I had an interesting impromptu meeting today with a former prof of mine from my undergrad days. He is in the analytic tradition, and his training is in the area of philosophy of religion. He is currently completing his PhD dissertation in the area of philosophical theology with a focus on American Theologian, Charles Hodge; in particular his methodology and epistemological commitments. Needless to say, my former prof is not a fan of what folks have called Continental Theology (this would be German, Modern, etc.); he is a true blue Analytic Theology guy (I try to not hold that against him 😉 ). Anywho, we discussed multiple topics having to do with what else, but theology. I brought T.F. Torrance to the discussion (no, not me!) in the context of discussing foundationalism. My former prof believes that Torrance is a straight up ‘foundationalist’, without a doubt. My former prof’s working definition of ‘foundationalism’ is that “anyone who has basic foundational beliefs (a prioris) qualifies as a foundationalist.” Based on this definition I would imagine most folks would qualify as foundationalists; even if they don’t want to. When I brought up the idea that Torrance follows a certain order of knowledge; meaning that Torrance endorses the order that ‘ontology’ precedes ‘epistemology’, my former prof relativized this, and said that this is pretty much meaningless since he believes that this can go either way at either time. In other words, he believes that in order to articulate things about ontology we have already presupposed an epistemology; and in order to talk about epistemology, we have already favored an ontology. In this sense then, my former prof would seem to think that there is really nothing special about Torrance’s ordering of things, and thus Torrance’s theological science can be felled with one fail swoop.
At the moment of our impromptu discussion, I was caught off guard a bit; but since, I have had time to reflect a little further. On the first point, I don’t have any problem accepting that Torrance was a foundationalist based on my former prof’s basic definition of that. But I think technically, because Torrance rejects a univocal relation between “our” mode of thought for thinking about God, and who God is in himself; that this asymmetry disqualifies Torrance from being a foundationalist, proper. Torrance’s stratified knowledge of God in Christ is more nuanced than I think my former prof would want to concede. But again, I won’t hold that against him; too much 😉 .
On the second point—on the order of knowledge—again I think my former prof has misappreciated the significance that this plays within T.F. Torrance’s theological realism (or critical realism). This is oneo f the more basic, and profound points that Torrance has to offer us (I think) in regards to providing a methodology to do genuinely ‘Christian Theology’. My former prof seems to think that the doing of theology needs to be able to account for the fact that we live in a pluralistic society, and thus our theological grammar needs to somehow satisfy the needs and questions that our pluralistic society presents (but this sounds more like apologetics versus the doing of theology). Torrance provides a way forward for doing Christian Theology by his kata physin (according to the nature of the thing) or ‘theological science’ approach. This is to say that the object under consideration needs to be that which provides us with the contours and categories through which we begin to apprehend the reality of the thing itself (and so this avoids the ‘foundationalist’ charge). In other words, we don’t dictate or impose our thinking upon what we are studying; but we follow the lead of whatever we are studying as it opens itself up to us through the process of on-going inquiry into its reality. Here is what Myk Habets has written about this in a guest post of his I once posted:
[T]he point was made above that epistemology is founded on or correlated with ontology.[27] This holds true throughout Torrance’s method and theology. Like Barth before him, Torrance holds that the distinctive nature of theology is determined by its object, which is defined as God revealed in Jesus Christ. Hence theology and any and every other true science, is under an intrinsic obligation to give account of reality according to its distinct nature, that is, kata physin.[28] The fundamental axiom that Torrance develops throughout his theological exploration is that ‘We know things in accordance with their natures, or what they are in themselves; and so we let the nature of what we know determine for us the content and form of our knowledge.’[29] He goes on to argue that:
science, in every field of our human experience, is only the rigorous extension of that basic way of thinking and behaving.’[30] By natural extension, ‘all this applies as much in our relations with God as in our relations with nature or with one another. There is no secret way of knowing either in science or theology, but there is only one basic way of knowing, which naturally develops different modes of rationality in natural science and in theological science because the nature of what we seek to know in each is different.[31]
The final application of this principle is expounded by Torrance in the following way, ‘In each field of inquiry, then, we must be faithful to the reality we seek to know and must act and think always in a relation of relentless fidelity to that reality.’[32] In this way Torrance has expressed a fundamental and unifying method for all scientific investigation. Not least of which includes scientific theology. (taken from here)
My former prof would say, I know, that this is only to privielege such a methodology by importing already established beliefs about God (like those provided grammar through the ecumenical Church councils) into or onto our conceptions of the ontology of God. So that, again, the order of knowledge is really from the bottom up (from us up). But of course the response to that is that this is the point of the incarnation and the hypostatic union. It is through God’s accommodation to us by becoming man in Christ; that we now have the capacity to know God mediated to us through the creaturely media of Christ’s humanity for us. But this does not really cut the mustard for my former prof; remember, he thinks the conditions for doing theology is that it needs to somehow meet the constraints placed thereupon by the pluralistic society which we inhabit. But this doesn’t seem to be a methodologically ‘Christian’ way to do or think theology. This seems like apologetics. What do you think?
Bobby, a couple of points of clarification are in order. I think perhaps in our discussion, you misconstrued my claims. First in regards to foundationalism and whether Torrance merits being labelled a foundationalist. My point was quite simply that most criticisms directed against foundationalism are based on a faulty understanding of what foundationalism is; typically, Cartesian foundationalism is upheld as exemplifying the essence of foundationalism and then rebutted leading critics of foundationalism to conclude that “foundationalism is dead.” But Descartes version is only of many, and foundationalism is not only much broader, but such a model of knowledge extends long before the early modern period. So to link foundationalism with modernism is inaccurate and misleading as to the current state of foundationalism in contemporary epistemology. In specific reference to Torrance, I have not read any specific comments by Torrance in regards to foundationalism, but based on what I have read, it does seem that Torrance draws parallels between the natural sciences and theology (and your quotes seem to corroborate that very point) that endorses the idea that there is a rational structure grounded in reality that comports well with a broadly foundationalist strategy (the alternatives would be either coherentism, pragmatism, or skepticism – none of which seems to fit Torrance). Your point about the order of knowledge and univocality of divine knowledge in comparison to human knowledge is irrelevant to the issue of foundationalism, at least I don’t see what that would have to do the structure of our beliefs in relation to knowledge.
In regards to the order of knowledge. I think you likewise missed my point. So let me attempt to clarify. My claim was that regardless of whether you start with metaphysics or epistemology, you do not and cannot start with kata physin simplliciter and likewise if you start with epistemology in your order of knowledge, you will of necessity start with certain metaphysical commitments. Perhaps an analogy will help here. It is like talking about the properties of a triangle. While the properties of being trilateral and triangular are distinct properties of the triangle, you cannot affirm one without also affirming the other. If you start with metaphysics as the starting point of your analysis, you necessarily invoke certain epistemological principles in order to make your metaphysical claims. To give an example, if one is a materialist, then they will naturally privilege certain epistemic postures consistent with their materialism, namely empiricism. I have no problem if one wishes to start with a metaphysical claim, but by doing so, one has not bypassed epistemology and the attendant issues.
One final point that will hopefully enhance our dialogue. In regards to pluralism, my position is not that in order to do theology, one must satisfy the constraints placed upon the theologian by a pluralist society. This greatly misses my position. If one wishes to ground their theological beliefs (which is very foundationalist language) in their experience with the risen incarnate Lord that God initiates, such an experiential encounter still requires cognitive reflection to take one beyond the encounter to theological affirmations. All experiences are interpretive and thus involve prior cognitive beliefs, including theological ones. Given that human experiences are variegated and result in a plurality of theological, even religious claims, suggests that there is a very human element in theological reflection. This requires careful assessment of our presuppositions, both theological and philosophical, and how they inform our interpretive conclusions. Is there an apologetic dimension to such reflection, certainly. But that hardly undermines my point.
Hi Michael,
I am currently trying to finishing writer a paper to present at ETS this year on TFT vs Carl Henry’s methodology. Henry, a foundationalist of course, does not think of TFT as a foundationalist at all. I wonder what you think of that? Is Henry wrong? Or does he see something in TFT that you may be missing? Henry rightly considers TFT to be a dialogical theologian (his term) while Henry is a nominalist (TFTs term). What, exactly, Henry takes exception to is Torrance’s attempt to relate human logic to the Logic of God in a non-formal way.
So, can a critical realist rightly be called a foundationalist? I would think only in the very softest sense of the term foundationalism – but yes. But TFTs position is more nuanced than current definitions of soft-foundationalism would currently permit. Thus dialogical, critical realist, and kata physic would more properly describe him, and as such, would distance him from what would typically be called foundationalism. I wonder if you would agree?
Torrance’s use of Scripture avoids a fundamentalist and Roman Catholic realism on the one hand, and on the other hand, a liberal and neo-Protestant idealism; both approaches Torrance considers to be mistaken. In relation to fundamentalism, Christian dogmas or doctrines are not to be read directly off the pages of Scripture in a propositionalist kind of way: “The assumption that the Scriptures are impregnated with universal, changeless divine truths which can be read off the sentential sequences of the inspired text, provided that it is properly or authoritatively interpreted, is admittedly the view that was long held, and often still is held, by Roman Catholic and Protestant fundamentalism alike.” (STI, 7-8). Fundamentalisms of this sort result in a position in which faith is placed in Scripture directly rather than in that to which Scripture bears witness—God’s being and act. To mistake the text of Scripture for the truths they seek to reveal is to adopt some form of nominalism or extreme realism. According to Torrance:
in a scientific theology, on the contrary, we are concerned not with thinking thoughts, far less with thinking statements themselves, but with thinking realities through thoughts and statements, and with developing an understanding of God from his self-revelation mediated to us by the Holy Scriptures in the Church, in which the connections we think are objectively and ontologically controlled by the intrinsic connections of God’s self-communication as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. (STR, 8).
The second position Torrance distances himself from is that of liberalism or neo-Protestantism in which Christian dogmas or doctrines are reached by simple empirical observations of uninterpreted facts, that is, simply existentially. This form of neo-Protestantism is considered the by-product of the scientific world of Newton. This was a radically dualist conception of science that carried over into theology, exemplified, as Torrance notes, by Hermann’s distinction between Geschichte and Historie. (STR, 8-9).
Is this foundationalism according to your definition?
Blessings,
Mike,
Thank you for providing clarification. My intent was certainly not to misconstrue what you said; instead I was only voicing what “I” heard you saying, thank you for clarifying where I mis-heard you. Would you say, though, that what I said about your definition of foundationalism is pretty spot on. What I said seems to be verbatim of how you described it in very basic terms. And this isn’t something I haven’t heard or read before. As I recall Ronald Nash supplies the same basic definition of foundationalism in his book “Faith And Reason,” which I read years ago; so I know that this is a live definition. But my only push back with it is that it seems too broad; so broad that almost anyone could and should fit into it (even to their chagrin—say if they wanted to claim to be a non-foundationalist of whatever flavor). I know that as part of our conversation you highlighted how Cartesian foundationalism has become the red headed step child for those who seek to attack foundationalism, and that you believe that it has much more nuance to it as an epistemological construct. I understand your point there.
I also understood your point about the “order of knowledge,” or not. I realize that you believe that no matter how someone wants to slice this that they must be committed, at some level, to both epistemological and metaphysical suppositions; the question then, which I think you are underscoring, is how “critical” is this person going to be about that (or honest). I thoroughly understand this rather basic point; what my issue is with this is, is that what you are presuming in your analysis is that certain types of Greek philosophy ought to serve as normative modes for how we construe reality; and I would suggest that it seems that this is simpliciter for you, but it is not for me. I know that you think this move on my part is philosophically naive, but if there are other modes that better account for a theological realism w/o relying on hellenistic philosophical suppositions; then don’t you think it possible to move forward w/o appealing to them? Do you think it possible to think “Christianly”, categorically, w/o first thinking “secularly?” Or do you think this is a naive false dichotomy.
I think the point on univocity is important only insofar as it recognizes that it is not man’s naked rational structures of thought that provide capacity for knowing God. Instead it recognizes the role of analogy, and how that fleshes out as mediated through Christ. Again, I realize that this will seem fideistic and/or naive to you, Mike. But what if someone rejects the premises of analytic theology; is this even possible to do from your perspective?
On pluralism. I wasn’t necessarily seeking to undermine your point, but I was reflecting upon how I interpreted your point. It seems to start from a place, methodologically, that I am not comfortable with; me. This is the whole point that Torrance is going after; the mediation of my knowledge of God does not start with my cognitive interpretations of God (apart from God-self in Christ), but in fact humanity finds its capacity to know God through participation in God’s life through Christ. This is the sphere wherein knowing God finds traction and movement. What you’re saying sounds like knowledge of God is grounded in my cognitive interpretations of reality prior to meeting God in Christ; in other words, it sounds like there is a whole set of epistemological categories in place that are spatial to humanity apart from Christ.
I am curious to hear how you might respond to Myk’s query too; if and when you have the chance.
Thank you for the dialogue and challenge, Mike; I appreciate all of this push-back 🙂 !
Bobby and Myk, in order to provide a timely response and for the sake of brevity given my time constraints, I will respond to your questions and thoughtful comments with several points knowing that my answers will have to be somewhat brief but hopefully sufficient to sustain the dialogue.
First, in regards to defining foundationalism. Let me quote Christian philosopher and epistemologist William Alston (Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 1992, p. 144):
“Foundationalism is a view concerning the structure of the system of justified belief possessed by a given individual.”
I think this generic definition betrays a common misconception among many theologians in talking about foundationalism, and that is foundationalism is a particular epistemological posture indicative of Enlightenment influences. As Alston explains in his brief article and I likewise have claimed, foundationalism is a fairly broad and pervasive perspective that enjoys a long history going back to the very beginning of philosophical reflection. The alternatives to foundationalism are coherentism, pragmatism, and skepticism. I think for someone to claim to be non-foundationalist necessarily involves one in one or some combination of these three alternatives. I would not claim any expertise in regards to Torrance’s epistemology as he was a prolific writer and most of my impressions of his theory of knowledge are based on my reading of his “Reality and Evangelical Theology,” but let me quote something that he says that informs my judgments on his realist and associated epistemological tendencies:
“If we cannot cut off knowledge of God either from the world of which he is the Creator or from ourselves who are creatures of this world, then theological concepts and statements can have meaning for us only when they are coordinated with empirical reality, even though within that coordination their reference, along with that of the contingent world, reaches out indefinitely beyond themselves to God the Creator and the ultimate source of all truth and rationality within the universe.” (p. 35)
This quote in conjunction with the overall thesis of the book suggests to me that Torrance’s version of realism both in regards to God and the world has significant overlap in terms of relating our knowledge of the world to our knowledge of God. By implication, he grounds both types of knowledge in such a way that is consistent with a broad foundationalist understanding of knowledge.
This surfaces a second point, and perhaps a point of confusion, in regards to realism and foundationalism. Myk, you made reference to “nominalism” and I am wondering if by my references to “realism” you are confusing the metaphysical question concerning the existence of universals in which “realism” is contrasted with “nominalism,” with my reference to “realism” which is specifically concerned with whether we have genuine cognitive access to the world as it is. These are related but two very distinct concerns. So when one talks about “critical realism” which involves the claim that our cognitive interactions with reality, i.e. the world, are in some sense mediated, I don’t think such a perspective necessarily denies realism per se (depending on your version of “critical realism” which has a wide variety of permutations) and has no direct reference to “foundationalism” in terms of how we structure our justified beliefs in regards to knowledge. I think where there is relevance is in respect to our “basic” beliefs and how they relate to the world and thus whether such beliefs are ‘properly basic,’ but I don’t think that “critical realism” simpliciter poses any problems for foundationalism in general, or at least I see no obvious reason why. In specific reference to Henry’s response to Torrance, I have not read Henry in this regard, but once again it is my observation that many theologians are not always careful in their comments about complex epistemological concepts like foundationalism and realism; hence, the confusion that often abounds in dialogues like this.
Third, Bobby, your statements about Greek philosophy require a response. My point is not that you need to embrace a particular Hellenistic philosophy like Platonism, Aristotelianism, etc. Rather, it is that the questions and categories of various Greek thinkers seem to be unavoidable in discussing metaphysical and epistemological claims, including ‘the order of knowing.’ I think it is incorrect to talk about ‘Greek philosophy,’ it is more accurate to talk about ‘Greek philosophies’ that cover a wide spectrum of epistemological and metaphysical positions. Moreover, as I stated before, whatever your starting point, be it metaphysical or epistemological, it necessarily involves both metaphysical and epistemological claims that bear relevance to these Greek thinkers. That is why, regardless of whether you hold to the Analytical or Continental approach, you will be in dialogue with Plato, Parmenides, Aristotle, etc. Even in engaging with the Church Fathers through to the Reformation, their works and ideas are influenced by Greek philosophy. Even Torrance’s preference for Einstein over Newton is laden with philosophical notions that can be traced back to Parmenides and Heraclitius. To affirm the law of non-contradiction is not to commit oneself to all of Aristotle’s epistemology.
Finally, Bobby you are correct in your interpretation of my point that our all of our knowledge of God involves the cognitive. You state that “humanity finds its capacity to know God through participation in God’s life through Christ” and my contention is that such “participation” necessarily involves the cognitive and thus relies on our metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions to inform our interpretation and theological conclusions. I think it is necessary to engage in thoughtful reflection on such suppositions to fully develop our theological understanding. I think that given the plurality of interpretations and theological conclusions even within the broad parameters of Orthodoxy, as evinced by our dialogue, strongly supports my claim.
In Grace and Truth,
Mike (aka “the former prof”)
Mike,
Thank you for your response. In regard to your specific point to me on “Greek Philosophy;” I agree that there is no escaping whatever “philosophies” may be culled from the past for Christian usage — whether Analytic or Continental. I think the question I am after, more, is to what end can we say that said philosophy serves or dis-serves the Gospel? From what I have observed with the Analytical approaches I have come across; there tends to be an inherent dualism between the knower and the one to be known (in our case, God). There is a methodological move here that seems to weight the philosophy more than the material that said philosophy purports to serve (like the tail wagging the dog). I think the Gospel is better served by theological approaches that are “theological” or even “Christological” in intention. So that while we certainly have metaphysics, ontology, epistemology as necessary structures within our dialogue about God; these points of contact with the “outside world” (so to speak) don’t take center stage in our theological articulations. Here is a post written by a guy named Troy that I responded to by comment years ago; it is apropos to this discussion, and so I am going to share it in full here:
My summary response to this post was this:
This is a great post, thank you Troy! So it’s really Christians pillaging the “Barbarians” for grammatical symbols which then are framed by sacred conceptual trajectory? But wouldn’t this then, in the end, truly be non-correlationist . . . and rather “positive,” internal to the Christian self-referential? In other words, if we “take” (like Constantinople did) grammar from one “context,” and “pretext” it within a Christian conceptuality, so that this becomes the new context . . . isn’t the disjunction between the original context, and the new so great that there really isn’t “correlation?”
I know this is long, but it gets something across about what I am after that w/o sharing this (or even just summarizing it) I don’t think I could get across any better.
Thanks, Mike.
It is always good to have a philosopher around to test and see what is good or not 😉 . I think your PhD work is definitely apropos to this issue, and thus your insights on how philosophy and theology (or Athens and Jerusalem) relate are always helpful and welcomed.
I am still thinking about your assessment of TF Torrance’s critical realism in your comment above. There is to be sure, for TFT, an order or taxis (as Myk has said in article I’ve shared here on the blog previously) to creation; and thus their is a contingent rational structure inherent to said creation. Yet, the point of contention between what you are saying and what TFT would be saying about that are distinct. I think TFT, while seeing a correlation between the two spheres (of Creator/creature), believed that contingency and thus creaturely independence poses a problem post-fall (an noetically). In other words, there is no “natural” transposition from the creaturely to the Creator inherent to humanity. Thus, along with Barth, this “gap,” so to speak, is not filled up by a created grace (or grace perfecting nature); but it is mediated by the God becoming man in Christ — thus “Reconciliation is Revelation.” The creaturely media are analogized through God-self in Christ. In this way the usual nature-grace dichotomy is given unity (vs. duality) in the homoosious person of Jesus Christ.
Clearly there are epistemological/ontological categories at play in what I just stated above; but these categories are taken up into the Gospel (methodologically) in a way that, I believe, provides space for the “basic” ideas of humanity to given theological, even christological telos. So these “human” machinations are no longer thought of from points of contact without Christ, coming to Christ; but they are given Christian specification and theological value as we as humans think from and out of the archetypical humanity of Christ.
I realize that this does not mitigate the fact that we think with metaphysical/epistemological categories; but I think that it gives the right weight and dogmatic location necessary for being able to say that we are doing Christian theology, and not simply theology.
Does that make sense?
Bobby, I am somewhat puzzled by your lenghty quote (which seems fairly sympathetic to my position) and more so with your brief response. I have read the whole post over a couple of times and I am still unclear what your point is. So to facilitate dialogue, let me ask you this: in your understanding of revelation, does God reveal himself in such a way that circumvents our cognitive processes? In other words, can we think about God without engaging in the philosophical categories of epistemology and metaphysics?
My answer is quite simply, no. Even if one was to grant the possibility of encountering God in such a way that did not require human cognitive categories, theological reflection upon such experiences would certainly seem to require such philosophical categories. You state:
“…these categories are taken up into the Gospel (methodologically) in a way that, I believe, provides space for the “basic” ideas of humanity to given theological, even christological telos. So these “human” machinations are no longer thought of from points of contact without Christ, coming to Christ; but they are given Christian specification and theological value as we as humans think from and out of the archetypical humanity of Christ.”
What exactly does this refer to? Can we think of Christ’s incarnation without involving common philosophical categories? I am curious what this would look like, especially given the historical discussions on the incarnation by the various Church fathers who did use such common categories. This goes to my point, that I cannot think of a single theologian who has not utilized such philosophical categories. Even Tertullian who is famous for his statement, ‘what does Jerusalem have to do with Athens?’ whose own thought was heavily invested in Stoic thought. Or Karl Barth, that while critical of “natural theology” is likewise influenced by Kierkegaard and German philosophy. So I remain suspicious of anyone who claims that their particular theological method is somehow capable of avoiding philosophical influence.
In regards to Torrance, I am quite open to the possibility of my misreading Torrance, but I will need to be convinced given what I have read of his. I fail to see how discussing ‘order’ in anyway mitigates what I think is pretty clear that Torrance affirms our knowledge of the created and contingent world does inform and correlate with our knowledge of God, even in our post-fall noetic situation.
In Grace and Truth,
Mike
Mike,
Before I answer your question let me clarify “my point;” so hopefully the fog of our blog discussion will be lifted a little. My point in referencing that longish post on “correlation,” is a simple one; it is to make a basic point about methodology in “Christian” theology. I don’t see you making this distinction; I see you supposing some sort of “public” theology grounded in an epistemology that leads to and from a natural theology or analogy of being approach. I think that post I quote illustrates the point that there is non-correlation, in the end, between the way natural man thinks about God and the way Christian theologians think about God; I don’t see you making this distinction, and so I lifted this post I quoted at length to highlight that. And I wanted to highlight this point, in the context of our discussion here to broaden our discussion a bit; to broaden it to what it is that really distinguishes what you’re saying versus what I am saying. And this directly relates to your understanding and reading of TFT (and thus gets us back to the initial idea of this post).
You have written:
I fail to see how discussing ‘order’ in anyway mitigates what I think is pretty clear that Torrance affirms our knowledge of the created and contingent world does inform and correlate with our knowledge of God, even in our post-fall noetic situation.
You make it sound like Torrance affirms a classic understanding of the analogy of being or natural theology, but he doesn’t. Two books that speak to this most clearly from TFT are: Ground and Grammar of Theology & Theological Science. But since I don’t have either of these at hand I will do the next best thing and quote at length from one of TFT’s best readers, Elmer Colyer. I am quoting from a section in his book on TFT that is discussing Torrance’s “Reformulated ‘Natural Theology’”. I wish I could quote the whole section (just a few pages, but I won’t). Here we go:
[W]hat we find in Torrance’s work is not a traditional natural theology as a praeambula fidei (preamble to faith) in which we attempt to “prove” God’s existence or develop an understanding of God’s essential attributes on the basis of an independent or autonomous movement of thought from the created order to God the Creator apart from special revelation. Torrance rejects any notion of an independent natural theology as a movement of thought and an autonomous rational structure developed on the basis of nature alone, abstracted from God’s actual self-revelation in Jesus Christ.
. . . Torrance finds traditional natural theology further undermined by Karl Barth’s pointed criticism of it on the basis of the actual content of our knowledge of God as it arises out of God’s self-revelation and self-communication in Jesus Christ, together with the rigorous scientific knowledge, as noted in the opening section of chapter four. If the God we know in Jesus Christ is really Trinitarian, how can there be an independent natural theology that terminates, not on the being of the triune God, but on some being of God in general? This splits knowledge of God into two parts: a natural knowledge of the one God and a revealed knowledge of the triune God.
. . . Torrance argues . . . theological science cannot be conceptually or methodologically constricted by an epistemology and an epistemological structure developed independent of God’s actual self-revelation and self-communication. Rather than operate with two conceptual systems and their respective epistemologies (general revelation/natural theology and special revelation/positive theology), Torrance believes that theological science has to operate with one coherent and integrated framework of theological understanding. Therefore, a reformulated natural theology has to give up it independent status and find its place within revealed theology where it is “developed as a complex of rational structures arising in our actual knowledge of God.” There natural theology “becomes ‘natural’ in a new way, natural to its proper object, God in self-revealing interaction with us in space and time. . . .[Elmer M. Colyer, “How To Read T. F. Torrance: Understanding His Trinitarian & Scientific Theology,” 194, 198-99]
I highlight this because I think it is significant to place TF Torrance in his proper context. He followed Karl Barth’s re-formed analogi fidei (analogy of faith), and not an analogy of being, or a traditional ‘natural theology’. I think this is important to establish because it provides a context for understanding why Torrance will not fit into a traditional foundationalist model; thus Myk’s suggestion that we should, at most, see Torrance as a ‘soft foundationalist’. I say this because it is quickly obvious that Torrance is not classical or traditional in his approach to epistemology. He does not see a “natural” correlation between contingent reality and non-contingent. He did believe that creation has its own created independence, but this alone (even given its rational structuring) could not yield for us a normative epistemological framework through which we can know God; only Jesus revealed can do that. Further, for Torrance Jesus’ life and history (including the nation of Israel as his pre-history) represents what he called a Novum; or something for which there is no analogy in this world. Thus the consequence of this is that this world offers no “foundations” wherein we can begin to know God from, apart from his own self-interpreting Word to us in Christ. Again, this is why, theologically, Torrance would not fit into a trad foundationalist understanding; as you have him.
As far as answering your question on our capacity to think about God w/o metaphysics or epistemology etc. My concern hasn’t been as much with whether or not we can or cannot do theology w/o these categories of philosophy; but instead my concern is more with how these are correlated (or non-correlated) in a way that is ‘Christian’, in principle and method. Along with Torrance, I do not believe that there is a natural correlation between our ‘god-thoughts’ and ‘God’s-thoughts’ without his self-revelation in Christ. I am under the impression that you believe there is a universal correlation between our thoughts (philosophy) about godness, and the God revealed in Jesus Christ; and this is what I am rejecting, along with Torrance. So if Torrance counts as a foundationalist he does so in a way that starts with an epistemology that thinks from a center in God’s life in Christ. This seems different to me than what a regular foundationalist epistemology would look like. It seems to me that a regular foundationalist model would start methodologically (theo-logically) under the rubric provided by a traditional natural theology approach. That’s why I wanted to broaden this issue out a little further.
I wonder if this has helped clarify, or muddied the water further? No matter, I’m going to bed; night, Mike.
Indeed, Grace and Truth,
Bobby