Armstrong, β€œCalvinism and the Amyraut Heresy,” 37-8 (Brackets and emphasis mine).

Discontinuity Between Calvin’s Hermeneutic on the Atonement from the Calvinists

I just read this essay Hermeneutical discontinuity between Calvin and later Calvinism by Kevin D. Kennedy from Southwestern Theological Seminary in Fort Worth Texas in the Scottish Journal of Theology Volume 64 (2011) – page 299. Unfortunately I didn’t have the chance to make a copy of it (I read this while I was at my alma mater’s theological library today — Multnomah University), but I would like to try and provide a synopsis of his thesis and argument (as I can recall).

Basically, Kennedy argues that John Calvin and the later Calvinists (post-Reformed orthodox) function with discontinuity relative to their hermeneutics on the extent of the atonement. For Calvin, as Kennedy convincingly argues, he held to a universal atonement, but not universal salvation; for the “Calvinists,” according to Kennedy, they hold to a limited (particular) atonement, and a particular salvation. As part of Kennedy’s “ground clearing work,” he notes Richard Muller’s work in this area; as well as the work of Paul Helm and Roger Nicole (their rejoinder to R.T. Kendall’s work on Calvin). He recognizes that said scholars need to be acknowledged for their work in the area of Calvin studies (especially Muller), but that in this particular area they all over-state things when it comes to Calvin’s view of the extent of the atonement. Kennedy demonstrates that Calvin’s hermeneutics, both in his commentaries (on the salient passages), and in his little book Concerning the Eternal Predestination of God consistently argues for a universal atonement (but not salvation). In particular, Kennedy looks at Matthew 20.28 which says:

[j]ust as the Son of Man did not come to be served, but to serve, and to give His life a ransom for many.

Kennedy demonstrates (by quoting Calvin’s commentary), that Calvin believes that the word ‘many’ is not referring to a limited class of people (the elect), or that it is excluding one group of people from the other (elect from the reprobate)—as, he notes, John Owen, along with the rest of the post-Reformed orthodox Tradition would argue—but that Jesus is providing dominical teaching by making a contrast between himself as the One over and against the Many for whom he died pro nobis (or would be dying, given the historical present in context). Kennedy goes on to look at other passages in Calvin’s commentaries that are pertinent to this topic; all illustrating this same point. For Calvin, when the word ‘many’ is used in these contexts it is not intended to exclude one class of people from the other; but instead, it is to contrast Christ’s death for us, over and against ‘us’ the many (or the point that Jesus wasn’t dying for himself, but for us). Kennedy, then, moves on and takes a look at the more universalist passages in Paul’s corpus (like I Tim. 2.4 etc.); he notes that Calvin, qualifies the word ‘all’ (like God desires that ‘all’ men be saved) in a way that speaks, not to his view of the extent of the atonement; but to Calvin’s view that not all will believe. So the limiting, for Calvin, according to Kennedy, has to do with appropriation of salvation and not the extent of the atonement as the post-Reformed orthodox interpret Calvin (so Muller, Helm, Nicole, et al).

Kennedy concludes that the post-Reformed have imposed their later developed hermeneutic of particularism onto Calvin’s hermeneutic of the atonement. He suggests that a more fruitful way forward, while noting that there are some continuities between Calvin and the Calvinists (per Muller’s exhaustive argument, like in his After Calvin), would be not to gloss over the genuine discontinuities that are present between Calvin and the Calvinists. In this instance the primary distinction is between Calvin’s view of the extent of the atonement (which is universal), and the particularist view of the atonement held by the Calvinists (the Reformed orthodox ones).

In closing, what is very enlightening with Kennedy’s essay, is that it helps to substantiate what we Evangelical Calvinists, Thomas Torrance amongst us, have been arguing in regard to Calvin’s view of the atonement. This helps substantiate Thomas Torrance’s reading of many of the Scottish theologians in his book “Scottish Theology;” which argues that there is a whole strain of development of Calvinism in Scotland that follows and develops this teaching on the atonement first articulated by Calvin. Again, it is important to note that Calvinism has a variegated currency; and much of this is because Calvin left the doors open for more than one trajectory. In other words, his method was not scholastic.

The Atonement in Evangelical Calvinist Relief

*Here is an important repost from my other blog on the distinction that I see between my “Evangelical Calvinism,” and Federal Calvinism (versus simple American 5 point Calvinism).

Here T. F. Torrance (uber-Evangelical Calvinist) is commenting on John Knox’s understanding of the atonement. You’ll notice that the Federal (*forensic*) understanding is being implicitly critiqued throughout the unfolding of the comment:

. . . Several comments on this understanding of Christ’s sacrifice may be in place. While traditional forensic language is used, the atoning sacrifice is not to be understood as fulfilled by Christ merely as man (which would imply a Nestorian Christology), but of Christ as the one Mediator between God and man who is himself God and man in one Person. This means that β€˜the joyful atonement made between God and man by Christ Jesus, by his death, resurrection and ascension’, is not to be understood in any sense as the act of the man Jesus placating God the Father, but as a propitiatory sacrifice in which God himself through the death of his dear Son draws near to man and draws man near to himself. It is along these lines also that we must interpret the statement of the Scots Confession that Christ β€˜suffered in body and soul to make the full satisfication for the sins of the people’, for in the Cross God accepts the sacrifice made by Christ, whom he did not spare but delievered him up for us all, as satisfication, thereby acknowledging his own bearing of the world’s sin guilt and judgment as the atonement. As Calvin pointed out in a very important passage, God does not love us because of what Christ has done, but it is because he first loved us that he came in Christ in order through atoning sacrifice in which God himself does not hold himself aloof but suffers in and with Christ to reconcile us to himself. Nor is there any suggestion that this atoning sacrifice was offered only for some people and not for all, for that would imply that he who became incarnate was not God the Creator in whom all men and women live and move and have their being, and that Jesus Christ our Lord and Saviour was not God and man in the one Person, but only an instrument in the hands of the Father for the salvation of a chosen few. In other words, a notion of limited atonement implies a Nestorian heresy in which Jesus Christ is not really God and man united in one Person. It must be added that the perfect response offered by Jesus Christ in life and death to God in our place and on our behalf, contains and is the pledge of our response. Just as the union of God and man in Christ holds good in spite of all the contradiction of our sin under divine judgment, so his vicarious response holds good for us in spite of our unworthiness: β€˜not I but Christ’. . . . (T. F. Torrance: From John Knox to John McLeod Campbell,” 18-19)

Lots going on here, primary of which is a robust, trinitarian Doctrine of God. Indeed, I would suggest that this is the key from whence Federal and Scottish Theology (or β€œEvangelical Calvinism”) depart, one from the other.

One of the subsequent points of departure between Federal and Evangelical Calvinism is how the β€œatonement” is framed. The former frames it forensically, per the covenant of works/grace (as shaped by the β€˜decree’); while the latter frames the shape of the atonement ontologically (per the one β€˜covenant of grace’ as shaped within the free predeterminations in the life of God).

There is more to be said. I will try and come back later and provide more reflection, especially for those of you for whom this is new (even β€œstrange teaching”).

From “Evangelical” Salvation to ‘Evangelical’ Salvation

[T]he real advance has obviously been made when we come to the INSTITUTIO of 1559, in which unio cum Christo [union with Christ] has become the common denominator under which Calvin tried to range his whole doctrine of the appropriation of the salvation achieved and revealed in Christ. For now in the Third Book, before he can speak of faith, of conversion and renewal, of the vita hominis christiani, of abnegatio nostri as its sum, of the necessary bearing of the cross, of the relation between this and the future life, then β€” and only then β€” of justification, of Christian freedom and prayer, of eternal election as the ultimate presupposition of the whole, and finally of the future resurrection, according to the view attained in 1559 he has first to make it plain how it can come about at all that what God has done for us in Christ, as declared in the Second Book, can apply to us and be effective for us. The answer given in the noteworthy opening chapter of the Third Book is to the effect that it comes about through the arcana operatio Spiritus, which consists in the fact that Christ Himself, instead of being extra nos, outside the man separated from Him and therefore irrelevant to us, becomes ours and takes up His abode in us, we for our part being implanted into Him (Rom. 11:17) and putting Him on (Gal. 3:27). (Karl Barth CD 4.3.2, 550-51 cited by Charles Partee, The Theology of John Calvin, 195)

How much of β€œEvangelical” theology has missed this point? By β€œonly” viewing Christ as the instrument of salvation; what’s missed is the fact that God in Christ through the Spirit is salvation! Union with Christ becomes the center which all other soteriological concerns should find their orbit. If we hope to be β€œsaved” at all, it will only be because we participate with God through Christ by the Spirit. In this way salvation is understood in personal, relational, trinitarian terms versus the usual β€œEvangelical” instrumentalist, substantialist, qualitative terms. There is a huge difference between the two approaches. I wonder if you too appreciate the significant weight in this difference of approach and understanding?

Am I Really Saved? Assurance in Calvin & Luther, Questioned

I am also just starting to read Randall C. Zachman’s book The Assurance Of Faith: Conscience in the Theology of Martin Luther and John Calvin. I am really excited to dig into this work, Zachman engages in a comparison between Luther and Calvin on how they conceived of assurance of salvation issues; he ends up arguing that contra conventional readings of both, that in fact they have the same functional conclusions at play in their respective theological ouvres.

Jumping right in Zachman begins to broach an un-sightly problem left expose in both Calvin’s and Luther’s approaches to articulating a theory of assurance that is ultimately grounded in the person of Christ. While both theologians believed that they had achieved this, Zachman highlights how, in fact, they left the door opened for things like Theodore Beza’s syllogismus practicus (practical syllogism); which would later play a pivotal role in the Puritan theology of someone like William Perkins and William Ames et al. This is one of the consequences of operating with a limited atonement in one’s theological construction; the subjective side of assuring oneself that s/he is one of the elect for whom Christ died (or for whom Christ has chosen in his Priestly office pace Calvin cf. Heb. 7.25) is left to creating mechanisms that can do that kind of heavy lifting for the tortured souls left wondering such enigmas (am I saved?). Here is what Zachman writes on this front in regard to Calvin’s & Luther’s theology:

[G]iven the fact that both Luther and Calvin had a doctrine of limited election, which restricts the saving efficacy of the reconciliation won in Christ to those who believe in Christ, the possibility of this reversal could not in principle be removed; and this gives rise to a suspicion that their distinction between the “foundation” and “confirmation” of assurance is a distinciton without a difference. If we are assured of our faith only by the testimony of Jesus Christ to us (which Luther and Calvin rightly maintained), and yet the testimony of Jesus Christ to us only applies for those whom God’s secret will has elected (which both also maintained), how are we to turn from ourselves to Christ with assurance and ignore the question of our own individual election by the God behind and in a real sense distinct from Jesus Christ, a question that can only be answered by the testimony of the individual to him/herself via the syllogismus practicus? Either the question of assurance will be asked alone and the question of election will be ignored (the happy inconsistency of the Lutherans), or the question of assurance will be asked directly in the light of the limited election of individuals (the miserable consistency of the Reformed, attaining confessional status at Westminster). It is clear that both Luther and Calvin wished to steer clear of the second alternative, but they did so only by ignoring the dilemma which their theologies had in fact created. As Barth rightly says about Calvin, “A happy inconsistency led him to believe that he could unify the christological beginning and the anthropological conclusion of his thinking.” [Randall C. Zachman, The Assurance of Faith, 7]

This ought to be a real and present danger for Reformed and Lutherans today, but it doesn’t really seem to have the teeth that it had, at least as it did in Puritan England. In other words, if someone follows limited atonement theology; then this person ought to be having plenty of angst and dark nights of the soul — at least commensirate with their daily sinning. This is one of the reasons why I think it is so important to move out of the voluntaristic theology of both Calvin and Luther (insofar as this is lurking in their respective theological approaches … Calvin being influenced by Scotus, and Luther, Occam); it is important because while both of these theologians offer a rich well of christocentrism to drink from, they still need some constructive help. Neither one of them totally bridge the gap between God’s inner life and outer life (the ontological and economic). Someone like Thomas Torrance or Karl Barth help to round off these rough edges left in both C & L. Nevertheless, Luther and Calvin present a much more fertile landscape than do those who immediately follow them do.

I have more reading to do, but this represents a start …

On Being ‘Reformed’ and “non-Reformed”

I like to contemplate on what it means to be ‘Reformed,’ because that’s where I find myself, theologically. I reflected on this a few posts ago, a bit; I was communicating how being ‘Reformed’ has certain connotations associated with it, usually negative (well, if you’re ecclesially situated, as I am). My friend is reading I. John Hesselink’s classic little book On Being Reformed: Distinctive Characteristics and Common Misunderstandings, he encouraged me to pick it up, so I have (I have intended to get to him, at some point anyway, so now is the point). In his first chapter he deals with the misunderstanding “That the word “Reformed” refers primarily to those denominations which bear that name, especially those of Dutch origin (this is his title for chapter 1). He underscores how his understanding of being ‘Reformed’ developed over time. He grew up the son of a Dutch Reformed pastor in Michigan, and so this is all he knew. Later, he did his doctoral work under Karl Barth, and he also studied with Emil Brunner. Anyway, he came to appreciate something that I have been trying to trumpet here often (and we do in our book as well), and that is that being ‘Reformed’ represents a spirit more than a letter or a particular cluster of denominations. You see, I grew up the son of a Baptist preacher-man, and currently we happily attend a Calvary Chapel (which by constitution are against the ‘Reformed’ tradition — of course that’s only because folk in Calvary Chapel have a very limited view of what being ‘Reformed’ means and what it entails [and this is not limited to Calvary Chapel folk] — if they understood what it meant, I think many of them would realize that in fact they fit within the ‘spirit’ of what it means to be Reformed both formally and materially); both of my ecclesial situations are in the ‘Free-church’ tradition, and both are congregational (somewhat) in format. Here is what Hesselink has to say about what it means to be ‘Reformed’, beyond the common misconception that this is dictatedΒ  by, by being associated with certain “Reformed-denominations” (like the Pressies):

[I]n the United States and the British Commonwealth there are numerous ministers and theologians who serve Baptist, Congregational, and Anglican (Episcopelian) Churches but who consider themselves basically “Reformed” in their theology. I find it intriguing, for example, that for many years the standard text in systematic theology at Western Seminary [Holland, Michigan] was not that by the famous Presbyterian Charles Hodge or by Christian Reformed scholar Louis Berkhof, but the three volume work of Augustus Hopkins Strong, a Baptist theologian from Rochester Seminary. One of the leading Calvin scholars in the United States, the late Ford Lewis Battles, was of Congregational background, and many of the finest Calvin scholars in the English-speaking world are Anglicans: Philip Hughes, James I. Packer, and T.H.L. Parker.

In conclusion, then, Reformed comprehends a large, international group of churches as well as countless individuals who belong to denominations that are called neither Reformed nor Presbyterian. Hence, any time we who belong to the Dutch Churches (RCA or CRC) here in the United States imagine that we are the principal representatives of the Reformed tradition, we are both presumptuous and in egregious error. On the other hand, there is no need to be shy or defensive about the name simply because in the Anglo-Saxon world the term Presbyterian is better known. Few ecclesiastical theological terms are more respected and honored that that of Reformed.Β 

We can be justly proud as long as we remember that the word denotes a task more than an accomplishment. Ecclesia reformata semper reformanda est! “A Reformed church must ever be reforming itself”—in accordance with the Word of God. [I. John Hesselink, On Being Reformed, 7-8]

I am one of those Congregationalist ‘Reformed’ guys, and of course I walk and breath in the ‘spirit’ of what that means, and in the ethos of the Reformed mantra that Hesselink ends with. In fact our forthcoming book entitled: Evangelical Calvinism: Essays Resourcing the Continuing Reformation of the Church, is squarely situated in the very place thatΒ  Hesselink sketches above. And of course what it means to be ‘Reformed’ also has a multi-faceted conceptual/material range; there is not a monolithic voice when it comes to every duck in the ‘Reformed’ row. And that is what I continue to hope to clarify for so many folks who seem to think that being Reformed equals being a 5 point Calvinist. It doesn’t.