I am writing a review for this book right now, for the Pacific Journal of Baptist Research; I should be done with the review by tomorrow. But I thought I would throw something up here from the book for your consideration. 
Michael Rea writes:
The methodological divide between systematic theologians and analytic philosophers of religion is ripe for exploration. It is of obvious theoretical importance to both disciplines, but it also has practical import. The climate in theology departments for analytic theologians is muck like the climate in English-speaking philosophy departments for continental philosophers: often chilly. Moreover, the methodological divide is surely the most significant obstacle to fruitful interdisciplinary dialogue. The problem isn’t just that academics with different methodological perspectives have trouble conversing with one another. Rather, it is that, by and large, the established figures in both disciplines don’t even view mutual conversation as worth pursuing. They ignore one another. They (implicitly or explicitly) encourage their students to ignore one another. They allow their methodological preferences to play a very large role int their judgments about hiring and about the quality of papers they referee for professional journals. And the divide only grows deeper. No doubt many (on both sides) will thin that all of this is perfectly legitimate. Maybe it is, but that is beside the point; its legitimacy shouldn’t just be taken for granted. It is an open and interesting question whether theology can sensibly be done in the analytic mode. [Michael C. Rea in Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology, edited by Oliver D. Crisp and Michael C. Rea, 2]
For some of you you could care less about what appears to be cutting the bologna way too thin. But I assure you this represents a substantial issue with real life fall-out (which I understand personally). The divide that Rea is speaking about represents a substantial methodological difference between how folk “do” theology. The difference is the difference between starting with Christ, in principle (principially) and methodologically (which is the method I follow); or starting with generic philosophical abstractions about nature and the god of nature, and from this set of principles working toward God and Christ. This divide works its way out, finally, to the issue that I am often harping on here at the blog; the distinction that I often draw between classical Calvinism and Evangelical Calvinism—viz. the disparate doctrines of God, for example (do we have a substance metaphysic [classic Calvinism] or a [onto] relational metaphysic [Evangelical Calvinism] shaping how we conceive of God and all the subsequent doctrines that follow? etc.).
I realize that I moving fast, from one thing to the other; but I want to illustrate how this “divide” that Rea is speaking about can play out THEOLOGICALLY.
“It is an open and interesting question whether theology can sensibly be done in the analytic mode.”
The trouble is, right as Rea is on many points, I don’t see how this is an as-yet-unanswered question. But the answer I see as obvious as a theologian is, “of course it can — as apologetics.” There is no reason that the theologian cannot use analytic philosophy (not philosophy of religion, per se, but the tools of analytic philosophy in general) as a language in which to speak theologically. I can speak what I know from proper dogmatics using the analytic tradition. But I cannot do dogmatics from analytic philosophy.
Put differently, I don’t see how analytic philosophy, even and especially as set in the service of an analysis of religion, is a science whose object is God. What it is, is a science whose object is human statements and anything reducible to sets of them. Analytic philosophy is a set of evaluative criteria (actually multiple competing sets, but we’ll leave that be) for dealing with systems of statements in combination in order to validate their integrity. It is static program analysis — it is a debugger, and I gladly use it as such!
@Matt,
I don’t have a problem with using analytic rigor for theological evaluation; but of course that’s not how analytic theologians use analytic philosophy; they use it for analytic theology—which you know. Do you think there is an analytic theology that does not use substance metaphysics?
At the very least, I see no reason beyond theological history why it should use substance metaphysics — that is, no reason derived from analytics, which has moved past Aristotelianism several times. Be clear what you mean by “substance metaphysics” — clear enough that a philosopher could agree with you. Do you actually see examples of substance-attribute metaphysics in current analytic theology?
@Matt,
I think some of the work of Oliver Crisp, like his “God Incarnate” exemplifies reliance on substance metaphysics. But of course, Matt, my focus is usually in the history and less in contemporary theology. My focus is on constructs, like what I often call “classic Calvinism” that surely move and breathe in the atmosphere that scholastic-analytic theology has produced for many in Christendom today. So when I refer to “substance metaphysics” I am usually referring to Aristotelian-Thomist instances of this kind of metaphysics simpliciter. I am curious, can you think of the bulk of analytic theologians who are not engaging some kind of substance metaphysics?
I’m not quite convinced that what you call ‘substance metaphysics’ is the big issue here. Isn’t the point this: the analytic theologians keep asking whether proposed theological concepts are consistent and coherent concepts. The classical theologians on the other hand insist that proper use of reason and logic isnΒ΄t a guarantee for theological truth, because that is personal, to be found in Jesus Christ. As I understand Rea, one of the big problems is this apparent lack of communication between these two different points of departure. We need both in my point of view: proper use of logical concepts and the conviction that theological truth is (far) more than that.
@Arjen, I don’t think that would be a substantive enough of a point for the point of departures that have inhered between the two groups. I’m not quite sure I understand this distinction that it seems both you and Matt are driving at; i.e. the usage of logic V. some sort of personalism by way of methodology. That doesn’t seem to be the issue to me.
I really don’t understand why it is hard to understand “substance metaphysics;” I thought that was common parlance used to describe the kind of theological out-put that is common amongst certain strains of theologians, no? As I understand metaphysics we have substance, [onto]relational, and actualistic; what other metaphysics am I missing here?
Bobby, let me try to explain what I meant. It isn’t hard to see what you mean by ‘substance metaphysics’. I’m not sure, however, that this ‘label’ is very helpful. In general ‘substance metaphysics’ seems to be associated with a kind of Aristotelian metaphysical way of thinking, which seems to pervade Medieval philosophy and theology. But the use of Aristotle in the Middle Ages is highly diverse. Some medieval theologians use his vocabulary (at least in part) while radically altering its content. Thomas Aquinas, who tried to find a kind of synthesis between christian faith and Aristotelian philosophy, is in this respect very different from someone as Duns Scotus, who brought about an emancipation of Aristotle.
Contemporary analytic philosophers and theologians generally work with a kind of logic which is primarily functional. At any rate, their use of logic can’t be associated with Aristotelian or Thomist philosophy. So, that’s why I’m not quite happy to speak of ‘substance metaphysics’.
Hey Arjen,
I am aware of the history of ideas, I took my Medieval and Reformation history classes too π . My way of thinking is quite particular; when I think of Analytic Theology I am thinking of actual applications of Theology. The distinction you seem to be driving at–or non-distinction–seems to be supposing that Analytic Theology and Philosophy of Religion are the same things; but I don’t think they are. I also don’t agree that Analytic Theologians are the only ones interested in functional uses of logic (which I really don’t understand that distinction); since Continental and/or Dialectic Theologians also use vigorous applications of modal logic (for example) as well (which I think is what Matt is highlighting with his comments)—so this can’t be a meaningful distinction between Analytic Theologians and Dialectic Theologians; this is what I am pressing and pushing back at you with. I also think it overstates to suggest that “their use of logic canβt be associated with Aristotelian or Thomist philosophy.” Why? For some this is surely the case, i.e. usage of Thomist Philosophy; certainly not for all. But then, my question is in what meaningful way these so called Analytic Theologians can be said to be operating as Theologians and not simply as Philosophers of Religion? That seems to be a legitimate question, and a meaningful distinction. In fact it is an Analytic Philosopher friend who made this distinction for me, some years back. So my question still stands; what metaphysics do you think analytic THEOLOGIANS (not yelling, emphasizing π ) have available to them? Whether that be some form of substance (like the Medieval basket represents), relational, or actualistic? These are the only forms of metaphysics that I am aware of; do you know of any others?
Bobby, thanks for your explication once again. Of course you took your Medieval and Reformation classes. I didn’t want to suggest otherwise…
Now, I don’t assume Philosophy of Religion and Analytic Theology to be equivalents. I do think, however, they operate with the same logical and conceptual tools. The main difference between them is perhaps that Analytic Theologians operate with the doctrinal content of the Bible and the tradition as a given, explicating how this doctrinal content is to be understood, how it is related to other theological doctrines, and so forth. Philosophers of Religion investigate how the Christian faith as a whole, or specific doctrines, can be explained and defended in the light of philosophical questions, concerning the nature of our knowledge, human liberty, and so forth.
Then about your question about the kind of metaphysics analytic theologians could or should use. What I tried to explain by referring to the Medieval diversity was that, according to me, a term like Β΄substance metaphysicsΒ΄ doesnΒ΄t clarify much and the same can be said of relational and actualistic metaphysics. Let me give one example. Karl Barth is said to work with an actualistic metaphysics. It has been commented however that his use of the term ‘history’ functions the same way as the term ‘substance’ by some of his predecessors. Of course, sometimes it can be useful to make a division like these three kinds of metaphysics. But in the end, we need to do careful reading,questioning and differentiating to uncover the inner logic which is at work.
Arjen,
And of course my point is that the line between an Analytic Theologian and a Philosopher of Religion is thin to non-existent, from my perspective π . And yet, of course, I also recall you description of these respective disciplines in the Analytic Theology book; but I simply don’t think that there ends up being a real difference that inheres between the two; I think this because ultimately, as you concede, they work from a similar prolegomena; they just apply that different, as the occasion warrants.
On Metaphysics; there is no question that we need to do careful work in making our distinctions and differentiating, but there is an end to the day, and at that end I think these are all legitimate categories for different metaphysical (or post) schemas available. I actually do find these designations helpful, since it enables me to gauge the relative trajectory that said theologian will be heading in; viz. per the constraints of whatever general category of metaphysic they are working with. I think it safe to say that Barth follows an actualistic metaphysic (or post-metaphysic); of course there is conjecture on how that is parsed out (like between Hunsinger and McCormack or Justin Stratis for that matter [see his essay in IJST 2010 Sept. which seeks to offer an alternative read to actualism in Barth contra McCormack). As far as an onto-relational metaphysic or better, theological ontology, I think that is pretty unique to TF Torrance. In other words, I think these categories, while general, also have specific instantiations which generated them as categories in the first place; and it is in this sense that I find them useful and helpful (and even specific).
Thanks for the push, Arjen, this helps me.
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